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Post by fred on Nov 15, 2007 21:06:44 GMT -6
Custer headed north with his headquarters command and companies E and F.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 6:33:35 GMT -6
√ After a brief halt on Calhoun Hill, the Custer-Yates left wing—which has, by now, remounted—proceeds across Calhoun Hill and along Custer Ridge, to look for an advantageous place from which to cross the LBH River. • This opportunity to again divide his force, stemmed not only from substantially less than overwhelming odds, but also from the warrior tactics of cautious infiltration. Thus, battalion operations from Custer Ridge clearly started at a time when the command did not perceive a serious threat. • Left wing activity was clearly for intelligence gathering. • By leaving the right wing behind on Calhoun Hill, the left wing’s rear was covered and the contact with Benteen could be affected sooner. • In all likelihood, the first real picture of the full Indian activity was afforded Custer from Custer/Battle Ridge. The view from here was expansive. The LBH hugs the bluffs, opening up the plain to view. The soldiers could now see the elderly and the children leaving camp. • Once they saw the Indian encampment fleeing, the soldiers knew their plan was working, i.e., Reno’s attack would draw the warriors (remember, only a few Cheyenne warriors countered the left wing threat at the MTC ford; it would have been easy to cross there). • Once the warriors were engaged, the assumption was the non-combatants would flee for safety (they were!) and if Custer could cross the river in strength, corral the non-combatants, it would draw the warriors and they could be dealt with or kept at bay at that time, neutralizing the superior warrior strength. ** This had clearly become Custer’s strategy: pursuit of the women and children [Fox]. Liddic agrees with this assessment of Custer’s strategy. [Vanishing Victory, p. 146] • Custer’s widely dispersed forces were part of his plan—based on experience—for gathering in all the elements of a fleeing enemy village. ** Reno’s attack toward the village had the desired effect, i.e., warriors were drawn towards the attack, while the non-combatants fled in the opposite direction.
√ On Calhoun Hill, the right wing would facilitate contact with Benteen, check the Indians, and provide the left wing with the luxury of unhindered mobility. • “There are a number of students who do not believe Custer would have left these men on Calhoun Hill and moved north with only 2 companies. He probably would not have, if he thought these troops were going to encounter the resistance they did, nor did he expect these 2 companies to be in a fight [Yates’ battalion, along with HQ]. In my reconstruction Custer thought he was going north to chase after and capture the noncombatants.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, footnote, pp. 148-149] • Liddic’s interpretation also differs from Fox’ in that the former believes Custer went to Ford D to cross and attack, whereas the latter believes Custer was still on a recon, then returned to Cemetery Ridge to await Keogh with Benteen.
√ Fox says the Custer-Yates left wing proceeded along the east side of Custer Ridge, across Custer Hill, and down the north side of Cemetery Ridge (the side you cannot see from the river), westward into the valley, in all likelihood, less than 2 1/2 miles beyond Calhoun Hill. Liddic has the column in plainer view, moving down through the cemetery area and along the high ground of Cemetery Ridge. • Reached banks of LBH and apparently found a suitable ford to cross, from where they could press their attack and one that the Indian fugitives had not yet neared. This is now called Ford D (Sioux Ford on the McElfresh map) and is about 1.5 miles north (below) the camp and the view probably gave the officers an accurate view of the north (downstream) edge of the village, as well as an assessment of the fleeing families.
√ The left wing has now fixed the northern extremity of the village, determined the tactical requirements posed by a mass of fugitives, found a ford providing access to those fugitives, and discovered scant resistance. • Pending the attack, Custer chose to leave the river environs and station his wings on Custer and Cemetery ridges, waiting for Benteen and the packs. • Liddic does not believe Custer tried to force a crossing here: “vedettes had advanced ahead of the companies, who were about 300 yards behind on the south side of [the current] Route 212 in the flats across from the present-day gas station complex.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 147] • Liddic feels as they approached the ford, the videttes met with heavy resistance from warriors, old men, and camp police who had raced ahead. [p. 147] ** “‘The Custer men tried to cross the river at a ford west of the railroad tracks… Cheyenne hidden in the brush on the south side of the ford drove the soldiers back and killed a couple of them in the bush by the river.” [Liddic, quoting Rickey, a John Stands In Timber interview, Vanishing Victory, p. 147] * “Kills Eagle… said the soldiers didn’t come within 60 yards of the ford before they drove them off and up the hill. Other Indian accounts record they had massed in the timber and had opened such a terrific fire from all sides that the troops gave way.” [p. 147] * This, of course, could be the Indians’ perception that the videttes—who probably never intended to cross in the first place—were driven off by the Indians’ firing. * If Custer himself—along with the command—never got closer than the 60 yards Kill Eagle claims, he may still have determined the ford was crossable because of the presence of the Indians. And, of course, Boyer’s say-so. • Liddic diverges from Fox right about here. Liddic believes Yates’ videttes were driven back by warriors who had raced downstream to block any sort of crossing and they “covered their retreat with well-placed fire support.” [p. 147] He then mentions Fox as saying this action—I’m assuming the firing on the troops—took place when the troops took up their position on Cemetery Ridge rather than on the flats below. Liddic does state that maps drawn by Indians who were there indicated the action took place below, “on the flats between Route 212 and the cemetery on the bluffs.” [p. 147] * Liddic believes that when Custer pulled back from Ford B to look for another crossing, the Indians read his intentions and hurried downstream to intercept him. [This may be over-analyzing!] * Liddic now claims the Indians became aggressive, something they were not before. They “were not falling back, as a shield for the non-combatants, but instead they just kept pressing towards the battalion’s flanks… instead of rushing to remove their families and horses from harm’s way, then try to flee, the warriors were counterattacking.” [p. 148] * This would put Custer on the defensive somewhat earlier than Fox’ scenario.
N.B.—This is very interesting. Fox claims the minor, sporadic firing the soldiers received reinforced Custer’s sense the Indians were well engaged with Reno. It almost appears there was no indication Reno—and even Keogh—was in serious trouble. This sense of confidence probably remained intact until some time after Custer returned to Cemetery Ridge. Yet despite this, he still had to know Reno had gotten himself into a hornet’s nest (from Boyer).
√ This is now a major part of the Fox thesis. • Custer had gathered all the intelligence he needed to make a valid assessment of the situation. • It was now time to head back to Cemetery Ridge to await Benteen’s arrival. • The scattering of the non-combatants probably gave Custer the impression Reno had been successful, despite Boyer’s earlier report. If he was not successful in tactical terms, he at least had occupied the warriors to the extent Custer desired. • By returning to Cemetery Ridge, Custer felt he could overview the battle—such as it was—while awaiting Benteen and he could control access to the Deep Ravine environs as well. • The whole situation, to this point, probably meant to Custer that tactical integrity was still being maintained and he was still on the offensive. ** It is also important to remember that the vast majority of warriors probably had no idea Custer was where he was (to the north). They thought Keogh’s right wing was their only remaining threat.
√ Another extremely important point: • While we know today, there was a single, huge village and Custer’s scouts reported it as such, there was serious doubt among the officers. Experience taught them there were probably several smaller villages. • This knowledge, gathered from prior experiences, e.g., the Washita battle, may have accounted for Custer’s decision to send Benteen off to the left and probably also added to Custer’s concern about the Indians scattering to the four winds.
√ Rather than attack the village, Custer starts back towards Cemetery Ridge and takes up positions below and west of Custer Hill to await Benteen and Keogh, pausing for 20-30 minutes on the lower, flatter part of the ridge. It’s possible this is when Kellogg was killed, 1/2-3/4 mile from Custer Hill. [N.B.—It is important to understand that Custer did not intend to wait this long a period of time, but was forced to out of necessity, anticipating Benteen’s arrival.] • The left wing, even at a slow gait, consumed no more than 30 minutes in this 3+-mile round trip. • Right wing was also waiting; low-key, sporadic firing.
* Company C had not yet been committed. * “Dr. Don Rickey, who had interviewed John Stands in Timber on the battlefield, noted that the real action started, at least from the Cheyenne viewpoint, below and west of the cemetery.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 148] * “Custer, probably never entertained the thought … gunfire from Keogh’s position was an indication of a serious problem involving Benteen’s/Reno’s anticipated arrival… Custer decided to pull back. The decision to abandon this forward position might have been hastened by Wolf Tooth, Big Foot, and their followers. These Indians had moved in, from the Last Stand Hill area, behind a ridge line above the white men to the east and were firing down into Custer’s men.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 148] • In 1876, the LBH flowed more west of Deep Ravine’s mouth, allowing easy access across the river for the Indians. As Custer returned from his northward foray, he could see this infiltration into Deep Ravine. As the soldiers waited in their “halt” at or near the slope of Cemetery Ridge, they fired into the “flats” just below them and towards the mouth of Deep Ravine. Today, the river’s course has changed enough to have eliminated the crossing ford at Deep Ravine. Now, the river hugs the bluffs and the low-lying alluvial plain that once formed the mouth of Deep Ravine is under water. • From here, the left wing moved a little more south, into this much broader basin-area called the Flats, just north of the mouth of Deep Ravine. • It then moved up the higher, north side of Deep Ravine, without going into it. As the ravine split—north and east—the soldiers went up the east bank of the north fork to the “basin” where they dismounted. • Company E moved back onto Cemetery Ridge—probably leading its horses—and formed a skirmish line. Company F stayed in the Basin as a reserve.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 6:45:30 GMT -6
Bruce Liddic: After leaving the Ford D environs, Custer “ordered a retreat back to the high ground, the hogback ridge (Custer Ridge Extension) overlooking the flats.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 148] • “Custer ordered ‘E’ Company to pull back and take up positions in the present cemetery to the south and west of the visitors center, to protect the retreat of ‘F.’ Company ‘F’ reached the crest of Last Stand Hill and positioned itself along this ground and extended into the slight depression just to the west of the battlefield road.” [p. 149]
√ At this time, Companies E and L were the battalion flanks on opposite ends of Custer Ridge, while C and I, together with F, beyond—all 3 sheltered in low-lying areas—followed prescribed tactics by assuming reserve roles.
√ A bugle call instructs troopers of Company L to dismount (Calhoun Hill) where some at least, take up a skirmish line on a low ridge coming off the knoll, i.e., southward, facing what we now call Henryville—initially facing south to counter infiltrating Indians. Other L Company troops lead horses to cover, probably where Custer Ridge and Calhoun Hill come together.
√ Keogh’s right wing: • Calhoun’s Company L is deployed on a slight knoll—Calhoun Hill—ostensibly as a rear guard. • Infiltrating warriors come very close to soldiers, but fighting remains light. • Companies I and C remain as reserve, undeployed, probably on southern end of Custer Ridge, in a slight depression or swale near Calhoun Hill. • So far, all these troop dispositions, i.e., skirmish line facing the perceived threat, companies in reserve, fit normal tactical disposition doctrines.
√ About 1 mile separated the two wings—Cemetery Ridge and Calhoun Hill.
√ Indians continued to infiltrate, improving their positions, but did not launch an all- out assault.
√ By the time Crazy Horse arrived at Custer Ridge (in all likelihood, via Deep Ravine), taking up positions close to and northeast of Calhoun Hill, the left wing had already disappeared into the valley toward the Indian “fugitives.” The Indians probably never even realized there were still more soldiers to the north of them. • Greg Michno, through his Indian testimony, says that Crazy Horse crossed the LBH “above Calhoun Hill” (probably at the Deep Ravine ford), as Custer was coming off the Nye-Cartwright complex and before he reached Calhoun Hill. ** I suspect the timing here is probably way off. Crazy Horse was heavily involved in the Reno fight and Reno’s crossing point during his retreat is almost 4 miles from Deep Ravine. It would have taken Crazy Horse about 30 minutes to reach Deep Ravine if he bee-lined it back at full throttle. Michno does allow for a Crazy Horse crossing of the LBH at Deep Coulee, which makes even less sense for he would have then had to go northward through Calhoun Coulee on the east side of Greasy Grass Ridge. • Historical accounts suggest there were at least hundreds of warriors in the Calhoun Coulee/Greasy Grass Ridge areas, but it took time for these Indians to accumulate there.
√ “It is not necessary to inflate the numbers of Indians (or the village’s population) who overwhelmed the soldiers. Individually, the 2 battalions would be outnumbered 12 to 1, if only 1200 warriors confronted them. The soldiers were divided by faulty command decisions which committed one to a holding action and the other to an offensive operation without either having sufficient manpower to accomplish their objective. This was compounded by Custer’s failure to grasp the Indians’ frame of mind.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 149]
√ Edgar Stewart takes a different view of how the Custer battle developed, claiming the Indians were prepared for his attack, the only surprise being that Reno’s attack occurred earlier than they had anticipated. This is extremely far-fetched, as far as I am concerned! He goes on to say, “As far as the Indians were concerned, the fight against Reno was a holding action… and the main fighting force of the hostiles—probably at least three-fourths of the warriors—was held in readiness to meet the attack which they knew was coming from across the river.” [Custer’s Luck, p. 435] • Contrary to Willert, Stewart felt the Indians had scouted the soldiers’ column for several days and knew they were coming. [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 434] • Stewart cites Stanley Vestal in disagreeing about the numbers awaiting Custer: “[Vestal] says that all the warriors who could get there (1,000) defended the camp against Reno but that not half of all the warriors (2,500) joined in the attack on Custer.” [Custer’s Luck, p. 435, FN 14, citing Vestal, Sitting Bull, p. 171]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 8:12:44 GMT -6
√ Custer-Yates/left wing/Company E—waiting on lower end of Cemetery Ridge somewhat before the massive breakdown along Custer Ridge—now begins moving closer to Custer Hill, ultimately covering the retreat of the remnants of C, I, and L as they begin arriving at Custer Hill. • Company E begins moving up the ridge when it realizes the right wing soldiers are fleeing towards them. • Cemetery Ridge is a broad, flat ridge, sloping west from Custer Hill and less than 1 mile long. It widens at the bottom, with about a 100-foot drop at its end. ◊ 1 mile from Calhoun Hill. • Evidence suggests organized cavalry firing from this ridge, at Indians in the “Flats” and emerging from Deep Ravine. ◊ Company E—much like Company L—manned a tactical line, just below Custer Hill. • 6 cavalry markers were once located on Cemetery Ridge where visitors’ center is now located. √ It appears pressure on the left wing—Company E—mounted fairly quickly after right wing disintegrated. • A group of young Cheyenne and Sioux warriors joined at Cemetery Ridge (probably near where the national cemetery is today), raced toward Company E—probably as it was moving up the ridgeline to aid the right wing soldiers—scattering the gray horses, and continued up and over Custer Hill onto Custer Ridge and into Keogh sector where they cut off fleeing soldiers of the right wing. Seeing this, some right wing troops fled eastwards, back into the Keogh sector. This Indian charge may have been responsible for the 4 mounted soldiers turning back and heading south. These may have been the first Indians to come in north or in front of the fleeing right wing. Other scenarios claim this "suicide boys" attack came at the very end of the battle. • Increasing pressure and the loss of its horses soon forced Company E to leave the ridge and rejoin Company F in the Basin. This was a significant step-up in the Indian’s attack.
√ The remnants of the right wing were now reaching Custer Hill and the left wing moved up from the Basin to join them. • Before this, the left wing had not occupied Custer Hill (Greg Michno disagrees with this).
√ Company F—still mounted—probably rode up to Custer Hill to intercept the remnants of the right wing. • Company E—mostly unmounted—straggled behind. • As they were leaving the Basin, a couple of right wing soldiers may have spilled over the west side of Custer Ridge and joined the left wing before it made Custer Hill.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 8:33:38 GMT -6
Custer Hill: about 3/4 miles from Calhoun Hill; heavy vegetation that year. • 43 cavalry markers on Custer Hill, though the most accurate count is 42 dead (Scott says there are 52 markers within the fenced area). Best guesses: at least 21 were from Company F, including 2 officers and 2 NCOs. * 9 documented. * At least 5 from Company I, including LT Porter, whose body was never identified. * At least 4 from Company L. * 1 from Company E (LT Smith). * At least 4 from Company C (including Tom Custer, who probably rode with HQ and was therefore with HQ and left wing) + possibly LT Harrington, whose body was never found and is not included in the 42 total. * 7 from HQ, including civilians * This totals 42. • Godfrey claimed to have counted 42 bodies and 39 horses on Last Stand Hill [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 162] * “DeRudio remembered that many of these horses were ‘sorrels’ from ‘C.’ If so, and DeRudio was quite positive about this, they could have been from a couple of ‘sets of fours’ who had retreated to this position.” [Liddic, p. 162; FN Hammer] * Someone counted 6 sorrels. • Indians were on a low ridge east of the hill and were fired upon by soldiers at the hill’s apex. • Fox claims what took place at Custer Hill was the product of erosion in military unity of the cavalry located elsewhere. This makes perfectly good sense, because Companies E and F were drawn up to Custer Hill to cover the rout of the remnants of C, I, and L. • Large number of dead cavalry horses at this end of the battlefield indicates soldiers managed to control their mounts until late in the battle. * 39 counted * a few grays * probably a few from the R wing * mostly Company F’s horses * 6 sorrels (C Co.) [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 154; FN Hammer] • As Companies F and E arrived at Custer Hill, along with the remains of the right wing, Custer probably had only about 100 men remaining, counting himself. Once on the hill, officers restored some semblance of order.
** 7 markers in Calhoun Coulee [all C] + 12 on Calhoun Ridge [all C] + 11 on Calhoun Hill [all L] + 70 in Keogh sector/Custer Ridge + 2 (1SG Butler and PVT Short or CPL Foley) + 6 on Cemetery Ridge + 1 (M. Kellogg) + 1 trooper from Company E killed at Ford B = 110. This assumes no one was killed when left wing (Custer/Yates) moved up Deep Coulee to Calhoun Hill. This means only about 20 men from the right wing made it back to Custer Hill. ** Fox says about 102 gathered on Custer Hill. • Fighting was desultory, with Indians creeping up rather than charging. Cheyenne to the north and east, Sioux to the south and west [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 157] • Final rush was short; siege and final rush measured only in minutes. • Early in this final episode, about 45 troopers, mostly from Company E, dashed downhill towards the LBH, either to drive off Indians who were moving closer, or to enable horsemen to ride for help. • Liddic agrees with Fox that the final action took place in this area, as opposed to Calhoun Hill. [Vanishing Victory, p. 157]
√ South Skirmish Line: • Ridge is actually a low-lying, elongated rise, sloping gently from Custer Hill and runs about 2,000 feet, ending near Deep Ravine. It is bordered on the north (or right side coming down from Custer Hill) by what is today known as Cemetery Ravine. • “Dr. Kuhlman first brought to the battle students’ attention the South Skirmish Line.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 158] “It has been said of Dr. Kuhlman ‘that he is right 100 times for every time he is wrong.’” [Liddic, p. 158 FN, Stewart to Frank Mercatante, 1962; Steve Moses collection.] • Early in this final episode, about 41-45 troopers dashed downhill on this ridge, towards the LBH, apparently on trumpet command; organized charge. Indians estimated about 5-9 mounted, maybe as many as 40 on foot. Probably 30 of these men were from Company E. LT Smith’s body was found on Custer Hill, so he was probably already dead. The horsemen turned south, in the direction they had come from, towards Reno’s position, obviously riding for help. It is probably a good bet then, the 40 or so dismounted troopers were an organized diversion.
** This left approx. ± 57 on Custer Hill. “Wooden Leg remembered a band of soldiers rode down and dismounted near the head of Deep Ravine.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 158] • Liddic has Custer positioning E Company on this ridge as soon as the command returned from the Ford D area. [Vanishing Victory, p. 158] • As these 40 ± charged, the Indians backed off, then charged, forcing many of the soldiers into Deep Ravine. Michno disagrees with this, saying that the Indians were already in Deep Ravine and actually fired at the troopers who were fending off attackers from the north (or from what is now the cemetery grounds and Cemetery Ridge) forcing the soldiers toward Cemetery Ravine. This is also why so many of these troopers were found shot in the back. Several troopers managed to get close to the LBH in their attempt to escape. • There is an interesting comment in Willert, LBH Diary, p. 451. In a footnote he writes: “Curiously, there are only two white markers along the north slope beyond Custer’s last position. However, on a map, drawn by Captain Benteen after the battle, he indicated that bodies were seen by him down the north slope. He noted on the map: ‘… Ravine off here containing 30 bodies which were not found nor buried.’” Willert cites Graham’s endpaper to the Reno Court (Abstract). Could Benteen have been referring to Cemetery Ravine or north of Custer Hill? • There is no evidence of an organized cavalry formation or resistance, or even a skirmish line. It was a melee, with no form of tactical order. Michno discusses LTC Michael Sheridan’s testimony at the Reno Inquiry. Sheridan “acknowledged that troops killed in a charge would be more scattered than those killed while resisting" (a point to be considered in assessing the validity of the SSL with its regularity of bodies). • It appears Indians were in this sector first. • Liddic writes that the suicide boys—among the last warriors to enter the fight—charged “up the level area from the national cemetery and charged right into” E Company. Within 30 minutes of the suicide boys’ attack, the battle was over. [Vanishing Victory, p. 159] • Soldiers evidently deployed in an attempt to counter the perceived threat. If so, this deployment, per se, did not last long enough to establish an effective skirmish line. Evidence points to soldiers originating from Custer Hill. Data suggest troopers only briefly occupied SSL and probably passed rapidly over this ridge, into Deep Ravine. Best evidence says 28 bodies were found in Deep Ravine, 13 near the ravine’s headwall: 8 of 12 bodies identified in Deep Ravine belonged to Company E; 2 from Company F; 1 from Company L; possibly, 1 SGT from HQ (Hughes, attached to HQ from Co. K). • Like Keogh sector, evidence suggests many soldiers died offering scant resistance. • Near the end of the fighting, several troopers (5+... 7?) dashed south and were killed just below crest of Custer Ridge, 600-1300 feet from the obelisk; 7-10 others dashed towards LBH into Deep Ravine. (Jack Pennington uses 7.)
N.B.—Kate Bighead claimed the sequence of the battle varied somewhat from that generally thought. After the SSL had been overrun was when Calhoun’s defense collapsed, the fighting moving on to Keogh’s company. After Keogh was destroyed, the only remaining soldiers were those on Last Stand Hill. [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 160] Liddic himself doesn’t necessarily agree: “At the same time ‘E’ was being assaulted, White Bull and possibly Crazy Horse continued north along the ridge and confronted the last of Custer’s men who were making the final stand on Last Stand Knoll.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 162]
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 19, 2007 8:35:48 GMT -6
PVT Jacob Adams (H)— Custer was within a circle of dead horses on a flat area at the end of the ridge. [121]
LT Carlo DeRudio— 1. “Custer lay on top of a conical knoll.” [87] 2. Five or 6 dead horses—all from C Company—lay there as if they had been shot to form a barricade. 3. LT Reily’s body was shot full of arrows.
LT W. S. Edgerly— 1. GAC, TWC, and Cooke lay at the highest point of the ridge. [58] 2. Only a few dead on top of ridge. 3. Only a few men scalped. 4. Calhoun not mutilated. 5. Calhoun’s men lay in remarkably good order for a defense. 6. SGTs Bustard and Varden were near Keogh; Keogh’s leg broken from shot through his horse. 7. Vic was killed; Dandy was with pack train.
PVT John Foley (K)— 1. Buried LT Cooke. No scalped men around Custer. [147] 2. He found Francis T. Hughes (L) around Custer. [147]
Fred Gerard— 1. Said Custer’s body was on the side of the hill, shot through the head behind the temple. [237] 2. Tom Custer was found on a level space at the highest point of a ridge, less than 20 feet from brother George. The back of his head was smashed and an arrow shot into the top of his skull. [237]
PVT George W. Glenn (H)— 1. Custer lay just below the end of the ridge. [136] [He is probably referring to Battle Ridge.] 2. Tom Tweed (L) lay less than 50 yards from Custer. He and Glenn had once been “bunk mates.”
LT E. S. Godfrey— 1. Buried Boston Custer “who lay down on side hill some distance below the General.” [77] 2. “Tom Custer lay on his face up on top of the ridge with arrows shot in his back and head and head all smashed in.” [77] 3. Few bodies between this ridge and Deep Ravine.
LT Luther Hare— Dead horses near Custer. [68]
SGT Daniel Kanipe (C)— “Asked Knipe if ridge where monument now is was so level and wide… Says no, say was narrower and Custer laid on very peak of it.” [95, FN 15]
PVT Dennis Lynch (F)— 1. Saw 7th Infantry troopers carrying dead men out of deep gully. After seven were carried out, Lynch remarked there were still a lot in there. “Lynch says these men in gully were carried up and buried on the ridge.” [139] 2. One of the men in the deep gully was Timothy Donnelly (F). [139] 3. Lynch identified CPL Briody by the sailor tattoo on his arm. [139] 4. Groesbeck (Vickory), Voss, and Donovan (there was no Donovan in the 7th Cavalry) lay near Custer. [139] Glenn claimed Voss was found nearest to the LBH. 5. 14 men from Company F lay around Custer. [139]
LT Edward Mathey— 1. Buried Mark Kellogg’s body on 29Jun76. The last one buried. 2. Mathey said Kellogg’s body “lay near a ravine and between Custer and the river.” It had been overlooked. [79]
CPT Thomas McDougall— 1. “There were few or no dead cavalry horses between top of ridge and deep ravine where Company E men were found.” [72; Camp’s words, told by McDougall] 2. McDougall said there were only a few bodies between the deep gully and where Custer lay. He was sure there were less than 12 and might not have been more than 6. 3. In McDougall’s letter of 18May1909 from Wellesville, NY, addressed to Godfrey, he says, “he found most of E troop in the ravine. Does he mean in the deep gully? Were there as many as 28? Yes. All the bodies in the deep gully were buried in the gully—none was carried out. Homeyer was in there and Hughes.” [72]
PVT Thomas F. O’Neill (G)— Claims he and CPL Hammon (G) personally dug the hole and lay GAC in it. [110]
2LT Charles F. Roe (F/ 2 Cavalry)— 1. Boyer’s body was found west or northwest of where the monument now stands. He claims it was near the river and the timberline. Roe did not actually see Boyer’s body. [250] 2. LT Bradley and 12 mounted soldiers first found Custer’s body. [250, fn 3] 3. Roe said the [Custer] ridge was level, originally, not rising to a peak. [250] 4. No grading had been done by 1878. 5. He was emphatic that no EM bones had been dug up until the monument was placed in 1881. Then he gathered as many as he could find—bones were scattered all over the countryside—and buried them around the monument, after it was erected. [250]
2LT Richard E. Thompson (Acting Commissary of Subsistence)— 1. The ridge ended in a round top, higher than the rest of the ridge (Custer Hill). Dead horses formed a sort of barricade. a. TWC lay nearest the peak of this round hill. [247-248] b. He lay on his face; his head and face all hacked up with a hatchet. c. His abdomen had been cut open and his bowels were out. 2. Dr. Lord lay about 20 feet southeast of Custer (he doesn’t say which one) on side of the hill. [248] 3. Only 9-10 men between Custer and the gully. [248] 4. Thought there were about 34 bodies in the gully. [248] 5. Mark Kellogg’s body was found about 3/4 mile from Custer, down near the river on a hillside 100 yards from the river. [248]
CPL George W. Wylie (D)— TMP John W. Patton’s (I Company) body lay across Keogh’s.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by erkki on Nov 19, 2007 11:09:35 GMT -6
√ • This opportunity to again divide his force, stemmed not only from substantially less than overwhelming odds, but also from the warrior tactics of cautious infiltration. Thus, battalion operations from Custer Ridge clearly started at a time when the command did not perceive a serious threat. • Left wing activity was clearly for intelligence gathering. • By leaving the right wing behind on Calhoun Hill, the left wing’s rear was covered and the contact with Benteen could be affected sooner. • In all likelihood, the first real picture of the full Indian activity was afforded Custer from Custer/Battle Ridge. The view from here was expansive. The LBH hugs the bluffs, opening up the plain to view. The soldiers could now see the elderly and the children leaving camp. • Once they saw the Indian encampment fleeing, the soldiers knew their plan was working, i.e., Reno’s attack would draw the warriors (remember, only a few Cheyenne warriors countered the left wing threat at the MTC ford; it would have been easy to cross there). • Once the warriors were engaged, the assumption was the non-combatants would flee for safety (they were!) and if Custer could cross the river in strength, corral the non-combatants, it would draw the warriors and they could be dealt with or kept at bay at that time, neutralizing the superior warrior strength. ** This had clearly become Custer’s strategy: pursuit of the women and children [ Fox]. Liddic agrees with this assessment of Custer’s strategy. [ Vanishing Victory, p. 146] • Custer’s widely dispersed forces were part of his plan—based on experience—for gathering in all the elements of a fleeing enemy village. ** Reno’s attack toward the village had the desired effect, i.e., warriors were drawn towards the attack, while the non-combatants fled in the opposite direction. √ On Calhoun Hill, the right wing would facilitate contact with Benteen, check the Indians, and provide the left wing with the luxury of unhindered mobility. • The whole situation, to this point, probably meant to Custer that tactical integrity was still being maintained and he was still on the offensive. √ Rather than attack the village, Custer starts back towards Cemetery Ridge and takes up positions below and west of Custer Hill to await Benteen and Keogh, pausing for 20-30 minutes on the lower, flatter part of the ridge. . The Squaw Creek refugee area was plainly visible to Custer from the ridge above the DeWolf marker. There is also an excellent view of the valley from Greasy Grass, so GAC did not need to be on Battle Ridge to get a fix on the situation. Some of the warriors were engaged with Reno, but most had gone to the western bluffs to get their horses and were not a visible threat--yet. There were two ford D's. One near the RR bridge in the valley, the other nearer the Cheyenne camp--vicinity of Deep Ravine. Acker Standing Crane's account indicates that Custer split his command one last time, with E Co. going to the Willy Bend ford. Custer was repulsed at the nearer ford, and E Co. came back from the Willy Bend ford and covered the withdrawal. From there the forces fought all the way back up the hill to the monument. This was not a withdrawal to wait for Benteen. Not a recon. GAC was after hostages to immobilize the warriors. Keogh's battalion most likely protecting GAC's flank in addition to holding the way open for Benteen--and that suggests deployment above Battle Ridge extending south across NC to Luce. This accounts for the period of long distance, slow shooting involving primarily Keogh's battalion. The engagement of Yates' battalion required Keogh to redeploy, so that as GAC approached/was on LSH, the line was about like this: HQ xxxxxxxx--space--xxxxxxxxxx I Co xxx-space-- L Co. ---------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------C Co (Crude depiction, but the best I can do here. Calhoun Ridge does go at an angle so C Co. was a bit sw of Calhoun Hill.) The situation did not provide the leisure for reserve units.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 15, 2011 9:38:47 GMT -6
When I read the excellent posts you guys write, I get a little confused, the map I have of the Custer Battle Field has the following areas, Ravine X Custer Hill Custer Ridge South Skirmish Line North Branch Deep Ravine Calhoun Ravine West Perimeter Calhoun Ridge Are there different names for these features depending on what book or site you are on. Regards Ian. Upper Deep Ravine
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Post by quincannon on Jun 15, 2011 11:47:16 GMT -6
Ian: If I might suggest you invest about $8.00 (I don't know how much that is in local money) and purchase a pictomap - LITTLE BIGHORN BATTLE - Archeological Finds and Historical Locations. It can be purchased at the LBH Battlefield. I find it an invaluable tool for the study and understanding of the battle. To contact the battlefield: Internet: www.nps.gov/libiTelephone: 406-638-2621 Address: Superintendent Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument P O Box 39 Crow Agency, Montana USA 59022
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 16, 2011 4:17:02 GMT -6
Thanks Quincannon, it would be about £4 I think, Regards Ian.
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Post by scottbono on Aug 17, 2013 23:24:40 GMT -6
Custer headed north with his headquarters command and companies E and F. Best wishes, Fred. I've read that just prior to his move north, Custer had five men from Co. F move out in front and these men were subsequently killed before major fighting started in that sector. Can you shed light on this? I know it may seem trivial but it's a point that has hung with me awhile. Thanking you ahead of time.
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Post by fred on Aug 18, 2013 7:08:08 GMT -6
I've read that just prior to his move north, Custer had five men from Co. F move out in front and these men were subsequently killed before major fighting started in that sector. Can you shed light on this? I know it may seem trivial but.... Scott, where did you read that? Custer used an NCO and five EM from F Company to scout ahead... he started this around the lone tepee area... or at least that's the first allusion to it, I believe, in Hardorff's work. Some how I think I have another source for it, but I cannot put my finger on it just yet. Any claim these men were "killed before major fighting started in that sector," has to be speculative, and body placements do not support such a claim. Logic and some simple reasoning would tell me these six men-- and based on roster data I would suspect the NCOIC would be either Fred Nursey or John Wilkinson (my money would go on Nursey)-- would have been pulled back either just at or just before Ford D. Neither body was IDed, so they invariably died on LSH. That would belie any other speculation. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 18, 2013 7:28:00 GMT -6
Fred: Ian cited a similar reference awhile back and I think he got it from Gray.
Nowhere, have I seen it discussed that it would be very natural in all these movements to employ a point detachment, whose sole purpose is to detect before the main body comes upon something unexpectedly. What would be unnatural, against all tactical precepts not to do this. The size depends of course on the size of force to be covered, but I would estimate a one and five would be quite sufficient for the job of covering movement of Custer's 210.
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Post by fred on Aug 18, 2013 7:37:40 GMT -6
Ian cited a similar reference awhile back and I think he got it from Gray. Chuck, I agree with you completely about the efficacy of such a move. In fact, the whole campaign is peppered with such examples. I just cannot pinpoint the original source. The Hardorff book was published well after Gray's, and is merely mentioned in a footnote (but that's the kind of book it is). I was thinking maybe it came from Davern, but my notes do not show it. Kanipe maybe? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by scottbono on Aug 18, 2013 11:54:00 GMT -6
I've read that just prior to his move north, Custer had five men from Co. F move out in front and these men were subsequently killed before major fighting started in that sector. Can you shed light on this? I know it may seem trivial but.... Scott, where did you read that? Custer used an NCO and five EM from F Company to scout ahead... he started this around the lone tepee area... or at least that's the first allusion to it, I believe, in Hardorff's work. Some how I think I have another source for it, but I cannot put my finger on it just yet. Any claim these men were "killed before major fighting started in that sector," has to be speculative, and body placements do not support such a claim. Logic and some simple reasoning would tell me these six men-- and based on roster data I would suspect the NCOIC would be either Fred Nursey or John Wilkinson (my money would go on Nursey)-- would have been pulled back either just at or just before Ford D. Neither body was IDed, so they invariably died on LSH. That would belie any other speculation. Best wishes, Fred. Fred, I want to say it was Hardorff but cannot be specific or dogmatic. However, I distinctly recall reading of five men, specifically from Co. F (Bandbox Company) being sent out ahead of Custer's battalion. I will re-check and at least give a more concrete source than "I recall...". Thank you.
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