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Post by welshofficer on Feb 12, 2015 9:31:47 GMT -6
Fred,
I appreciate that I am blindly raising issues covered by your book, and maybe I should drop out of this thread until I have read your book.
Even allowing for standard tactics, deploy 2 companies and place a third in reserve, I have always been uncomfortable with the notion of I Company simply being a reserve down in the swale. That was a luxury that Keogh simply did not have and, even if he did have it in a parallel universe, that company should have been deployed long before it was overrun down there.
I shall look forward with interest at the proximity of the I Company corpses to the BR "gap" and DR headcut.....
WO
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Post by fred on Feb 12, 2015 9:52:13 GMT -6
... and maybe I should drop out of this thread until I have read your book. Absolutely not. I agree. Even though that was my original thinking-- and I believe (though not certain) the thinking of Richard Fox, as well-- I was never really comfortable with it. That is why my discovery of that gap was so immediately stunning. And when I say immediate, I mean immediate!! To me, it cleared up everything in an instant. I was only a few yards to the first body. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 12, 2015 10:10:11 GMT -6
Fred,
That explains much. The complicating factor with Keogh will always be what direct orders he was operating under and constrained by. But even that comes with the caveat that he should have extricated himself before being overrun to no purpose/benefit. When GAC headed north, it is hard to imagine that he envisaged that sort of hostile build-up when issuing orders.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 12, 2015 14:24:51 GMT -6
Justin;
It is a double edged sword, if he was ordered to wait for support arrive then he could be there quite a while, on the other hand he could have had orders to follow Custer after a certain length of time, also was Custer waiting for him on cemetery, if so then he must have been told to come with or without support.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 12, 2015 14:48:58 GMT -6
Fred, I appreciate that I am blindly raising issues covered by your book, and maybe I should drop out of this thread until I have read your book. Even allowing for standard tactics, deploy 2 companies and place a third in reserve, I have always been uncomfortable with the notion of I Company simply being a reserve down in the swale. That was a luxury that Keogh simply did not have and, even if he did have it in a parallel universe, that company should have been deployed long before it was overrun down there. I shall look forward with interest at the proximity of the I Company corpses to the BR "gap" and DR headcut..... WO Don't drop out, you will appreciate the book more if you ride along with the troops, ask questions if you will. I sent Chris a photo this morning, because I can't load it here. Do I have issues heck yes. Ride it out. You will enjoy. Chris, if you can clean up my pix of markers and forward it here I would appreciate it. Now I need to catch up.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Feb 12, 2015 15:01:37 GMT -6
What was the proximity of the I Company corpse cluster in the swale in relation to the "gap" and the DR headcut? Justin, Believe it or not, that is all in the book. Appendix A gives you all the place names and their variations, as well as distances from one place to another. Also, the crosses representing the markers on the map are pretty accurate, and those distances are all covered there. I'm sure robb/vben hasn't gotten that far... or simply doesn't care. There is a lot more information in the book than one sees at first glance. We have a tendency-- or at least I do-- to gloss over the appendices in certain books. In this one you shouldn't; at least not if you want the most out of it. Best wishes, Fred. Fred you book is so packed full of information that it is impossible (at least for me) to absorb all it has to offer in one sitting. Everytime I read it I find more treasures. Last night I took your books, maps, timelines as well as your comments in this thread plus the videos that CusterApollo put up. I used the videos at first to 'see' the battlefield again but as I listened I realized that his statements were pretty much how I used to view the battle for the most part, except for the heavy Benteen and Reno made this all happen tone. It was interesting to see how much my view has changed but how much more sense your views of the flow of the battle makes sense. It just works, all the things just fall into place better. Bodies aren't no longer so haphazardly spread around. I realized that I have much more to learn as well as old theories that I have to get out of my head. Question 1. I always read and hear waiting for Benteen, waiting for Benteen? Why would they wait? Shouldn't a battle plan be with what forces you have now? Anything could have happened to Benteen to prevent his joining them. Question 2--and is probably really dumb. Why is there no Ford C? Beth |
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Post by Colt45 on Feb 12, 2015 15:16:00 GMT -6
The cavalry never tried to cross the LBH at a ford C, which is an area in between MTCF (ford B) and the area Custer went to before retreating to cemetery hill. From the hostiles standpoint, ford C would probably have been where Deep Ravine emptied into the river, as they used it as an ingress into the battle area. There is no specific ford C, as there is at ford B, and ford D is also a bit nebulous since there is no good evidence Custer tried to cross there either. I don't think a location C was ever listed on the map used in the RCOI (Maguire map I think) but there was a location A (ford A) and a location B (ford B).
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Post by Beth on Feb 12, 2015 15:28:58 GMT -6
The cavalry never tried to cross the LBH at a ford C, which is an area in between MTCF (ford B) and the area Custer went to before retreating to cemetery hill. From the hostiles standpoint, ford C would probably have been where Deep Ravine emptied into the river, as they used it as an ingress into the battle area. There is no specific ford C, as there is at ford B, and ford D is also a bit nebulous since there is no good evidence Custer tried to cross there either. I don't think a location C was ever listed on the map used in the RCOI (Maguire map I think) but there was a location A (ford A) and a location B (ford B). Thank you. That makes sense. Beth |
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Post by fred on Feb 12, 2015 16:40:02 GMT -6
Fred you book is so packed full of information that it is impossible (at least for me) to absorb all it has to offer in one sitting. Everytime I read it I find more treasures. Last night I took your books, maps, timelines as well as your comments in this thread plus the videos that CusterApollo put up. I used the videos at first to 'see' the battlefield again but as I listened I realized that his statements were pretty much how I used to view the battle for the most part, except for the heavy Benteen and Reno made this all happen tone. It was interesting to see how much my view has changed but how much more sense your views of the flow of the battle makes sense. It just works, all the things just fall into place better. Bodies aren't no longer so haphazardly spread around.... Question 1. I always read and hear waiting for Benteen, waiting for Benteen? Why would they wait? Shouldn't a battle plan be with what forces you have now? Anything could have happened to Benteen to prevent his joining them. Question 2--and is probably really dumb. Why is there no Ford C? Beth, First of all, I know you get tired of me saying thank you, but whenever I read something as nice and as kind as your post, it remains in me to say thanks. To me it's manners and it is the way Mother and Dad raised us. Thank you, Beth. If you keep finding new things, then I have achieved my goal, because I tried to cram as much information in there as possible without making the book overly burdensome. I can get terribly loquacious. Question 2, first. There is a Ford C. I am almost positive it is Deep Ravine Ford. I think it may also be referred to as Cheyenne Ford, but it is so irrelevant, I have forgotten. There is also a D-1 and a D-2. If memory serves me correctly, D-1 = plain ol' D. Question 1. I probably should have addressed this in the book... or if I did, I should have made it more clear. And it is more opinion, I believe, than fact, maybe even something to be debated here. I believe by the time they are reunited on Calhoun Hill, Custer knew precisely what he was going to do. Plus, even that late in the game there was little pressure so he was clearly on the offensive. Still. He dropped off Keogh to, (a) protect his rear, and (b) to wait for Benteen. It makes absolutely no sense otherwise. Keogh's presence there would tend to keep the lanes of advance open, plus he could be seen quite easily. There is a modicum of efficacy there, too, in that any Indians caught between the stationary Keogh and the advancing Benteen, would be quite well squeezed, though I doubt that sort of a movement was planned. Keogh's presence would have attracted Benteen and I believe the plan was for those two to unite, then move along north to join Custer. Custer backtracked from D to Cemetery Ridge to be on the high ground so he could be easily seen by troops moving along the crest of Battle Ridge. That fully united command-- eight companies-- would then attack across Ford D. "Attack" being the key word here; not "corral." Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by Beth on Feb 12, 2015 17:51:04 GMT -6
Beth, First of all, I know you get tired of me saying thank you, but whenever I read something as nice and as kind as your post, it remains in me to say thanks. To me it's manners and it is the way Mother and Dad raised us. Thank you, Beth. If you keep finding new things, then I have achieved my goal, because I tried to cram as much information in there as possible without making the book overly burdensome. I can get terribly loquacious. Question 2, first. There is a Ford C. I am almost positive it is Deep Ravine Ford. I think it may also be referred to as Cheyenne Ford, but it is so irrelevant, I have forgotten. There is also a D-1 and a D-2. If memory serves me correctly, D-1 = plain ol' D. Question 1. I probably should have addressed this in the book... or if I did, I should have made it more clear. And it is more opinion, I believe, than fact, maybe even something to be debated here. I believe by the time they are reunited on Calhoun Hill, Custer knew precisely what he was going to do. Plus, even that late in the game there was little pressure so he was clearly on the offensive. Still. He dropped off Keogh to, (a) protect his rear, and (b) to wait for Benteen. It makes absolutely no sense otherwise. Keogh's presence there would tend to keep the lanes of advance open, plus he could be seen quite easily. There is a modicum of efficacy there, too, in that any Indians caught between the stationary Keogh and the advancing Benteen, would be quite well squeezed, though I doubt that sort of a movement was planned. Keogh's presence would have attracted Benteen and I believe the plan was for those two to unite, then move along north to join Custer. Custer backtracked from D to Cemetery Ridge to be on the high ground so he could be easily seen by troops moving along the crest of Battle Ridge. That fully united command-- eight companies-- would then attack across Ford D. "Attack" being the key word here; not "corral." Best wishes, Fred. Thanks Fred, You may well cover my question about waiting for Benteen in the book. Your books is like an encyclopedia and jammed packed with information. I read it the first time to get the overall impression but I often times I find that I can get distracted by one thinking about bit and miss the importance of another. Sort of like looking up apples and getting distracted by airplanes. Now I find I am continually use it as a reference to look things up. That's not a complaint mind you, just an attempt to explain why your book will never be a read once and put it on the shelf book for me. It is a great resource tool. So at the time Custer deployed Keogh, do you personally think that Custer didn't foresee Indians coming up from the valley to the bluffs through the coulees and ravines as a credible or serious threat? Was that functional fixedness on Custer's part to believe that all the Indians not engaging Reno would be heading North or perhaps a misunderstanding still about the size of the force he was facing. Sometimes I know I have trouble seeing things as they would have appeared to Custer at the time, and not with what we now know actually existed and end up asking the the same questions phrased different ways. Beth |
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 12, 2015 18:07:00 GMT -6
Beth,
My view is that GAC had no comprehension of the large numbers that subsequently came from Fords B and C against Keogh. GAC was focussed at Calhoun Hill on remedying the anticipated mischief of hostile flight. Bring up Benteen for an attack further north. It's decades since I have been to the battlefield, but the immediate impression was of a very large area. It takes time for that sort of build-up against Keogh.
WO
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Post by fred on Feb 12, 2015 18:28:42 GMT -6
Beth,
I think Justin's (WO's) explanation is right on the money. And let us not lose sight of the "speed" factor. Combat-- especially one where it appears the quarry is running away-- happens very quickly and Custer was in a rush from the very beginning. All this is happening in double-time and what is really odd is it took the Indians to slow things down. I have always believed-- and this also goes back to Custer's Civil War experience-- Custer felt these guys were on the run, would not "retaliate" in great numbers, didn't have great numbers (at least not overwhelming numbers), and unlike many Northern Civil War generals, never followed through on apparent victories.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by Beth on Feb 12, 2015 19:06:04 GMT -6
Beth, I think Justin's (WO's) explanation is right on the money. And let us not lose sight of the "speed" factor. Combat-- especially one where it appears the quarry is running away-- happens very quickly and Custer was in a rush from the very beginning. All this is happening in double-time and what is really odd is it took the Indians to slow things down. I have always believed-- and this also goes back to Custer's Civil War experience-- Custer felt these guys were on the run, would not "retaliate" in great numbers, didn't have great numbers (at least not overwhelming numbers), and unlike many Northern Civil War generals, never followed through on apparent victories. Best wishes, Fred. Speed factor is something I have a hard time wrapping my mind around. I understand how time can drag or compress for an individual depending what is going on around them, and it can even seem to do both at the same time as you micro focus on part of the event perhaps close to you which can only make things seem to be going even faster around you. I can not put that into having that experience over such a sustained period as a battle. When I read about the battle, I admit its more like reading a recipe, take this, add this, pour in that, fight, move on. I'll work harder on the mixpooraddfight aspect. Maybe Custer was more of an if I do A then B will happen so I will follow up with C person, and not a if I do A then B,C and/or D could happen so I better not be locked into C person. General CW question. Was the battle, pull back, battle pull back mindset at the start of the war considered the right way to do things instead of Grants, hit, press on, hit, press on, method. I know at the time that Grant was viewed as a bit of a monster for his battle style but it was effective? Beth |
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Post by welshofficer on Feb 12, 2015 19:32:08 GMT -6
Beth,
When do you think GAC's mind set changed from he was the hunter to he was being hunted....? That, I believe, is critical in trying to understand what went wrong after Ford B.
I can't remember which thread, so hopefully QC will remember and point you to it, but I have had the discussion with QC over Grant being the right commander in 1864-65 to operationally grind down the tactically more gifted Lee. At the outset of the ACW, the winning army was usually in as much chaos as the losing army after a battle. Otherwise, the Confederates would have walked into Washington DC after 1st Manassus/Bull Run.
WO
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Post by Beth on Feb 12, 2015 20:02:54 GMT -6
Beth, When do you think GAC's mind set changed from he was the hunter to he was being hunted....? That, I believe, is critical in trying to understand what went wrong after Ford B. I can't remember which thread, so hopefully QC will remember and point you to it, but I have had the discussion with QC over Grant being the right commander in 1864-65 to operationally grind down the tactically more gifted Lee. At the outset of the ACW, the winning army was usually in as much chaos as the losing army after a battle. Otherwise, the Confederates would have walked into Washington DC after 1st Manassus/Bull Run. WO I don't know if it ever did. It might have gone from hunter to oh my god we are going to die mode. I think though it must have been sometime around the time were he was looking at Ford D to make plans and turned around to see Indians all over behind him. I'd love to read the Grant discussion. I tend to agree that Grant was the right man at the right time. The nature of the war changed during the Civil War so that Grant was more the commander of the now while Lee, though brilliant was becoming a relic of the past. Can someone tell me when battles stopped being tourist/picnic events like at the 1st Manassus, or was that it? Beth |
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