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Post by noggy on Jan 1, 2018 7:24:57 GMT -6
Geir (noggy), The six markers were not found on the ridge known as the South Skirmish Line; they were found on Cemetery Ridge. They were removed when the National Cemetery and the visitors center and parking lot were built. I first read about them in the Richard Fox book on archaeology and I discuss them in some detail in my Strategy book. Chances are all six were E Company (Gray Horse Troop) men killed either when the ridge was overrun or when Custer and Smith moved up the ridge toward Last Stand Hill. Nothing else makes sense as all the HQ personnel were accounted for and F Company had been sent into the basin area. I do not have the data in front of me, so my memory may be a little faulty, but with those in Deep Ravine, Smith on Last Stand Hill, and these six on Cemetery Ridge, that would mean there were two other E Company men remaining... and they were, in all likelihood, two of the nine men found on the South Skirmish Line. Wishing you a very Happy New Year, Fred. Fred, Thank you so much for the answer. It is truly appreciated. I dig a good bit in older threads and what I could not make sense of was claims about these markers never being on any maps or pictures, yet if I`m not mistaken the visitor center was built in the 50s. That sounded strange to me. And in the New Year`s haze I wrote Participants but meant of course Strategy. Soldiers starting to be hit on Cemetery Ridge after the trip to Ford D, maybe in some rearguard action, makes a lot of sense to me. I actually have the Fox book back home, but have not yet got to it due to a hefty reading queue. Guess I may jump straight to the chapter "The Cemetery Ridge Episode" even if that`s a no no. Once again, thank you.
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Post by fred on Jan 1, 2018 9:32:44 GMT -6
I dig a good bit in older threads and what I could not make sense of was claims about these markers never being on any maps or pictures, yet if I`m not mistaken the visitor center was built in the 50s. That sounded strange to me. And in the New Year`s haze I wrote Participants but meant of course Strategy. Soldiers starting to be hit on Cemetery Ridge after the trip to Ford D, maybe in some rearguard action, makes a lot of sense to me. I actually have the Fox book back home, but have not yet got to it due to a hefty reading queue. Guess I may jump straight to the chapter "The Cemetery Ridge Episode" even if that`s a no no. Geir, First off, you are very welcome indeed. Next... the visitors center was built some time in the 1950s, so you are correct about that, but the six markers were removed before that, though when exactly I do not know. My feelings about the move to Cemetery Ridge are that Custer did so under mounting pressure, though not severe enough to be of consequence. If it was, there would have been casualties and there were none, except for the slower-moving Mark Kellogg. Also, if Custer were under severe pressure he would have never sent Yates into the basin area. The pressure was building, but it was building behind Custer, not in front. In other words, not in his front as he approached Ford D. That approach was another surprise for the Indians, a surprise met with additional fury, but only by a small element. That element grew rapidly, however. Remember, these warriors were protecting the families and the approach of the troops was the most serious threat the Indians faced all the way up to that point. So their response to the threat would have been furious... and growing. It took a few minutes for Custer to go from Ford D to Cemetery Ridge and we have Indian accounts through John Stands In Timber, of Custer residing on Cemetery Ridge for a half-hour. I believe that is over-stated by quite a bit-- it was probably a lot closer to 20 minutes than 30 minutes. Regardless, it was enough time for the Indians to gather overwhelming strength to Custer's west and north and to cut off his eastern escape route east of Last Stand Hill. Custer's move from Cemetery Ridge to Last Stand Hill was the first and only time he was forced anywhere. Happy New Year, Geir. I wish you all the best for 2018. And thanks for helping to keep these boards alive and vibrant. Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by noggy on Jan 1, 2018 11:02:50 GMT -6
I dig a good bit in older threads and what I could not make sense of was claims about these markers never being on any maps or pictures, yet if I`m not mistaken the visitor center was built in the 50s. That sounded strange to me. And in the New Year`s haze I wrote Participants but meant of course Strategy. Soldiers starting to be hit on Cemetery Ridge after the trip to Ford D, maybe in some rearguard action, makes a lot of sense to me. I actually have the Fox book back home, but have not yet got to it due to a hefty reading queue. Guess I may jump straight to the chapter "The Cemetery Ridge Episode" even if that`s a no no. Geir, First off, you are very welcome indeed. Next... the visitors center was built some time in the 1950s, so you are correct about that, but the six markers were removed before that, though when exactly I do not know. My feelings about the move to Cemetery Ridge are that Custer did so under mounting pressure, though not severe enough to be of consequence. If it was, there would have been casualties and there were none, except for the slower-moving Mark Kellogg. Also, if Custer were under severe pressure he would have never sent Yates into the basin area. The pressure was building, but it was building behind Custer, not in front. In other words, not in his front as he approached Ford D. That approach was another surprise for the Indians, a surprise met with additional fury, but only by a small element. That element grew rapidly, however. Remember, these warriors were protecting the families and the approach of the troops was the most serious threat the Indians faced all the way up to that point. So their response to the threat would have been furious... and growing. It took a few minutes for Custer to go from Ford D to Cemetery Ridge and we have Indian accounts through John Stands In Timber, of Custer residing on Cemetery Ridge for a half-hour. I believe that is over-stated by quite a bit-- it was probably a lot closer to 20 minutes than 30 minutes. Regardless, it was enough time for the Indians to gather overwhelming strength to Custer's west and north and to cut off his eastern escape route east of Last Stand Hill. Custer's move from Cemetery Ridge to Last Stand Hill was the first and only time he was forced anywhere. Happy New Year, Geir. I wish you all the best for 2018. And thanks for helping to keep these boards alive and vibrant. Very best wishes, Fred. Aha, that makes way more sense than how I first interpreted things. I found the idea of them somehow being there kind of unnoticed until the 50s very X-Files like I find a lot of what happens after turning back from Ford D to the last man is killed challenging, at least beyond the broader strokes , and there is an abundance of plausible an implausible theories to go through. To me, at least, small things like the markers on Cemetery Ridge and such are pieces of a puzzle, and helps my understanding of things immensely. "The more you know!" as the announcement goes. And yes; I agree with Cemetery Ridge being the place his command really came under heavy and deadly pressure. Would have been more KIAs than the poor guy riding a mule by that time if not. I`m a Curious George, so I do my best to only ask when really clueless. Too much vibration isn`t good for anyone! But I really enjoy being here and as long as I don`t come off as a moron I`ll keep it up By mistake I actually first signed up on the other board thinking it was this (I had done my homework through years of lurking and reading and knew this was were I should join), but made a hasty and not to graceful retreat to where I intended to be. Live and learn! And again; I really appreciate you taking the time to answer my ramblings and hope 2018 will be a good and year for you and yours, Fred All the best, Geir
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Post by brenda56 on Jan 1, 2018 13:56:07 GMT -6
Is it not possible that when the ford d location was reconnoitred that not all of those with Custer had to proceed from cemetery to the river for that purpose ? Those who were left at the cemetery location may indeed have been observed in that position for twenty minutes or so. Whilst the majority were left at cemetery let's say several went to the river, had a look around and then returned to the cemetery location. That could account for twenty minutes. After and all Custer was known to have that ability to split his forces, not unlike the looksee at ford B whilst Keogh headed towards Calhoun.
Apart from the unnecessary need to take all on a round trip from cemetery to the river and back those who were left at the cemetery could also have acted as a marker, line of sight/indicator for Keogh.
In other words in the latter stages Custer kept his split forces, in a strange way, united either by sight or maybe sound.
Problem was the "bogged down" Keogh and the "nice to have but not necessary" Benteen were a tad "sidetracked".
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Post by fred on Jan 2, 2018 9:15:24 GMT -6
I think you all may be interested in this article. It explains a lot. Go to page 29... GG 2016 Workcopy.pdf (1.04 MB) Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by noggy on Jan 2, 2018 9:49:24 GMT -6
noggy & Fred, The idea having Custer call a halt and sit on his horse for 30 minutes while the maelstrom of moving bodies encircle the pivot point of cavalry aggression, is difficult to entertain, knowing the psychology of the 7th Cavalry commander, as Fred Wagner certainly does, should give pause to anyone suggesting it was more than 20 minutes. In the swirling heat of battle (if I may be permitted an old cliche) a minute would seen like an hour.... Regards, Pequod (Robb) Although I`m not impressed by GAC during this day, even I`d never have thought he would organized a picnic or something on CR For all we know, he was hit around Ford D and his officers made the halt, and a halt is just a stop of movement in a direction. Lots of things can be done/happen during it.
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Post by montrose on Jan 21, 2018 8:12:18 GMT -6
Geir,
I remain open minded on the actions of E Company on the north end of Battle Ridge.
I believe they had a horse holder line on Cemetery Ride, with a dismounted skirmish line deployed. The suicide boys mounted charge hit the horse holders. After this there are several viable options on how they got to the ravine. They could have gone to LSH and then moved from there to the ravine. Or they could have gone directly without going to LSH.
I think Fred believes they did go to LSH. Body placement and archeology is inconclusive, supports either option.
The interesting part for me, is who gave the order to go to the ravine. If they were on LSH, order most likely came from regiment, LTC Custer or senior survivor. If they never were there, order likely came from company leadership. With Smith wounded on LSH, this would be either green as grass 2LT, or the first sergeant. My belief here is the 1SG. LSH is a lousy place to defend, the ravine area offers more cover and concealment.
E Company acted as a collective entity, under leadership until the very end.
Again, any discussion on the north end of battle ridge involves varying degrees of speculation.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by dave on Jan 21, 2018 10:43:21 GMT -6
montrose It is great to have you back posting again as you have been missed. I had not thought that the action of seeking cover in the deep ravine as an organized act but had imagined the soldiers saw one move and the others followed. Would they have not moved at the end of the defense of LSH when it was every man for himself? Regards Dave
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Post by noggy on Jan 22, 2018 5:02:51 GMT -6
Geir, I remain open minded on the actions of E Company on the north end of Battle Ridge. I believe they had a horse holder line on Cemetery Ride, with a dismounted skirmish line deployed. The suicide boys mounted charge hit the horse holders. After this there are several viable options on how they got to the ravine. They could have gone to LSH and then moved from there to the ravine. Or they could have gone directly without going to LSH. I think Fred believes they did go to LSH. Body placement and archeology is inconclusive, supports either option. The interesting part for me, is who gave the order to go to the ravine. If they were on LSH, order most likely came from regiment, LTC Custer or senior survivor. If they never were there, order likely came from company leadership. With Smith wounded on LSH, this would be either green as grass 2LT, or the first sergeant. My belief here is the 1SG. LSH is a lousy place to defend, the ravine area offers more cover and concealment. E Company acted as a collective entity, under leadership until the very end. Again, any discussion on the north end of battle ridge involves varying degrees of speculation. Respectfully, William Great post and I agree with everything. I too believe they went to LSH and from there moved on out towards the end of the fighting. The reason for it and who gave the order is like you say bound to stir up a fair amount of speculation, which I`m fine with. I can "buy" a lot of theories regarding LBH (minus the North-South thing, I believe we agree there from your previous posts), and in this part of the battle I feel one can make several good cases for what happened (pretty sure this isn`t the correct use of the term). All the best, Geir
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Post by wild on Jan 23, 2018 15:24:12 GMT -6
There was no SSL .There were no tactical deployments because there was no system to control such deployments. The terrain was irrelevant because the disparity in numbers rendered all defensive positions null and void.Horses and single shot carbines reduced defensive capibilities to baby with candy status . I'll make one exception for terrain and deployment and that is LSH . Here Custer got to choose the ground on which he would be butchered. With apologies to all my old friends . Richard
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Post by wild on Jan 23, 2018 15:35:34 GMT -6
Further Supposing our hero ever got to ford D and was retreating South. What was his intention , where was he headed? I mean this is his final throw of the dice. Surely it is not to dismount his 80 men on Lsh ?
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Post by edavids on Jan 23, 2018 16:16:37 GMT -6
There was no SSL .There were no tactical deployments because there was no system to control such deployments. The terrain was irrelevant because the disparity in numbers rendered all defensive positions null and void.Horses and single shot carbines reduced defensive capibilities to baby with candy status . I'll make one exception for terrain and deployment and that is LSH . Here Custer got to choose the ground on which he would be butchered. With apologies to all my old friends . Richard [ Since when did LTC Custer have a problem deploying his men our of control/support range on that day? 😉. Good to see you posting again. Best, David
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Post by herosrest on Jan 23, 2018 16:37:43 GMT -6
The battlefield markers were surveyed shortly after being placed and were all accounted for. Montana, Custer Battlefield, U.S. Geological Survey ; R.B. Marshall, topographer, surveyed in 1891 Document record link.cpl.org/portal/Montana-Custer-Battlefield-U.S.-Geological/Cw-0MOlPChg/ Map in detail, online - www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/topo/montana/txu-pclmaps-topo-mt-custer_battlefield-1891.jpgI haven't the time to root about digging up stuff on Marshal ut he was an important guy. link He was meticulous in his work. He made West coast America what it became through his Marshall Plan. Very important history. He was 'the' Big Beaver'. If you ever become bored, really , really bored, or suicidal, follow the link to the US geo portal, open the map and expand it and count the markers. Great fun.
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Post by herosrest on Jan 24, 2018 6:18:13 GMT -6
Further Supposing our hero ever got to ford D and was retreating South. What was his intention , where was he headed? I mean this is his final throw of the dice. Surely it is not to dismount his 80 men on Lsh ? If, a significant element of the regiment (a battalion or company) went at the western fords then it occurred early during the advance east of the river. We know from Reno himself and within weeks afterwards that Yates and Keogh went with the advance In this model, as a battalion were checked or halted on the MTC/North MTC and Greasy Grass Hill terrain, the right wing's second battalion element pressed on urgently for the western crossings and halted for some reason. The model and its scenario become realistic with this timing and eschews the Gray proposition of a feinting split wing. Two Eagles does not a coherent plan of attack, justify. In reality he supports the idea of an early advance on the western fords. The difficulty which a majority of the politically incorrect authors have with this model is the implication that 7th Cavalry were repeating the tactics employed at Washita to strike the camp from four directions with the four manoeuvre elements (battalions).
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 24, 2018 6:25:57 GMT -6
Nice job and welcome Hunter. I have a tendency to believe more went north toward the Ford D area than GAC is given credit for, but I agree that E was deployed, pretty much as you say.
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