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Post by shan on Jul 3, 2011 2:59:57 GMT -6
Whoops,
Shan
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Post by fred on Jul 3, 2011 5:51:51 GMT -6
The scenario suggested by Fred is one of high risk.... If Fred is correct then Custer is motivated by desperation and his own agenda. Yes, Wild, but only to a certain extent. Custer didn't think so... I am guessing. Again, we have a tendency to look at this... always... through hindsight. There are many narratives that state, (1) surprise; (2) that not all the Indians who fought Reno went on to fight Custer; and (3) that so many of the warriors took their sweet time to get into the fighting because of all the preening and preparation warriors went through in preparation for battle/to die. Again... I have to emphasize... Custer was under no pressure whatsoever at any time until he reached Cemetery Ridge. No pressure! In my opinion, this is the only way Custer would have done what he did (as I have outlined it), otherwise, Wild, you are correct. Desperation is not the issue because no one involved felt such an emotion. We look at it that way, because it clearly appears-- based on the size of the village and what was happening to Reno-- that the entire command was under similar pressure. The majority of the Indians, however, were still in the valley and their desperation and lack of communications kept their focus on Reno and their families. Only a few understood the threat developing to the east and moving north, but that threat soon become more widely known and that is what brought about the build-up of Indians moving to confront Custer. The biggest threat to Custer's command early on was the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot band of some 40 to 50 warriors and even that group split in two. It is my opinion that the volley firing was directed partially toward one or both of those bands. Again, however, they posed no serious threat and Keogh's carbines-- from Luce Ridge, Nye - Cartwright Ridge, and Calhoun Hill kept all of these potential threats at bay... at least for a while. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jul 3, 2011 6:02:46 GMT -6
... I want to thank you for mentioning Prof. Weigley in such a complimentary manner. Diane, It is easy to do. Weigley's book is one of the best WWII books I have ever read (and I have read a few, indeed!!). It is about the Western campaign from D-Day on. He is extremely objective and the book is loaded with smart, savvy, and intelligent snippets of tactical and strategic insights. A friend of mine gave it to me-- in paperback-- back around 1998 and I have seen it subsequently in Borders, hardcover and paperback, so it seems to be still in print. I took notes-- as usual-- throughout. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 3, 2011 7:56:36 GMT -6
Diane: Weigley's book was for a long time on the "Chief's Reading List" as one of the essentials. I fully agree with Fred. Top knotch from start to finish. He did for Western Europe what Freeman did for the ANV.
You might also want to give a look at "Once an Eagle" by Anton Meyer. Although it is a novel that pits the two characters of Courtney Massingale angainst Sam Damon, it gives insights into the military mindset better than anything I know of.
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Post by benteen on Jul 3, 2011 10:33:34 GMT -6
If Fred is correct then Custer is motivated by desperation and his own agenda.A commander with less of a personal stake depending on the outcome could have with no loss of face retreated,fallen back on his reserves and have won a draw. Wild, I don't expect anyone else to agree with me, in fact I will probably have a few salvos fired in my direction, so be it. This post of yours sums up what I believe to be the main factor, the key element in the annihilation of 5 companies of US Cavalry. I don't believe Custer went into this fight for the sake of any Army mission but rather as his last chance as Major Elliott said "For a brevet or a coffin". You cant ask a man to do more than die for his ambitions or desires, which Custer did. My anti-Custer bias is because he took 209 other men to their deaths who didn't share in his vision of fame and glory Remember folks one long, one short, then fire for effect Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Jul 3, 2011 10:46:18 GMT -6
I have no ammo, Dan, to agree or disagree. That is a mind-set and I am not qualified to dig into that realm. I view George Custer only as I have read of him as a military man and then I transcribe that into various actions at the LBH, i. e., his penchant for speed, risk, daring, etc. My only issue with "Wild's" post is in the word, "desperation," and the fact that I do not believe it was cogent for that point in time. It is more reminiscent of a Monday morning review rather than the mood at the time. I really, truly believe Custer felt he had things pretty much under control, even as late as his departure from Ford D and his first several minutes atop Cemetery Ridge. If that were not the case, he still could have salvaged two companies by running farther north beyond the enemy's reach. Instead, he chose to head back and fulfill what I believe was his plan, hatched in its finality, when he was atop Luce Ridge... or better yet, Calhoun Hill. I see him taking the risk, but I see it as a calculated risk he felt he could control. And that was all because no pressure had yet developed.
Now... is that arrogance on his part? Or mine?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 3, 2011 11:52:07 GMT -6
Dan: I think that Custer must have had a quest for redemption in his mind. For that not to be he would seem less than human. I don't think that was the only factor, but rather a contributing factor. As Fred says he thought himself, I believe, to be taking a calculated risk. It is to what degree redemption played within those calculations that we might question.
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Post by benteen on Jul 3, 2011 11:57:35 GMT -6
Fred,
Capt, you have more ammo than they had on June 6, 1944, as a gentleman you choose not to use it.There is no arrogance on your or Wilds part there is just stubbornness on mine
Sir yours, Wilds and others opinions and theories are based on painstaking research, mine isn't. It is a gut feeling based on certain facts, and one I cant let go of.
I try to post to others as a gentleman and we all want to be accepted and our opinions looked upon as knowledgeable,but at the risk of looking foolish I have to say what I believe and let the chips fall where they may. If I don't whats the point of posting at all.
Be Well Your stubborn friend Dan
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Post by fred on Jul 3, 2011 15:40:31 GMT -6
Shan, As usual, you always get to the heart of things and always present valid and challenging questions and ideas. One question though. I've been to the battlefield and walked a good part of it, but I wonder could Custer have really seen the ford at Deep ravine from Cemetery ridge? My memory of that area is that the river runs well below some fairly high bluffs in which case I would have thought the ford itself would be out of sight. The picture below is not the best, but it does give you somewhat of an idea of the terrain Custer was looking at from Cemetery Ridge. (My iPhoto album went haywire and I lost all the albums, though managed to save the pictures. The problem is that many of them wound up as duplicates and with almost 3,000 pictures I have too much to wade through right now.) In this picture, Custer was probably sitting farther down to the right. That would make the most sense to me, not needing to be too high up (and therefore too far away from Ford D) to be seen by Keogh and Benteen as they traveled along the Battle Ridge crest. If you look at the far, far right of the photo, you will see a notch in the ridge. That is the Deep Ravine ford area. The path down to Deep Ravine is noticeable, so you can see the edges of the ravine itself. I suspect the trees along the river were there in 1876, at least in some form, and I would suspect that a constant flow of riders into that notch area would be easily seen by riders atop the lower end of Cemetery Ridge. Otherwise, your memory of the area is spot-on. I would agree completely with this assessment. The depth of the ravine would clearly mask the depth of the threat, especially since riders were into the ravine before Custer reached the ridge. My estimates have Indians into Deep Ravine at least six minutes before Custer’s arrival on Cemetery, and some possibly even earlier than that (though I tend to doubt it). Dust is clearly a relevant issue here as well. Ah – h – h, herein lies some interesting stuff and you will have to e-mail me for the heart of the answer!! It is so cool, it is almost delirium! Let me just say that the headcut is not difficult to negotiate. Also, my estimates don’t have Yates arriving in that vicinity until some 20 minutes after Custer reached Cemetery Ridge, and in fact, he wasn’t sent until maybe five minutes after the command reached the ridge. Again, remember, the times have to be relative because of the number of people involved and the length of columns, etc. While “Custer” could reach a point at one specific time, the completion of the total event may take several minutes. I think this is probably accurate, except for the firing while they were moving toward Ford D. I would tend to doubt that, simply because of the distance involved, the time involved, and the previous circumstances of when the band split. Wolf Tooth was probably fired on in MTC by Keogh, and if Big Foot split off and took some warriors with him (or the other way around) he would have to guess that the troops would be heading north… not something I would be willing to credit the Indians with. For either of those elements to fire on Custer as he moved toward “D,” they would have to be moving inordinately fast; they would have to know his plan; and they would have to move too far east to avoid contact. Once the command was on Cemetery Ridge, I would think firing down on the troops was a real possibility. Yes, but I do not think it happened. By this time, Custer had divided his force to the limit and I doubt seriously he was willing to play with platoons at this juncture. Supposedly… and I have no reason to doubt it. Yes… to the first part; I have not thought about the second. I would suspect, however, that it could have been a combination of the two: increasing pressure from Deep Ravine and the calamity that was beginning to unfold along Cemetery Ridge. There is no doubt in my mind that a commander like Yates would and could have taken it upon himself to move toward the high ground. You flatter me my friend, and I am very appreciative of it… especially coming from a brilliant artist and a fine historian. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jul 3, 2011 15:47:15 GMT -6
... yours, Wilds and others opinions and theories are based on painstaking research, mine isn't. It is a gut feeling based on certain facts, and one I cant let go of. I try to post to others as a gentleman and we all want to be accepted and our opinions looked upon as knowledgeable,but at the risk of looking foolish I have to say what I believe and let the chips fall where they may. And what is wrong with any of that? You have never looked foolish to me and quite frankly I value your opinions and your ideas very much. No bull there; just fact. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Jul 3, 2011 17:03:57 GMT -6
Hi Dan Sir yours, Wilds and others opinions and theories are based on painstaking research, mine isn't. It is a gut feeling based on certain facts, and one I cant let go of And I try to post to others as a gentleman We share the same viseral source Dan.Where we differ is in that you are a gentleman.
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Post by benteen on Jul 3, 2011 17:08:22 GMT -6
Dan: I think that Custer must have had a quest for redemption in his mind. For that not to be he would seem less than human. I don't think that was the only factor, but rather a contributing factor. As Fred says he thought himself, I believe, to be taking a calculated risk. It is to what degree redemption played within those calculations that we might question. Quincannon, Sure thank you sir. I was very comfortable and content in my opinion but you have to ruin it with a logical,open minded and most of all fair statement You are of course correct and I don't disagree with any of your sentiment. I will go back to the drawing board and think it over. For now I will down grade my opinion from Custer completely wrong to mostly wrong. I will speak again to Mr Rossi and Mr Daniels as I have done before to seek their advice. Fine post sir, thank you Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Jul 3, 2011 17:12:10 GMT -6
... And what is wrong with any of that? You have never looked foolish to me and quite frankly I value your opinions and your ideas very much. No bull there; just fact. Best wishes, Fred. Fred, Capt thank you for the kind words, they are certainly very much appreciated Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Jul 3, 2011 17:16:31 GMT -6
[ We share the same viseral source Dan.Where we differ is in that you are a gentleman. Wild, For whatever my opinion is worth my friend we don't differ at all in that respect. Be Well Dan
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jul 4, 2011 4:07:51 GMT -6
Hi Guys, I have enjoyed the posts, and I see things a lot clearer now, Thank you. Its ironic that when I got back from the pub on Saturday night, I switched on the TV and the Discovery Channel was showing Custer's Last Stand, did any of you guys give any advice to this program, it said that Custer divided his men into three, one at Calhoun Hill (L Coy) and one at an area they never stated on there map (I & C Coys) the last was Custer's wing, they went down one ford and found the Village empty, so he went back up and tried another ford and found the Village there full of Indians (probably Non-Com's) seeing that he had bitten off more then he could chew, he then took the HQ, F & E Coys back up to Custer Ridge to wait for Benteen, whilst he was waiting the biggest fight took place on Calhoun (according to the program they found the most empty shell cases here) were the Indians snook up the area know as Greasy Grass hill and routed L Coy, this had a domino affect and things went from bad to worse, it also said that there was no last stand and the amount of empty shell cases around the area were Custer was found were few. The program also noted that the Indians used 47 different types of Rifles/Pistols etc, and 200 of those were repeaters. Great show. Regards Ian.
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