Post by fred on Dec 31, 2012 14:22:29 GMT -6
Brenda—
I believe I know what you are saying here, but let me try to make some things clear. First of all, you must realize something about my “times” and the way I arrive at them. These specific times are not monolithic… nothing surrenders to them. They are the result of other factors, none placed there and backed into. Every "time" I have posted is formed to the right of the = sign… 2 + 3 + 5 = 10, i. e., “time.” Of the 480 or so I have arrived at, none were formed with the answer first: “time” = 2 + 3 + 5.
The other factors—the “2,” the “3,” the “5”—are things like accounts, testimonies, writings, terrain, distances, and speeds. Only when those factors are all analyzed and placed within their specific context have I arrived at a specific “time.”
I am also not a psychologist, a psychoanalyst, or a psychiatrist, so I can only judge GAC by what I have read and by what those who knew him said, wrote, or told others. I doubt seriously I have read anything you have not read, so we are looking at the same data. The major difference is, I believe—as a woman—you have a greater understanding of these factors than I have. That has probably less to do with gender than my own personal understanding of women, their kindness, and their instincts versus my own. So you have a leg up on me in that regard, and I will generally defer to the female “gut” when it comes to issues like that.
Now… I am going to take a dangerous road here because even though I have expressed these thoughts and beliefs before, I think they have been misinterpreted. I would like the following to lead into your last post and maybe then you will have a clearer understanding of what is in my mind.
The “danger” is a journey into fictitious nonsense… a dramatization of events, strictly as I visualize them, as I think of them.
So let’s set the scene… GAC, at the head of a column of 209 men, veers out of MTC and up a fairly gentle slope leading to what we call today, Luce Ridge. His mind-set is simple: he needs to get high and close to see exactly what is going on in the valley. A few things are uppermost in his mind—as a soldier—(1) how far down the river does this village go? Even from this height we cannot see what is along the river because of high ridges alongside the stream [Greasy Grass Ridge]. (2) What is happening in the valley… there is dust rising, indicative of movement of people and animals. (3) How far is the perceived exodus? (4) Where is that exodus ending?
As he mounts the slope up to the ridgeline, a cry goes out, ”Rider coming!”
(And let us set a time here… a time arrived at by other factors, and a specific time that is irrelevant to what we’re doing here… it is the relativity that counts. So let us, for argument’s sake say it is 2:39 PM.)
A couple minutes go by as Boston Custer makes his way up the slope and to the head of the column. He informs his brother of two major events: (1) Benteen is on the trail and when seen, was watering his horses. That shouldn’t take long and he should be on his way. (2) Reno is in some trouble. His command is retreating, pulling back. The upper valley is loaded with Indians.
In “fred’s” manifestation of the mind of GAC, that all represented pretty good news. Really.
Because GAC had traveled the route, he could quickly estimate the amount of time it would take Benteen to arrive at this point. Reno’s plight could actually be a boon because as he pulled away, more and more Indians would sniff the “bait,” drawing them even farther away from the village. That would be good news to GAC. He would also expect Reno to pull back using the same route he came; the route he knew. While Boston saw Reno’s retreat, the timing is such that he could have seen only the very beginning and would have no way of knowing how serious the rout was or would become. Any other timing scenario would have Boston moving at too great a speed rendering the whole scheme too fantastic to consider.
So… sitting atop Luce, GAC now had two valuable pieces in intel; but he still needed more.
The best way for a military officer to gain essential information is to get as close to the action as possible. If you are leading a patrol for a larger operation, you need to recon the route… get as close as possible. GAC decided to do just that. The drama begins…
GAC: “Myles, you stay back here; watch; protect my rear. If anything comes down this coulee, [MTC] open up on it. Also, watch the coulees off to the left [Middle Coulee, West Coulee]; we saw Indians along the ridges.
“Smith, you head back down into that coulee [MTC] and protect my flank. I am going to ride this ridge to the end and get as close to the river as we can. You form frontal protection along the river.
“And Myles, as we leave the river area and head north to that hill over there [Calhoun Hill], you make your way to that ridge [Nye – Cartwright], then meet us on the tall hill [Calhoun Hill].”
This took no more than a few minutes and by 2:49 PM things were in motion again. So we see, none of this is unreasonable to this point and a 10 – minute time frame is extremely workable, especially given the circumstances.
Now, Keogh deploys and Custer moves toward the river, say at an initial speed of 6 MPH, increasing to about 8 MPH as they gain their footing. Smith has to move more quickly in order to get back into the coulee and keep up—somewhere around a steadier 8 MPH.
As GAC and George Yates reach the end of the ridges—to the west of what we now call Butler Ridge—one of Yates’ troops loses control of his horse and the animal bolts down the slope, into the river, and is caught by a few Indians who are in the process of panicking because of the surprise of seeing these approaching soldiers. Smith arrives a few moments later and deploys his command, maybe even ordering a partial dismount. There is sporadic firing from a dozen or so Indians now taking to the bushes as a few more of the Cheyenne camp police arrive, and a group of as many as five Sioux come scurrying and scrambling across the river in the advance of Smith’s command. Some more warriors—we do not know how many—have crossed the river—a bit downstream—and have mounted the bluffs [Greasy Grass Ridge] north of the river crossing and watch as GAC arrives at the western end of the vast ridge complex.
GAC doesn’t spend a lot of time there, but he gathers enough intelligence to know he must continue north and find a ford… it appears the so-called refugees are consolidating downstream. It is not that easy to see, however, as there is considerable dust rising in the valley: there are tepees extending about another half-mile downstream; Indians are feverishly herding ponies (remember, the Cheyenne kept their horses north of their encampment); panicking women, children, older folk, and warriors are scurrying about, heading downstream… it is close to mayhem.
Ten minutes after arriving, Custer begins to pull away from the bluffs, heads down the slope, enters Deep Coulee, then up its cutbank and out onto the Deep Coulee flats. Smith, backing away from some sharp, increasing, but still small resistance, follows Custer’s rear… maybe some of his men dismounted for better aiming and coverage.
In the meantime, Keogh, seeing some warriors coming down West or Middle Coulee, orders his battalion to fire a volley or two, then back away toward Nye – Cartwright. Keogh sees more Indians coming down MTC, spreading, and mounting the ridges to his rear. It takes him only three minutes to move to the next ridge and he orders his men to fire again, probably at the same Indians to his rear, but certainly aiming some of it at Indians who have crossed the river and are trailing Smith.
Eventually, the commands are re-united on Calhoun Hill and Custer leaves instructions with Keogh: wait for Benteen; he should be nearing at xx – hour; then follow along the top of the ridge until he would see Custer waiting… hopefully, that wait wouldn’t be too long. Custer moves off… objective: a river crossing at or below the refugees. In the meantime, more and more Indians are fleeing north; more and more are crossing the LBH at Ford B, sniping at and following Smith. Some—mounted—move into Deep Coulee, some leaving their horses there, crossing the flats and entering Calhoun Coulee, while others—mounted—continue up Deep Coulee, eastward.
So let us assume a time here—yy – hour. Keogh begins deploying his men; Calhoun sets up at least one skirmish line on Calhoun Hill—but I think probably two: one facing the upper reaches of Deep Coulee, the other facing the upper end of Finley – Finckle Ridge and the lower end of the Deep Coulee flats. The threat increases.
The timing now becomes very clear… a simple function of 2 + 3 + 5 = 10. The distance between the crossing point at Ford B and Calhoun Hill is known. The terrain is known. We assume a certain element of anxiety and immediacy in each Indian warrior. We can calculate intelligently a speed of movement while on foot. It is faster closer to Ford B because the farther from Calhoun Hill, the safer it is… so assume the warriors run a straight line from the egress point of Deep Coulee to the beginning of Calhoun Coulee. Then lower the speed; factor in jumping up, laying down, darting from ditch to bush, bush to ditch, crawling… and we can arrive at a “block” of time where warriors now become a serious threat to troops and horses along a ridgeline. The amount of time isn’t very long, especially considering how mad these men must have been and how adrenaline drove them on.
A 17 – minute time span can be considered very long or very short, depending on one’s perception of danger and the anxiety it produces. That same time span, however, must also take certain factors into consideration: the usual… distance and speed, speed now measured more by men afoot than mounted. And again, that 17 minutes was dictated not by theory, desire, favorites, or prejudices, it is determined by all those factors we have mentioned, plus a moment or two to gather wits and make decisions. There is no five minute hurry; no two hour hiatus; no 45 minute wait because we cannot make heads or tails out of what someone said or what someone else makes us believe. It is a pragmatic, reasonable approach supported by various accounts—the plural being the key here—despite poor translators and translations, sign language, fears of the white man’s retaliation, etc.
Happy New Year, Brenda.
Best wishes,
Fred.
I believe I know what you are saying here, but let me try to make some things clear. First of all, you must realize something about my “times” and the way I arrive at them. These specific times are not monolithic… nothing surrenders to them. They are the result of other factors, none placed there and backed into. Every "time" I have posted is formed to the right of the = sign… 2 + 3 + 5 = 10, i. e., “time.” Of the 480 or so I have arrived at, none were formed with the answer first: “time” = 2 + 3 + 5.
The other factors—the “2,” the “3,” the “5”—are things like accounts, testimonies, writings, terrain, distances, and speeds. Only when those factors are all analyzed and placed within their specific context have I arrived at a specific “time.”
I am also not a psychologist, a psychoanalyst, or a psychiatrist, so I can only judge GAC by what I have read and by what those who knew him said, wrote, or told others. I doubt seriously I have read anything you have not read, so we are looking at the same data. The major difference is, I believe—as a woman—you have a greater understanding of these factors than I have. That has probably less to do with gender than my own personal understanding of women, their kindness, and their instincts versus my own. So you have a leg up on me in that regard, and I will generally defer to the female “gut” when it comes to issues like that.
Now… I am going to take a dangerous road here because even though I have expressed these thoughts and beliefs before, I think they have been misinterpreted. I would like the following to lead into your last post and maybe then you will have a clearer understanding of what is in my mind.
The “danger” is a journey into fictitious nonsense… a dramatization of events, strictly as I visualize them, as I think of them.
So let’s set the scene… GAC, at the head of a column of 209 men, veers out of MTC and up a fairly gentle slope leading to what we call today, Luce Ridge. His mind-set is simple: he needs to get high and close to see exactly what is going on in the valley. A few things are uppermost in his mind—as a soldier—(1) how far down the river does this village go? Even from this height we cannot see what is along the river because of high ridges alongside the stream [Greasy Grass Ridge]. (2) What is happening in the valley… there is dust rising, indicative of movement of people and animals. (3) How far is the perceived exodus? (4) Where is that exodus ending?
As he mounts the slope up to the ridgeline, a cry goes out, ”Rider coming!”
(And let us set a time here… a time arrived at by other factors, and a specific time that is irrelevant to what we’re doing here… it is the relativity that counts. So let us, for argument’s sake say it is 2:39 PM.)
A couple minutes go by as Boston Custer makes his way up the slope and to the head of the column. He informs his brother of two major events: (1) Benteen is on the trail and when seen, was watering his horses. That shouldn’t take long and he should be on his way. (2) Reno is in some trouble. His command is retreating, pulling back. The upper valley is loaded with Indians.
In “fred’s” manifestation of the mind of GAC, that all represented pretty good news. Really.
Because GAC had traveled the route, he could quickly estimate the amount of time it would take Benteen to arrive at this point. Reno’s plight could actually be a boon because as he pulled away, more and more Indians would sniff the “bait,” drawing them even farther away from the village. That would be good news to GAC. He would also expect Reno to pull back using the same route he came; the route he knew. While Boston saw Reno’s retreat, the timing is such that he could have seen only the very beginning and would have no way of knowing how serious the rout was or would become. Any other timing scenario would have Boston moving at too great a speed rendering the whole scheme too fantastic to consider.
So… sitting atop Luce, GAC now had two valuable pieces in intel; but he still needed more.
The best way for a military officer to gain essential information is to get as close to the action as possible. If you are leading a patrol for a larger operation, you need to recon the route… get as close as possible. GAC decided to do just that. The drama begins…
GAC: “Myles, you stay back here; watch; protect my rear. If anything comes down this coulee, [MTC] open up on it. Also, watch the coulees off to the left [Middle Coulee, West Coulee]; we saw Indians along the ridges.
“Smith, you head back down into that coulee [MTC] and protect my flank. I am going to ride this ridge to the end and get as close to the river as we can. You form frontal protection along the river.
“And Myles, as we leave the river area and head north to that hill over there [Calhoun Hill], you make your way to that ridge [Nye – Cartwright], then meet us on the tall hill [Calhoun Hill].”
This took no more than a few minutes and by 2:49 PM things were in motion again. So we see, none of this is unreasonable to this point and a 10 – minute time frame is extremely workable, especially given the circumstances.
Now, Keogh deploys and Custer moves toward the river, say at an initial speed of 6 MPH, increasing to about 8 MPH as they gain their footing. Smith has to move more quickly in order to get back into the coulee and keep up—somewhere around a steadier 8 MPH.
As GAC and George Yates reach the end of the ridges—to the west of what we now call Butler Ridge—one of Yates’ troops loses control of his horse and the animal bolts down the slope, into the river, and is caught by a few Indians who are in the process of panicking because of the surprise of seeing these approaching soldiers. Smith arrives a few moments later and deploys his command, maybe even ordering a partial dismount. There is sporadic firing from a dozen or so Indians now taking to the bushes as a few more of the Cheyenne camp police arrive, and a group of as many as five Sioux come scurrying and scrambling across the river in the advance of Smith’s command. Some more warriors—we do not know how many—have crossed the river—a bit downstream—and have mounted the bluffs [Greasy Grass Ridge] north of the river crossing and watch as GAC arrives at the western end of the vast ridge complex.
GAC doesn’t spend a lot of time there, but he gathers enough intelligence to know he must continue north and find a ford… it appears the so-called refugees are consolidating downstream. It is not that easy to see, however, as there is considerable dust rising in the valley: there are tepees extending about another half-mile downstream; Indians are feverishly herding ponies (remember, the Cheyenne kept their horses north of their encampment); panicking women, children, older folk, and warriors are scurrying about, heading downstream… it is close to mayhem.
Ten minutes after arriving, Custer begins to pull away from the bluffs, heads down the slope, enters Deep Coulee, then up its cutbank and out onto the Deep Coulee flats. Smith, backing away from some sharp, increasing, but still small resistance, follows Custer’s rear… maybe some of his men dismounted for better aiming and coverage.
In the meantime, Keogh, seeing some warriors coming down West or Middle Coulee, orders his battalion to fire a volley or two, then back away toward Nye – Cartwright. Keogh sees more Indians coming down MTC, spreading, and mounting the ridges to his rear. It takes him only three minutes to move to the next ridge and he orders his men to fire again, probably at the same Indians to his rear, but certainly aiming some of it at Indians who have crossed the river and are trailing Smith.
Eventually, the commands are re-united on Calhoun Hill and Custer leaves instructions with Keogh: wait for Benteen; he should be nearing at xx – hour; then follow along the top of the ridge until he would see Custer waiting… hopefully, that wait wouldn’t be too long. Custer moves off… objective: a river crossing at or below the refugees. In the meantime, more and more Indians are fleeing north; more and more are crossing the LBH at Ford B, sniping at and following Smith. Some—mounted—move into Deep Coulee, some leaving their horses there, crossing the flats and entering Calhoun Coulee, while others—mounted—continue up Deep Coulee, eastward.
So let us assume a time here—yy – hour. Keogh begins deploying his men; Calhoun sets up at least one skirmish line on Calhoun Hill—but I think probably two: one facing the upper reaches of Deep Coulee, the other facing the upper end of Finley – Finckle Ridge and the lower end of the Deep Coulee flats. The threat increases.
The timing now becomes very clear… a simple function of 2 + 3 + 5 = 10. The distance between the crossing point at Ford B and Calhoun Hill is known. The terrain is known. We assume a certain element of anxiety and immediacy in each Indian warrior. We can calculate intelligently a speed of movement while on foot. It is faster closer to Ford B because the farther from Calhoun Hill, the safer it is… so assume the warriors run a straight line from the egress point of Deep Coulee to the beginning of Calhoun Coulee. Then lower the speed; factor in jumping up, laying down, darting from ditch to bush, bush to ditch, crawling… and we can arrive at a “block” of time where warriors now become a serious threat to troops and horses along a ridgeline. The amount of time isn’t very long, especially considering how mad these men must have been and how adrenaline drove them on.
A 17 – minute time span can be considered very long or very short, depending on one’s perception of danger and the anxiety it produces. That same time span, however, must also take certain factors into consideration: the usual… distance and speed, speed now measured more by men afoot than mounted. And again, that 17 minutes was dictated not by theory, desire, favorites, or prejudices, it is determined by all those factors we have mentioned, plus a moment or two to gather wits and make decisions. There is no five minute hurry; no two hour hiatus; no 45 minute wait because we cannot make heads or tails out of what someone said or what someone else makes us believe. It is a pragmatic, reasonable approach supported by various accounts—the plural being the key here—despite poor translators and translations, sign language, fears of the white man’s retaliation, etc.
Happy New Year, Brenda.
Best wishes,
Fred.