June 25: A Flight from the Timber

[fred]

After a (disputable) time on his skirmish line, Major Marcus Reno pulled his command into the timber. After a (disputable) time there, Reno decided to "charge" out of the woods and seek safety for his command on higher ground.



(Reno’s retreat point is in the distance. His command would have come in this direction, up these slopes, to the top of the hill.)



(This is where Reno probably crossed the LBH & the bluffs his men scaled to Reno Hill. His timber is the woods at the top of the river "S.")



(Reno's crossing area after leaving the timber. This picture is a little closer to the edge of the bluffs and is shot from a slightly different angle. What you are looking at is a little more up river, a little more to the left of the other two pictures.)

Best wishes,
Fred.

[conz]

On the last pic, I presume that Reno's intial charge towards the village was from the upper left to the lower right/center...spread across that broad plain.

Perhaps half way down this plain would be where Reno changed his formation to put all three companies on line.

Being lazy here...did Reno initially have his companies in column, and switched them to line formation? And when did the individual companies change formation...at the time the reserve company moved up on line, or back at the ford crossing?

Thanks,
Clair

[fred]

Clair--

No, again. Reno's retreat would be coming more from the right where that dark patch of green is. This is more of an up-valley shot. Notice the picture just above it and the orientation of that dark green patch.

Also, notice the difference in vegetation. The first picture was shot in April, 2006; the other 2 around June 12, 2007. Mike Fox pointed that all out on the other thread.

If you look in the first picture, you will see an array of buildings in the upper left. The skirmish line was supposed to have extended through those buildings and into the plain beyond. It was supposed to have been anchored to the timber to the right, not to the left. I believe the timber on the left is much greater today than it was in 1876. Reno would have left the timber and skirted the woods, then bending to his left toward the river.

Now go to the lower picture. I am guessing, but I would think he would have gone right through that yellowish patch right by the timber along the river's edge.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Bruce Liddic does extremely good work in describing Reno’s position in the timber: the troops are in a line facing west along an old dry cutbank of the LBH.
• The line extended about 150 yards.
• The woods in front and around the soldiers were heavily timbered with dense underbrush.
• Behind them, the woods opened into a “glade or grassy place.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 73]
• The horses were held in this “park-like” area.

All this time, the Indians are infiltrating Reno’s positions.

N.B.—One of the problems with Liddic is that he seems to assume too much. He makes the comment that this new position was much better than Reno’s original skirmish line, because the troops could take some cover behind this cutbank. While that may be true, he makes no allowances for Indians infiltrating from behind or from across the river and around the flanks. Reno’s men could not cut off the infiltration from their right side. Liddic claims Reno could have held here indefinitely and should have known there was “no precedent for organized troops numbering more than a hundred and armed with breach loading weapons, being overwhelmed by any combination of Indians.” [Vanishing Victory, p. 74] After proclaiming the woods a virtual fortress, Liddic, taking over Reno’s mind, writes, “the timber seemed to offer safety, but in 10 minutes it was no better than the open skirmish line.” [p. 75]

Reno’s retreat upstream begins (Richard Fox states Reno held his position in the timber for about 30 minutes; this creates about a 10 minute discrepancy with John Gray. Since Reno’s retreat was piecemeal, however, the trailing troops obviously spent more time in the timber). Liddic says less than 15 minutes.

Liddic says Reno asked CPT French what he thought of the situation. French was supposed to have replied, “I think we had better get out of here.” Afterwards, French was so incensed by this he reportedly wrote to LT Cooke’s mother, saying he should have shot Reno when he gave the retreat order. French never denied speaking to Reno about leaving the timber, but one minute before he bolted, Reno told French he was going to stay put. [Vanishing Victory, p. 75] Vern Smalley’s timing estimate jives with this timing at this point. [LBH Mysteries, p. 13-2]

Up to this point, there was no criticism of Reno’s actions by either his officers or his men.

Casualties at this point were still relatively light:
• MAJ Reno: Dorman killed, several troopers wounded.
• LT Wallace: 2 killed on skirmish line and 1 in the timber; several wounded.
• CPT Moylan: 1 killed and 1 wounded in A Company.
• SGT Culbertson: 1 wounded on the skirmish line, 4 wounded in timber.
• Dr. Porter: 1 man wounded.
• Dustin: 8 or 9 killed, though he claimed Reynolds and Dorman were killed on the skirmish line, which is incorrect.
• Graham: 1 killed.
• SGT Kanipe: not lost a man.

Once the soldiers began breaking up in the timber, the Indians began attacking close-up.

Greg Michno says the Indians who came crashing into the woods were led by Crazy Horse.

* Company A formed up first, then Company M; Company G was scattered within the woods and never received a definitive order to leave. As the troops formed up, their defensive fire slackened, allowing the Indians to get in even closer. The dust thrown up by the galloping horses and the smoke from the gunfire made the entire scene extremely confusing.

* Gray puts the retreat at 9 mph.
* Michno, making a comparison with the Kentucky Derby winner of 1876, Vagrant—who ran the 1 1/2 mile track in 2+ minutes—feels the “loaded, tired cavalry horses… would certainly have galloped the mile and a half in 4 or 5 minutes.” [Lakota Noon, p. 71]
* James Willert takes only slight exception to the panicked retreat scenario, claiming it was relatively well organized, with M Company on the left, A on the right (as were most of the Indians), and an incomplete G Company trailing. [LBH Diary, p. 307]
* The Rees—according to Little Sioux—were pushing the captured Sioux ponies up the bluffs about the time of Reno’s retreat, some several minutes before 4pm. Curley claims he saw this movement, thereby negating any claims that he rode with Boyer to Calhoun Hill. [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 88]
* Varnum tried to stop the panic, yelling at the men as he tried to reach the head of the column. When he saw Reno and Moylan out front, however, he stopped.

• Dr. Porter: “‘The tendency of the men was to keep on running, and LT Varnum tried to halt them.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 313]

* Varnum estimated the time from when Reno formed the skirmish line to when the retreat began, to be only about 30 minutes, total. [Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 163, RCOI testimony]
* Walter Camp infers that Reno was fighting for 20 minutes or less. [Custer in 76, p. 26]
* The Indians were concentrated mainly on the troopers’ right and rear.

* Michno, using Gray’s timing sequences, has Gall and Iron Cedar now crossing
the LBH to its east side, scaling the bluffs, and spotting Custer’s column, “about 2 miles east of the camp, kicking up dust and heading for the lower village.” [Lakota Noon, p.86]
* Other than scaling the bluffs, Gall’s account does not ring true. He claims several other warriors joined them and they dismounted and watched as Custer rode down the coulee, only 600 yards away. Custer spotted them—so Gall tells—and immediately became cautious, never getting much closer to the river.

Reno begins crossing LBH at “retreat ford,” all the while suffering severe casualties (probably at least 30 [20%+]) as his battalion disintegrated.
* River banks about 10 feet high at crossing point and the river about 4-5 feet deep [Connell, Son of the Morning Star].
* Liddic writes that recent research has concluded that Reno’s men split into 2 columns during this retreat, the majority heading for the nearest point of the river where they could ford. “Another group of about 20 men took an alternate route and rode southeast, directly to the LBH instead of skirting one of the river’s loops… the river had to be crossed 3 times by this group, and they reached the eastern bank at about the same crossing point used” by the others. [Vanishing Victory, p. 94]
• The first bank (into the water) was about 5 feet higher than the water. The river where most crossed was about 40 feet wide and up to the saddles in depth.
• The opposite bank was higher—maybe 8 feet—so the troopers had to scramble up a steep slope.
• “It has been recorded, that a person on foot in good physical shape, can make it to the top of the bluffs from the eastern bank of the river in less than 10 minutes…. The ravines going to the top had narrow deep draws interspersed with a dense tangle of shrubs and small trees.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 95]
* Varnum: “I think from what I saw that the Indians were withdrawn from us very near the time we left the woods. I don’t think there had been a great many withdrawn till we left. It seemed that whatever attack was made somewhere else, was made about the time we left the woods.” [Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 135, RCOI testimony]

Best wishes,
Fred.

[mwkeogh]

conz said:

On the last pic, I presume that Reno's intial charge towards the village was from the upper left to the lower right/center...spread across that broad plain.

Perhaps half way down this plain would be where Reno changed his formation to put all three companies on line.

Being lazy here...did Reno initially have his companies in column, and switched them to line formation? And when did the individual companies change formation...at the time the reserve company moved up on line, or back at the ford crossing?

Thanks,
Clair

Clair, to answer your question....yes, Reno's initial charge towards the village (based on the 3rd pic) was from the upper middle left to the upper middle right of the pic and spread across the open plain.
Part way down the plain, when Reno got a glimpse of the enemy, he changed his formation from column of 4's to line formation, moving the reserve company G up onto the line. There seems to be some debate about whether G Co. was moved up on the right or the left flank of the line. The companies changed formation while they were moving down the valley towards the village, the maneuver being described as being very smartly done.

[mwkeogh]

fred said:

Clair--

No, again. Reno's retreat would be coming more from the right where that dark patch of green is. This is more of an up-valley shot. Notice the picture just above it and the orientation of that dark green patch.

Fred, Clair was talking about Reno's charge towards the village, not his retreat from the valley. But this is a good description of the retreat route.

If you look in the first picture, you will see an array of buildings in the upper left. The skirmish line was supposed to have extended through those buildings and into the plain beyond. It was supposed to have been anchored to the timber to the right, not to the left. I believe the timber on the left is much greater today than it was in 1876. Reno would have left the timber and skirted the woods, then bending to his left toward the river.

There is still a lot of debate about where this skirmish line was located and I am not yet convinced of its true location. The location you mention above.....that it extended from the timber line out and thru the old (now closed) Fort Custer Museum building and into the plain beyond was first told to me by Jason Pitch back in 2000 or 2001. He claimed to have located numerous artifacts identifying this as the Reno Skirmish line. It struck me that, if true, this line extended well beyond 150 yards of length....certainly a problem.

Recently, Vern Smalley posted here a completely different location for Reno's skirmish line based on Jason Pitch's research. Apparently Jason has now changed his mind and moved Reno's line much further up the valley to where it faces nearly due north at the top of the garryowen bend and right smack in the middle of the interstate on both sides! This to me seems too incredible for belief.

Walter Camp was convinced that Reno's Skirmish line was much further to the south and east and much closer to the timber area. He identified Reno's charge as stopping before the 1st large drainage ditch (Otter Creek) about 3/4 of a mile short of Vern Smalley's proposed line across the interstate. He then has Reno advancing about 100 yards beyond the current drainage ditch with his right flank right on the timber position. Camp identified Reno's 2nd skirmish line as being exactly 202 magnetic azimuth degrees as shot from the top of Weir Point, or just west of the old Pitch homestead driveway. This location is based on Col. Gibbon's 1877 description of Reno's valley fight as being on the 3rd river bend downstream from Reno's 2nd (retreat) crossing.

Both of Pitch's proposed skirmish line locations leave Reno's right flank well open from the timber position. The Smalley/Pitch line is actually 3/4 a mile or so beyond the timber position. I find it very hard to believe that Reno's troopers could retreat on foot for that distance without being overrun and slaughtered by the mounted warriors. Thus, my own view tends to accept the Camp/Gibbon location of the Reno skirmish line in the valley as being the more likely location.

Both Camp and Pitch agree on the location of Reno's timber fight, so there is no real discrepancy there.

[fred]

Bill--

The position of the skirmish line I described as being through the old museum was told to me by Richard Fox. How does that tie in with the Pitsch/Camp site? Is it the same, close, or what?

We know the right flank of the line was anchored on the timber, so I don't think there is any problem there, but I believe you are wrong when you say 150 yards in length is "a problem."

I think the best description of the skirmish line's location was given by Bruce Liddic:

“[T]he skirmish line was formed about 500 yards to the east behind the former Reno Battlefield Museum, on a slightly diagonal axis. This fort-like building stands to the west, 1/10 of a mile, from the current irrigation ditch or what was then Reno’s Ravine. The right flank was about 100 yards from the river and extended out almost to the present gravel road, which enters from the service road paralleling the interstate highway, to the south of the museum building. The line advanced on a west by slightly north basis, about 300 feet, until the right flank was about 500 feet east of the present irrigation ditch, then stopped. There are no accounts which claim the battalion crossed this obstacle to their front. Jason Pitsch… told me… Kuhlman’s deductions on this point most closely match the physical evidence he uncovered.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 68]

From its right near the edge of the timber by an old dry channel of the river, the line extended only a short way into the valley [Michno, Lakota Noon, p. 56].
• According to LT Wallace, only about 75 men manned the line. If the normal 5-yard interval were maintained, the line would have stretched about 375 yards from the edge of the timber into the valley.
• According to SGT Culbertson of Company A, the line was about 200-250 yards long.

In either case, these numbers far exceed 150 yards.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[conz]

Some various Native accounts, to add flavor and perspective...

"The first attack was at the camp of the Uncpapas tribe. The shots neither raised nor fell. (Here he indicated that the whites commenced firing at about four hundred yards distance.) The Indians retreated - at first slowly, to give the women and children time to go to a place of safety. Other Indians got our horses. By that time we had warriors enough to turn upon the whites and we drove them to the hill, and started back to camp." – Crow King

“When we saw that the smoke was all going toward the soldiers that gave us a chance to charge from this side, and we all made a rush. When we made the charge we got them all stampeded.” -- Ohiyesa

"As the warriors rode on, the soldiers ran and mounted any horse and stopped fighting. Haw Man said, 'Charge,' and rode out in front at the soldiers alone the first time. So Hawk Man rode out in front and no one followed the first time. The second time he led. (Hawk Man was killed leading this charge.)" – Little Soldier

"When I looked around towards the soldiers they were running to their horses and Indians were thick as ants behind them. By this time the soldiers made quick for the LBH. The worst of it was that the soldiers struck very high banks of the river and all went over. When they struck the water it sounded like a cannon going off. This was awful as the bank was awful high." -- Brave Bear


“Just as the forces under Gall, Rain-in-the-Face and Crow King made their famous charge, the lower (north) end of the camp discovered General Custer and his men approaching. The two battles were fully two and one-half miles apart.” -- Ohiyesa


“By this time the soldiers were forming a battle line in the bottom about a half mile away. In another moment I heard a volley of carbines. The bullets shattered tipi poles. Women and children were running away from the gunfire. In the tumult I heard old men and women singing death songs for their warriors who were now ready to attack the soldiers. The songs made me brave. Warriors were given orders by Hawk Man to mount their horses and follow the soldiers to the forest and wait until commands were given to charge. The soldiers kept firing. Ten women were also killed. Father led my horse to me and I mounted. We galloped toward the soldiers. Other warriors joined in with us. When we were nearing the fringe of the woods, an order was given by Hawk Man to charge. The warriors were now near the soldiers. The troopers were all on foot. They shot straight, because I saw Hawk Man killed as he rode with his warriors. The charge was so stubborn that the soldiers ran to their horses and mounting them, rode swiftly toward the river where the horses had to swim to get across. Some of the warriors rode into the water and killed some of the soldiers and unhorsed some of them. The warriors chased the soldiers across the river and up over a bluff, then they returned to where the battle took place and sang a victory song. Someone said that another body of soldiers was attacking the lower end of the village. I heard afterwards that these soldiers were under the command of Pehin Hanska (Hair Long). With my father and other youthful warriors I rode in that direction holding my brother's war staff over my head. Rain in the Face shouted, "Behold, there is among us a young woman! Let no young man ride behind her garment!" knowing it would make the young men brave.” – Moving Robe

[erkki]

conz said:

“Just as the forces under Gall, Rain-in-the-Face and Crow King made their famous charge, the lower (north) end of the camp discovered General Custer and his men approaching. The two battles were fully two and one-half miles apart.” -- Ohiyesa

While I expect some of dc's healthy skepticism about Indian accounts would apply especially to Ohiyesa,
Vansina (Oral tradition as History. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985:194) terms such written accounts "messages" and points out that these "messages" have already gone through two interpretations: that of the sender and that of the receiver, a kind of double subjectivity.

"A first inclination is to hold the sources for better which go only through a single interpretation, and to deplore that fact that messages must go through at least two interpretations. But there is in fact a safeguard which renders the apparently more subjective sources (the messages) often more objective than the apparently less subjective sources (the direct evidence). The first interpretation limits the scope of the second, whereas nothing limits the interpretation of direct evidence. This is due in part to the different means of communication: language as opposed to direct perception...

Further, oral traditions develop within a community which experienced the events and that community excercises limitations on individual messages. Somewhere Dixon reported chiefs laughing at Two Moon' stories, and Two Moon said only that he didn't think it was a sin to lie to the white man.

As an example of the lack of limitation on direct evidence, Vansina used the example of archaeologists in Tripoltiana initially identifying oil presses as 'monuments of some prehistoric cult.' Similar interpretations of the Battle of the Little Bighorn based on the the field as it is presented exist.

Certainly all Camp interviews went through at least two interpretations since Camp did not take notes during the interview, but wrote up his interpretations afterward. This caveat applies to soldier interviews as well as native interviews requiring a translator. Equally, the officer recollections must also be seen as having developed in the course of after the battle discussions, just as oral traditions develop: note Godfrey's "theory with which we were then filled" (Custer Myth, p. 94); Varnum's testimony: "I base my opinion a good deal on other people's opinions compared with my own as to time;" and Benteen's changing his mind about Custer going into the village by two fords to they didn't get into the village at all (Custer Myth 299, 300).

On the whole, Ohiyesa supports the idea that the Custer forces became strongly engaged while the retreat from the valley was going on.

[mwkeogh]

fred said:

Bill--

The position of the skirmish line I described as being through the old museum was told to me by Richard Fox. How does that tie in with the Pitsch/Camp site? Is it the same, close, or what?

This description of the Reno skirmish line in the valley tallies up pretty close to what Jason Pitsch told me when I spoke to him in 2000 or 2001. However, it seems that he might have modified his views a bit as Vern Smalley has been out in the field with Jason and recently posted a map of his proposed skirmish lines that is far different than the description above. According to Vern, he has Jason locating the skirmish lines about 1/2 mile further north, just west of the Garryowen Loop. The Pitch/Smalley model does not match up at all with Camp's model, as the former is located about 3/4 mile closer to the village.

We know the right flank of the line was anchored on the timber, so I don't think there is any problem there, but I believe you are wrong when you say 150 yards in length is "a problem."

Sorry, I was mistaken about the 150 yard length. You point out one of the main problems with the Pitch/Smalley location for the skirmish line. The right flank of their proposed line lies 3/4 of a mile away from the timber position and anchored in the air on both sides.

I think the best description of the skirmish line's location was given by Bruce Liddic:

“[T]he skirmish line was formed about 500 yards to the east behind the former Reno Battlefield Museum, on a slightly diagonal axis. This fort-like building stands to the west, 1/10 of a mile, from the current irrigation ditch or what was then Reno’s Ravine. The right flank was about 100 yards from the river and extended out almost to the present gravel road, which enters from the service road paralleling the interstate highway, to the south of the museum building. The line advanced on a west by slightly north basis, about 300 feet, until the right flank was about 500 feet east of the present irrigation ditch, then stopped. There are no accounts which claim the battalion crossed this obstacle to their front. Jason Pitsch… told me… Kuhlman’s deductions on this point most closely match the physical evidence he uncovered.” [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 68]

Liddic's description of Reno's skirmish lines is closer to Camp's findings. They both do not have the skirmish line running thru the old museum site, but rather well short of it. Camp locates the left of the skirmish line as resting just beyond the dirt/gravel road and the right flank resting on the timber position. The main difference between them is that Liddic would propose that Reno's line fell back towards the timber position (thus was slightly west of it, while Camp proposes that the skirmish line moved forward into the timber position--a right wheel maneuver (his line being just east of the timber position). In neither case would they agree with Richard Fox that the line was situated so far to the west that it bisected the old museum. The distance from the timber position to the old museum is far greater than any proposed skirmish line should be factoring in the 5 foot intervals.

From its right near the edge of the timber by an old dry channel of the river, the line extended only a short way into the valley [Michno, Lakota Noon, p. 56].
• According to LT Wallace, only about 75 men manned the line. If the normal 5-yard interval were maintained, the line would have stretched about 375 yards from the edge of the timber into the valley.
• According to SGT Culbertson of Company A, the line was about 200-250 yards long.

In either case, these numbers far exceed 150 yards.

Best wishes,
Fred.

I was mistaken when I placed the skirmish line at 150 yards. I meant to say 250 yards according to Culbertson statement to Camp. It is interesting tho, that if true, it meant that the normal 5 yard interval between men was reduced to about 3 yards.

[fred]

Bill--

We were standing in the foothills when Fox told us how far out he thought the skirmish line was. I questioned him then and I question him now, believing the participants rather than the good professor. It becomes even more so-- as you say-- when you consider that the normal interval went from 5 yards to 3 yards-- the "scare" factor.

There is also something rather unusual about the RCOI testimony, and for some odd reason, I have not been able to reconcile this with the way my mind works. Several people who were there said the line moved into the timber "by the right flank." That-- to me-- sounds like a pivot on the right flank, the left end of the line moving forward rather than back. If that were the case, the left side of the line would be moving into the enemy rather than backing away. [See Culbertson, Gerard, and Moylan, below.]

There are also several excellent descriptions of the timber itself and its location, viz a viz, the river.

SGT Culbertson—
Some men fired very fast. They remained there some time when Culbertson heard the command “to move by the right flank. The skirmish line was moved by the right flank, every man moving off towards the timber.” Culbertson stopped at the edge of the timber on the brow of the hill. He had 3 men with him. Others moved into the timber itself. [367-368]

LT DeRudio—
1. The skirmish line advanced 75 to 100 yards. The troopers’ carbines were not able to reach the Indians, but some of the Indians’ fire reached the troops. [314]
2. Soon, the Indians were to the front, left, and rear. The only side the troops were not receiving fire from was the right. [314]
3. The skirmish line remained there for about 10 minutes. [314] 10 or 12 minutes. [317]
4. LT Wallace called DeRudio’s attention to some Indians entering the timber. DeRudio took five or six A Company men from the right of the line and moved into a small path in the woods to counter the Indians. He went down a bank into the woods, then into an opening where there were some tent poles and some meat drying, and then saw some Indians through the woods. [314]
• Company A was—by this time—next to the woods on the skirmish line’s right. [325] [That means Company G had already moved into the timber with Reno.]

Fred Gerard—
* When Gerard dismounted after going down the LBH valley—and having let the troops get ahead of him—the command was already forming a skirmish line and the horses were being led into the timber. When Gerard dismounted, he was 40 to 75 yards behind the troops (with Herendeen, Reynolds, and Bloody Knife). [118]
• Gerard claimed he only saw that the left of the line became the right. If this were the case, the left would have pivoted forward rather than backward, and I do not believe that is what happened. His description seemed to befuddle the court as well. He did not see the line move forward from where it originally formed. [See 118] This “right” move, however, agrees with Moylan’s testimony. [217]
• He backed up his story by claiming the right of the line was at point C—what Gerard called “the brow of the hill”—on Maguire’s map for some time. [119]

LT Hare—
* There was very little large timber there; it was mostly underbrush. “The basin or park was about 200 yards wide and the north bank four or five hundred yards long where it runs into the river. There is a cut bank downstream and there is a bend on the other side continuing to where the river makes this cut bank, in this there is a little park containing about 10 acres of ground.” [293]
• The prairie was 5 or 6 feet above the level of the “park” and ran around the “park.” [294]
• You could see all the way back to Ford A from the edge of the timber. [300]

George Herendeen—
1. The command came up to a point of timber that jutted out into the valley and that was where Reno halted and formed his skirmish line. [251-252]
2. Herendeen moved to the rear of the line and waited in a small swale. [252]
3. After the three men fired at the Indian, they moved their horses into the timber. Eventually, when Herendeen came out, he got separated from Gerard and Reynolds. He saw Indians circling around the hills and coming closer in the valley. He could not see the troops because of the way he was facing, but he saw Indians getting into the timber. He went back in, firing at the Indians—about 7 or 8 shots—but all the horses were gone except his. When he reached the glade he saw a company drawn up in line—in close order—facing the stream. [253]
• Herendeen tied up his horse in the timber somewhere between the glade and the prairie. [264]
• The glade was between the village and where Herendeen tied his horse. [266]

CPT Moylan—
1. Company G was on the right, Company A in the center, and Company M on the left. [216]
2. From the skirmish line’s right to the river was probably 150 to 200 yards. The first 30 yards were timbered, the balance being trees here and there with scattered underbrush. “In the timber was some heavy undergrowth.” [223]
3. The village began not more than 300 yards from the extreme right of Moylan’s command. [223]
4. After about 10 minutes Reno got a report that Indians were coming up along the left riverbank to threaten the horses. Reno withdrew the greater portion of G and went into the woods. This left a gap between Moylan’s right and the edge of the timber and he moved his troops wider apart to cover the gap. [216]
• Moylan noticed Indians moving to the line’s left and he went to the edge of the hill [Gerard’s “brow”] and called to Reno to see what was happening. Reno came up, looked, and ordered the line withdrawn to the edge of the woods. [216]
• Moylan also—as did Gerard—said the companies made a right flanking movement to get to the edge of the “brow.” [217]
• “About half of M Company had to face to the left again in order to change front in the direction of the hills, as the attack was being made from that direction….” [217]

LT Varnum—
1. Varnum rode into a glade within the timber and saw the stream. He figured part of the village was across the river and that was what they were going to attack. He heard no orders, but then saw Reno with G Company, helping to deploy it to move through the woods. G was on the downstream side of the glade. Reno asked Varnum if he had just come from the skirmish line and Varnum replied in the affirmative. [142]
2. He described the timber as being very heavy along the edge of the second bench; dense underbrush, little paths into it made by animals, then the glade with grass, small tress along the river’s banks. [147]
3. Varnum thought it might have been 100 yards from the right of the skirmish line to the river. [This would have been the width of the timber with the right flank anchored on the timber’s edge.] [147]
4. Varnum said it was tough getting into the timber: “… delayed by the narrow intricate paths in the first edge of the timber…” Reno asked him to go back and check on the line, then report to him. [142]
5. He spotted Moylan, but could not see all the men. Moylan said his horses were beyond the left flank of the line and the Indians were circling into the timber from his left, trying to cut off the horses. Varnum went back to try to bring the horses up. [142]

LT Wallace—
1. Command halted about 150 yards from the river. It “advanced to where the creek made a quick bend and the right wing was resting on top of the cut bank with the creek below. The village was across the bend, 75 or 100 yards to the first tepee, but on the same side of the stream we were.” [25]
2. The skirmish line’s right was anchored in the timber. [22-23]
3. The skirmish line took up a few hundred yards. [23]
4. Skirmish interval was 5 yards; Wallace thought 70 or 75 men were on the skirmish line. [48]
5. Skirmish line advanced 100 yards, horses all in the timber, right flank resting on the timber. [25]
6. After forming the skirmish line, Wallace saw Reno go into the timber with McIntosh and Company G. Wallace did not see Reno, but heard his order to “charge.” [27]
7. Shortly after the skirmish line advanced to where it finally halted, Wallace looked back and did not see Custer.
8. He could see a ravine a few hundred yards in front of the river’s loop when they halted. Indians were coming out of the ravine. [26]
9. Reno’s timber grew in a former bed of the LBH and the trees were young, none as big as a man’s body. Thick undergrowth. The body of timber was crescent-shaped on a bank 4 or 5 feet high. Only 25 yards wide, no protection. Could not have remained there. [30-31]
10. The bottoms were 4 to 5 feet higher than where the timber grew. [31]
• From the descriptions of others, it appears the timber itself was on a slight plateau—though below the general prairie—and when the skirmish line withdrew it pulled back into an old river channel, the “brow” (see Gerard’s testimony) of which formed the bank on which the troopers fired from. The opposite bank seemed to form the west side of this plateau, the east side being formed by the LBH’s left cut-bank.
• Moylan’s testimony: “… [F]rom the timber Major Reno could not have done any damage to the village or anyone in it. The ground was so much lower than that on which the village stood that he would overshoot the village.” [234] See Moylan’s testimony.
11. One end of the timber was probably 100 yards from the village. [31] The skirmish line advanced until its right hit the loop of the stream, then it halted. [49]

Of course the land and the river have changed so much since then, that I would think Pitsch's locating of artifacts would probably be the most definitive evidence in trying to pinpoint the exact location.

What about this "right flank" movement? You are a re-enactor, so you are probably more familiar with the 19th-century terminology than I am. Am I reading this correctly? If you look at Moylan's testimony, he was in the middle, then became the right when G moved into the woods. When the line pulled back, Moylan was the left. That certainly seems to me like they wheeled forward rather than back. Very odd, don't you think, moving into the Indians?

Best wishes,
Fred.