Jutland Anniversary

[Dark Cloud]

Didn't know where to put this. Merkel can move, obviously. Today and tomorrow are the 92nd anniversary of the Battle of Jutland, an event of no relevance whatever to the Little Bighorn, being actually important, huge, and history making in a war we hadn't entered yet. Although, it was so assiduously misstudied by the naval hussars (the sort who can get away with using 'aye') it was later referred to at the Naval Academy as a major defeat of the United States Navy.

There is, however, one shared bit: the media, public, and initial history got it all wrong. It seems the posturing, brave, rather dim but photogenic David Beatty - who lost the most ships and men and was clearly defeated by an inferior German force twice, and who misled his commander (with the help of his Communications Guy, Ralph Seymour) and failed to bring the most powerful ships into battle till too late - was thought the courageous underling who was held back by the dottering, wonkish, and amazingly competent and unflappable Jellicoe. Beatty bears many similarities to Custer. Not all.

Archaeology, late admissions, released files, and enemy reports prove pretty much the opposite. To this day, though, the Beatty fanboys - and they prance about as surely as Custer's for much the same reasons - cannot admit it. If Beatty had been in charge, Churchill's observation about Jellicoe might easily have become fact. Jellicoe, said Churchill, was the only man on either side who could lose the entire war in an afternoon.

Robert Massie's Dreadnought and Castles of Steel are recommended reading, by the by. The second covers the naval battles of the war well. In many strategic and surprising ways I was reminded of the Indian Wars.

[conz]

Aye, they make several wonderful wargames of the Jutland naval battle, both operational and tactical. I grew up playing them on my mother's dining room floor (it was never carpeted <g>).

And good implication that the Navy has hussar-types just like the Army does. Of course, the Air Forces of any nation are overabundant in this category of Warrior. <g>

Summary by American Admiral Nimitz and official USNA historian Potter, studied at West Point:

"The third phase, the main fleet action, lasted from 6pm until darkness at approx. 9:15. Jellicoe, as he waited for Beatty to rejoin, urgently needed reliable information on the location of the German fleet. Here he was ill-served by his subordinates, especially Beatty, who sent few and inadequate reports. Rather than risk missing the Germans altogether or permitting them a free run back to Germany, Jellicoe delayed his deployment into battle line until the last possible moment.

"Jutland was the last surface action fought between lines of battleships in daylight. It revealed the off-balance development of naval technology, in which speed and long-range fire had outstripped the commander's means of observation or controlling his own forces. In these circumstances, tactical doctrine for steam surface navies never reached maturity."


Several neat parallels to our favorite subject here, although I don't know if it is useful to our studies:
- Command decisions in the atmosphere of lack of information
- Failure of disparate parts of a command to communicate
- Questions of various leader's command responsibilities to make the proper tactical/deployment decisions
- Art of War in transition due to rapidly evolving technology (lethality, range, and communications) and how leaders deal with that on the fly...

Clair

[Dark Cloud]

Apparantly, a defeat of the Army as well.

"It revealed the off-balance development of naval technology, in which speed and long-range fire had outstripped the commander's means of observation or controlling his own forces. In these circumstances, tactical doctrine for steam surface navies never reached maturity." That isn't really true unless Beatty is involved. The technology existed. Everyone else, especially the Germans, performed detailed and intricate manuevers under fire using the same standards.

Beatty lost 40% of his battlecruisers right off the bat when they should not have been vulnerable at all. Of the three battleship elements - speed, armor, guns - that had to be balanced to construct the battlecruiser, they kept big guns and less armor to make speed. The Germans kept armor and had smaller guns with decidedly lesser range. (Turned out that British BC's could take four or five large hits before exploding; the Germans could take well over 20 and return to port, save one)

Beatty charged nearly straight at his enemy and only opened fire after the Germans had - meaning he'd lost all advantage to his ships and walked into every advantage of the Germans'.

In the next war, the Hood lost to the Bismark for the same reasons: same guns and speed but less armor to compensate for inferior engines.

The technology of naval communication - while primitive - worked unless, as Ralph Seymour did - you fail to take down one set of flag orders before hauling up another, a mistake that kept five huge and fast battleships out of the initial battle. Or, misread your signal book. Or fail to do your job by any accurate description. He'd done it all before under Beatty at Dogger Banks, but was kept on. He eventually killed himself after the war when his role was evident, but only after Beatty started to blame him for his own numerous errors.

[conz]

Cast Reno in the role of Beatty...the commander's "advance guard." Obviously it is one of the most difficult responsibilities/missions to pull off well. Most commanders are satisfied with "adequate" conduct of their advance guard...just "find the enemy, report what he is doing, and don't get too hurt."

Reno's mission, like Beatty's, first was to bring the enemy to battle. The fear was that the enemy would simply slip away, with no damage done. So the first thing an advance guard does in such a situation is to fix (or draw) them into a fight.

Having brought on the fight, Reno rather had the worst of it, until Benteen and Custer showed up, much like the British battleships showing up to cause the German battlecruisers to back off.

The main difference, at this point, is that Beatty was a much better officer than Reno, and not only conducted his contact with skill, but also kept his head and maintained contact with the enemy, continuing to assist the main force. Here the situations diverge, but the fact that Beatty continued to perform his mission, when Reno did not, is the learning/judgment point.

Clair

[Dark Cloud]

1. First, Reno was not the advance guard. He was never, in fact, in advance of Custer previous to his attack order. As Custer turned north, Reno was physically in advance of nothing; as Custer could have had no clue what to do till too later, if then. From the other perspective, Reno was temporally in advance of nothing.

2. Reno is not Beatty even if you can reduce this to childish role playing. If you had to, Reno would be Beatty's destroyers or light cruisers. Beatty would be Custer, and Jellicoe would be Terry.

3. Reno's orders, totally unlike Beatty's mission, was simply to bring the enemy to battle and/or attack, depending which version is believed. Beatty's was to lure the Germans north to the Grand Fleet after he ran into the entire High Seas Fleet. He did this because he had no choice but was running for his life.

3. "So the first thing an advance guard does in such a situation is to fix (or draw) them into a fight." And Reno did. "Fixing" a naval unit is notional and in any case, Beatty did not.

4. "Having brought on the fight, Reno rather had the worst of it, until Benteen and Custer showed up, much like the British battleships showing up to cause the German battlecruisers to back off." You play fast and loose with the facts again.

First, Reno hadn't 'brought on the fight', Custer had by ordering Reno in. I understand the thrill of military terminology, but don't leave the impression Reno brought on the fight at all, much less at the time and place he did. Say, rather, Reno followed his orders.

Second, Custer never showed up and failed to support. Whatever action Custer participated in later happened far too late to support the charge or even the defense in the timber, and was a separate action altogether.

Third, the German battlecruisers didn't back off, at all or ever, and in any case discovered the Grand Fleet after Scheer had being further away. The German battleships - Beatty having fallen for a trap in following Hipper - were already involved with the Grand Fleet, were totally surprised, and under fire.

5. "The main difference, at this point, is that Beatty was a much better officer than Reno, and not only conducted his contact with skill, but also kept his head and maintained contact with the enemy, continuing to assist the main force. Here the situations diverge, but the fact that Beatty continued to perform his mission, when Reno did not, is the learning/judgment point." Incorrect in nearly all particulars.

Beatty had failed to utilize his forces as designed, had fallen into a trap bovine like the Sioux's, had lost 40% of his force and thousands of men and millions of pounds the British could not easily replace, and this almost immediately, and had no choice but to stay in contact with the enemy because they were after him. He did not 'assist' the main force but misinformed it when he made contact at all (Jellicoe actually didn't learn of Beatty's losses till the next day) and well may have prevented a huge British victory.

And, the situations had diverged long before if they were alike at all. Given that Britain' strategic requirements were far higher than Germany's, they could win these battles but still lose the war if they didn't have control of the seas.

In greatly reduced form, that's something Terry up to Sherman had to have in the back of their minds, because it was their job. There were only, -ish, about 3k soldiers in a huge are vaguely available for the Sioux War pre-June 1876. If somebody did something stupid and rash and lost, oh, a thousand of them, the already tenuous protection afforded by the Army to the citizens would be shredded. It was therefore the responsibility of commanders to understand that winning dramatic victories at the expense of doing their overall job was contrary to the interests of government and nation.

[wild]

The German High Seas fleet never put to sea again and spent the remainder of the war snookered in port.That is not a British defeat.And Churchill's remark is a bit rich coming from a man who stranded a British army on the beaches of Galliopi.