|
Post by fred on Nov 30, 2007 21:15:45 GMT -6
Ask, bc, and ye shall receive! After leaving the Keogh battalion, Custer and Yates moved further north, probably below the military crest of Battle Ridge. Mitch Boyer knew the country and if Custer was to put a halt to the fleeing of Indian families he would need to cross the Little Big Horn somewhere north of where the families were headed or were congregating. This would be known as Ford D. [This picture was taken from the northern-most side of Last Stand/Custer Hill. There is a good possibility the Custer/Yates column moved along the ravine on the right side of the photo toward a crossing somewhere off in the distance. Unfortunately, whatever crossing was there is obscured today by buildings, Interstate, service roads, ramps, railroad tracks, and constant flooding.]Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Nov 30, 2007 21:22:13 GMT -6
The question now is, what happened at and after this little foray?
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by gocav76 on Dec 1, 2007 6:18:09 GMT -6
Fred, A terrain question for you. If Custer went to Ford D--upon his return towards Last Stand Hill--where in the posted photo would he have to be in order to see Keogh's position ?
|
|
|
Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 6:42:06 GMT -6
gocav76—
You cannot see the Keogh position from this picture, even if you stood there and turned in any direction. This picture is taken below the monument, right near the northern corner of the fence around those markers. The Keogh Sector (as it is called) would be off the photographers left shoulder, but over a hump in the hill and down toward the left. In 1876, the hilltop was a bit higher I believe (though flat). They leveled it when the monument was erected. I sent you the picture and it gives you a good illustration.
(This is one of the most fascinating pictures of all and it surprised the whole bunch of us when we stood there trying to see Custer Hill. It explained a lot and it is one of the reasons why these pictures mean so much in understanding what took place. It is also why I do not believe some of Conz' theory in his 13-points on the new threads.)
It is hard to believe you couldn't see into this sector from LS Hill, but Custer was on the other side of that hill and downslope a bit. So I am sure you could hear all the firing, but who knew what was actually taking place there?
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by gocav76 on Dec 1, 2007 6:45:50 GMT -6
Fred, I'm working on my theory. From where they found Custer's body--could Keogh's position be seen?
|
|
|
Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 6:50:43 GMT -6
Larry--
I'm sorry; I cannot get that picture to post. It's one of those with a dupe number. It may be on the I Company thread. I'm going to look. To answer your question, no, it could not be seen. You would have had to cross the hilltop and started down the ridgeline toward the low ground.
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by gocav76 on Dec 1, 2007 6:56:04 GMT -6
Fred, Thanks! So much for my theory! As I have never been to the battlefield I must rely on you and your great pics. I'll check my Post Office today for the photo disc, as it will no doubt be a big help to me. Larry
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Dec 1, 2007 7:06:05 GMT -6
Fred,
If Keogh was not in the swale all along, but on the ridge, could he be seen from Custer's position? From other photos, I'd assume he could ...
You mention hearing the firing. That, I realise, might mask other sounds; but in terms of sheer distance, would you say that bugle calls from Keogh's final position could be heard at Custer's? And vice versa?
(A sudden thought re the famous "signal" volleys. If they were indeed a distress signal, and not simply a way of fending off Indians ... could they have been a signal from Keogh to Custer, rather than from Custer to Benteen/Reno? On the assumption that the Ford D trip did happen, it might make sense that Keogh would attempt to recall Custer once things started to hot up ...)
|
|
|
Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 8:23:18 GMT -6
If Keogh was not in the swale all along, but on the ridge, could he be seen from Custer's position? From other photos, I'd assume he could ... You mention hearing the firing. That, I realise, might mask other sounds; but in terms of sheer distance, would you say that bugle calls from Keogh's final position could be heard at Custer's? And vice versa? (A sudden thought re the famous "signal" volleys. If they were indeed a distress signal, and not simply a way of fending off Indians ... could they have been a signal from Keogh to Custer, rather than from Custer to Benteen/Reno? On the assumption that the Ford D trip did happen, it might make sense that Keogh would attempt to recall Custer once things started to hot up ...) Elisabeth-- When we were there in June, two of the fellows could not figure out the Keogh business. Actually, I think it extends to a lot more than two, but.... We walked this area-- the Keogh Sector (the trail was open), all along Battle Ridge from the monument to Calhoun Hill and beyond. As we did so, we game-played the battle and I must say it works out very nicely. The Keogh business is one of the most perplexing, but it is solvable... at least I believe it is. Part of my ideas about this battle stem from the Fox work. I believe Custer did move toward Ford D with the intention of containing the so-called refugees. Again, remember, my theory relies of the fact that I believe none of Custer's column was under heavy pressure from the Indians. Of course, this all goes back to even earlier than Ford B, but I'm getting off track. As we walked Battle Ridge, we game played. Everyone agreed that Keogh sent Harrington into Calhoun Coulee to relieve the pressure they were beginning to feel from encroaching Indians firing arrows in the air and hitting troops and horses from up above. There is a perfect spot on Battle Ridge, not far from where Calhoun was entrenched, where Keogh could have observed both Calhoun's position and Harrington's move into the coulee. We even photographed it. Now, without getting into specifics here (I'll save that for those new threads if and when the occasion arises) I will simply say, this was a perfect spot for Keogh to over-view his entire position and command. Why wouldn't a commander have been in this exact location? My logic now makes me believe his command (specifically, Company I) was not too far away. That probably means somewhere along the military crest of the ridge, maybe a tad bit below, with horse-holders sequestered in a very nice, very convenient swale area below where Calhoun and Harrington would have had their horses. As the battle unfolded, it is my belief that Keogh was forced ever lower down the ridge, diagonally northeast into where the markers are generally placed. This could have easily happened by swarming Indians coming up Calhoun Coulee, Finley Ridge, and up and over Calhoun Hill. They would have also had pressure from Indians coming up the southern fork of Deep Ravine (these Indians could have been seen by Custer/Yates and could have drawn some of those volleys, especially if the Crazy Horse contingent were among them [not because it was Crazy Horse, but because his entourage would have been rather large]). The troops would also have had pressure from the east: it would have been a turkey-shoot from that direction. So where do men go when they have this kind of pressure? The same place E Company men sought protection: the ravines. And so on. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by shan on Dec 1, 2007 9:51:14 GMT -6
Given that there seems to have been a general acceptance of a move to ford D over the last year or so, { I remain doubtful myself, } I have a couple of questions regarding such a move, which, not being a military man, are primarily aimed at those that might be.
If we assume that as he moved across the battlefield, Custer had had ample time, and enough smoke and dust free views of the noncombatants fleeing North and West, to see just how big a task it would be to attempt to round them up, especially given how many of them there were.
As we all know, there are a lot of figures bandied about, but even if we take the lower end of estimates for the number of warriors as being 1700, this would mean there must have been at least 5,000/6,000 non-coms, surely even he must have thought that it was highly unlikely he could hope to round up and contain such a large number of people with the small force he had with him, which would be what, about eighty odd men. Again one would assume that he would have known that there would be a number of warriors amongst them, family men who didn't want to leave their loved ones, older warriors past taking part in the rough and tumble of the early part of the battle, men who would fight fiercely to defend their kith and kin. And lastly, only a fool would imagine that any number of warriors who were close enough, wouldn't take the opportunity break off what they were doing in order to turn and attack him. Also, by this time he must have been well aware that Reno had failed to get into the village and was unlikely to do so for some time yet, so why, having already divided up his command, was he now going to stretch it once again, stretch it as happened, to breaking point?
As many on this board have pointed out, Custer was something of a maverick when it came to military tactics, but would another commander have acted as he did, would your average commander have even considered going to ford D?
Maybe I'm wrong, but a far as I can remember, the only real source for this ford D story is the one that comes from John Stands in Timber. Now I tend to lean towards the Indian side of things, and as a result want to believe all their stories and everything they have to say, but in spite of a very different cultural outlook, they were not so different to anyone else when it came to the basic needs and fears we all have, in other words not so very different to the white folks when it came to memory slips, or simply wanting to seek a bit of attention.
It almost goes without saying that we all like to cherry pick the accounts that suit our own particular theories, I know I do it myself, but this ford D one seems to have been pounced upon by those that have a need to have the battle last longer than it actually did. It is also noticable that it sometimes quoted as if it were a fact by some that tend to rubbish most other Indian evidence.
As a non military man, much that Custer did that day seems contrary to common sense, and for me, non seems more so than attempting to split and stretch your command beyond what its capable of, and for what? To round up a herd of frightened people who outnumber you more than 50 to 1.
If, and for me its a big if, if there was any movement towards ford D, then might it have been made by a small detail that could check whether it was feasible to cross there, whilst Custer moved to the cemetery area to await their report.
Shan
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Dec 1, 2007 9:58:00 GMT -6
Thanks, Fred. That's a gorgeous photo -- and yes, indeed, exactly the position any sensible commander would have chosen.
From your experience of the ground, though ... did it deny him a view to the east? Any risk that he could have overlooked an encirclement from there, if (as is currently discounted, but isn't totally impossible) Crazy Horse came via Ford D and behind LSH?
Re "ravines": it's interesting how heavily those figure in the early newspaper accounts. Has to mean something. I guess they would seem like cover ... As they did for Reno's men, come to think of it, the only difference being that they were cutbanks rather than ravines. Odd, though; Co. I was mostly shot down in the open swale. Heading for the ravine, do you think? Or do you have another theory?
|
|
|
Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 13:10:33 GMT -6
Shan— First of all, I have to apologize. I have constantly used the term "round up" and it is not what I mean. I believe Custer wanted to threaten or attack from the absolute lower end of the refugee line. That threat—to me—would have broken the Indians' back. The mere idea of their families in mortal danger would have caused the warriors to flock to their protection and away from any up-valley fighting. I believe that was Custer's goal. ... Also, by this time he must have been well aware that Reno had failed to get into the village and was unlikely to do so for some time yet, so why, having already divided up his command, was he now going to stretch it once again, stretch it as happened, to breaking point? ... would your average commander have even considered going to ford D? ... As a non military man, much that Custer did that day seems contrary to common sense, and for me, non seems more so than attempting to split and stretch your command beyond what its capable of, and for what? You make an assumption here that Custer "must have been aware... Reno had failed." How would Custer know that Reno had failed? Because he saw Reno move into the timber? I do not consider that failure. Reno was accomplishing his mission-- or so Custer thought-- and Custer had no way of knowing Reno was in trouble. I do not subscribe to the theory that Boyer told Custer, because I don't believe the timing allows Boyer to have been in a position to have seen Reno retreat. You then ask about your average military man going to Ford D. If an attack up the valley, to bag as many Indians as possible was his objective, why wouldn't he have moved in that direction? What other objective could he have had? You can't possibly believe Custer intended to attack across Ford B. If you question why the average military commander might make a trip to Ford D, why wouldn't you question why a man like Custer would attack at Ford B and leave 60% of his command a mile behind him? By the time Custer reached Ford B, he knew the linear extent of the village (maybe not its density content-- and that's important) and would certainly attack with all or 90% of his force if attack there was his intent. As for splitting and stretching his command I would agree with you if we were to agree that Custer was under severe pressure. Without that pressure, leaving Keogh as a rear guard or reserve, is fine. That's not unsound strategy, especially if your aim was a recon for a suitable crossing and then a re-uniting with Keogh and Benteen for a hell-bent-for-leather attack up the valley, catching everyone in your net. And Shan... that was a great post. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Dec 1, 2007 13:21:05 GMT -6
From your experience of the ground, though ... did it deny him a view to the east? Any risk that he could have overlooked an encirclement from there, if (as is currently discounted, but isn't totally impossible) Crazy Horse came via Ford D and behind LSH? Re "ravines": it's interesting how heavily those figure in the early newspaper accounts. Has to mean something. I guess they would seem like cover ... Co. I was mostly shot down in the open swale. Heading for the ravine, do you think? Or do you have another theory? Elisabeth-- No, he had an absolutely clear view to the east, right directly behind him. I think Crazy Horse came up Deep Ravine, not Ford D. I think he cut threw that small basin area below Custer Hill, then maybe behind Custer Hill and up the ravine Custer took toward Ford D. I don't believe Crazy Horse knew Custer was behind him until much later. To me, all Crazy Horse knew was Keogh's command until Custer returned. Until he got back to Cemetery Ridge, Custer was clear to the north. It was only afterwards that he found himself boxed in and that's only after his foray to D. That's when the Indians realized Yates' battalion was that far north. To me, there is no other explanation for Custer's movements (i.e., to Ford D and back) and actions (i.e., the further splitting of his command on Calhoun Hill). This thing unfolded very slowly and piecemeal, otherwise Custer would have gotten away to the north with the Yates battalion. Also, don't forget, the vegetation was vastly different in those days and mortal danger can make men hide in any semblance of cover. Look at the men left behind in Reno's timber. If that was just open woods, they would have never survived, but with the thick underbrush it was probably pretty easy to hide. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Dec 2, 2007 6:44:30 GMT -6
Thanks, Fred. Much to mull over.
|
|
|
Post by mwkeogh on Dec 2, 2007 23:12:44 GMT -6
Fred, I'm working on my theory. From where they found Custer's body--could Keogh's position be seen? gocav76....to answer your question above, Custer's body was found at the SW corner of the monument atop LSH. From this position, you can see the Keogh position.
|
|