June 25: Company L

[fred]

Calhoun formed part of his company into a skirmish line, slightly down the slope of the hill.

They waited...

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

√ Calhoun Hill: essentially the same height as Custer Hill. Overlooks and commands Calhoun Coulee to the west and Deep Coulee to the east.
• Soldiers occupied lower part of an S-sloping ridgeline coming off Calhoun Hill on east side of the ridge’s crest.

** Evidence suggests skirmish line was set up, originally facing south. At least 26 men, possibly as many as 40 (2 officers, 44 EM) occupied this position. These men took minor, sporadic fire from the south (Henryville) and east (Wolf Tooth’s band?).
** Richard Fox claims Company L’s change in this skirmish line—from facing south near Henryville, to facing west along the ridgeline—came as a result of Company C’s failure in Calhoun Coulee. This S-facing line could not cover the Company C troops in Calhoun Coulee.

** This shift allowed warriors—Gall included—to move into the Henryville area and mount pressure on left flank of the newly deploying skirmish line.
• As the L Company soldiers moved up the slope towards Calhoun Hill, some of them formed this 2nd skirmish line, facing west and firing west and south.

** This was in reaction to fire being received from the west (GGR) and to cover the retreat of Company C. Bunching and flight of Company C developed from tactical failures at Calhoun Coulee and Calhoun Ridge sectors.
** At least 6 men on this 2nd skirmish line. This also implies the original battle line, facing south, faced only a minor threat. This redeployment allowed the Indians to the south to seize advantages and move closer to Calhoun Hill.

• Crazy Horse, who had already infiltrated onto and across Custer Ridge, attacked at will. Fighting in this sector now became furious.

** This wing was now, in essence, surrounded:
* Company C is in total disarray;
* Company L is trying to cover Company C;
* Company I may have tried to deploy to cover retreat from Calhoun Hill, but the movement failed as it came under severe fire from the east.

** Fox has Crazy Horse moving across Custer/Battle Ridge, west to east. Both Michno and Liddic, however, claim he moved across Ford B and up Deep Coulee to the ravines and ridges east of Battle Ridge.
• The second skirmish line was formed near the top of Calhoun Hill, facing threat to the west (GGR) as well as increasing threat from the south.
• Historical testimony suggests a 3rd skirmish line—or semi-circle—was formed on the hilltop.
At least 5 men in this position. These may have been some of the men from the original skirmish line, redeployed in response to the new developments in the GGR/Calhoun Coulee regions. This latest line, faced with attacks from the front (GGR vicinity) and left flank (Henryville), began to waver and was finally overwhelmed.

** It seems logical that Calhoun retained some of his men as a reserve while he set up his original skirmish line near the bottom of the Henryville ridge. He might then have set up the second line with this reserve, as well as some of those he was pulling out of the original line, in this way covering the first line’s pullback. The men he kept pulling back, he would then use for the third skirmish line, on the hilltop.
• 11 cavalry markers on Calhoun Hill (Company L dead, only), making 30 in this sector (7 [C] + 12 [C] + 11 [L] = 30, total). Bodies included Calhoun and Crittenden. Indians claim they suffered the heaviest casualties on Calhoun Hill.
• Evidence suggests some panic here, with at least 6 soldiers heading north to Keogh sector towards perceived safety.

** This theory of panic is further supported by lack of evidence of Indian firing from Calhoun Hill. Soldiers fled in panic, pursued by Indians who did not stop to shoot.
** More dead horses or horse bones were found in the Calhoun area than anywhere else. Indians claimed most of the soldiers who fled through the Keogh sector were dismounted.

• Company L and remnants of Company C suffered greatly from the shock effects delivered by repeating rifles. This terror figured significantly in the onset of demoralization and disorganization.

** Fox says the Yellow Nose-guidon-snatching incident occurred around this time.

√ Confusion and panic set in and many troops scurried north along Custer Ridge seeking out protection of left wing, i.e., perceived safety. Indians now vigorously pressed their attack.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[erkki]

fred said:

√ .

** Evidence suggests skirmish line was set up, originally facing south. At least 26 men, possibly as many as 40 (2 officers, 44 EM) occupied this position. These men took minor, sporadic fire from the south (Henryville) and east (Wolf Tooth’s band?).
** Richard Fox claims Company L’s change in this skirmish line—from facing south near Henryville, to facing west along the ridgeline—came as a result of Company C’s failure in Calhoun Coulee. This S-facing line could not cover the Company C troops in Calhoun Coulee.

** This shift allowed warriors—Gall included—to move into the Henryville area and mount pressure on left flank of the newly deploying skirmish line.

A shift of the L Co. skirmish line requires reading into the archaeological data more information than is actually present. That is, within a single strata timing the deposition of artifacts cannot be determined. Movement did occur as firing pin ID's of individual guns show. However, Fox's figures 6-17 & 6-18 for the paths these guns followed can be read, logically, to show a single pattern of withdrawal toward Keogh from a skirmish line initially posted in a semi-circle around Calhoun Hill facing south and west along Calhoun Ridge.