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Post by fred on Nov 9, 2007 16:04:54 GMT -6
Reno's skirmish line was set in front on a number of yelping and screaming warriors. It extended from the edge of a timbered area near the river out into the prairie. His command was stretched thin, all the more so because one trooper in four had to hold the horses, reducing his effective manpower by 25%... As Indians began to turn his left flank, Reno was forced to move his command into the woods. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Moltke on Feb 10, 2012 7:39:07 GMT -6
I'm reading through your posts on your thoughts for the battle chronology Fred. Wish some of those photos were still linked. Anyway, a question for you concerning Reno's attack. His orders were to attack the village and that he would be supported by the entire column. As the charge is being made, what really forced him into the terrible skirmish line? Was it just the sight of the full size of the village? An opinion that his forces couldn't survive nor undertake continued attack into the village? Geography? Number of Indians coming at him? The fact that the warriors were actually attacking rather than fleeing? In light of any of these reasons, a skirmish lines seems to be a bad strategic place to put yourself into. If the village size or number of defenders shocks and forces a halt to your attack, dismounting and forming a skirmish line with no real way to anchor your left seems like a worse situation. Just trying to put together his rationale and what the other officers such as Weir had to say about it. Was the formation of a skirmish lines directly asked at the inquiry? Again, my questions pertain just to the halting of the charge and forming skirmish lines ... not the disorganized and bloody retreat to the hills.
As always, thanks for the info.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 10, 2012 7:54:16 GMT -6
Hi lonewulf, going what info I have picked up over the last 12 months or so, it seems like Reno had no option but form Skirmish lines, he had a creek full of Indians in front of him plus all the dust and smoke obscuring his view, the other option open to him was turn around retreat and form a defensive line further back, but this would be against Custer’s orders, to attack the village.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Feb 10, 2012 9:33:38 GMT -6
The second Fred or anyone get sicks of my LBH trivia game show I can attempt a more specific thread based strategy. Lonewulf, As long as you ask intelligent questions and are interested in learning and discussing this thing civilly, "fred" will not get sick of your questions and our discussion. Now... on to a different thread... Wish some of those photos were still linked. I think, Lonewulf, those pictures disappeared when my iPhoto corrupted. There were some acrimonious exchanges going on here at the time, but I never took the pictures down... sorry. Well, I would not categorize the skirmish line as "terrible"; it saved his command, all things considered. Now... first and foremost: remember to keep things simple. That is paramount. This was war and war keeps things very, very simple. Contrary to what you generally read, written by all these historians and so-called battle scholars, Reno did not charge directly down the valley, i. e., a straight-line movement. If you read the various accounts, drop all your preconceptions and just concentrate on what these men said, you will find a couple of accounts that say there was a rapid advance; no charge, per se; and they followed the general course of the river. That's not straight-line. As the troops moved down the valley, Indians threw up a tremendous screen of dust. Then, as Reno got nearer the village they came in proximity of a large outcrop of timber and off to the left an intermittent creek bed, still visible on maps and still visible today on the ground. (Somewhere on these boards, I posted a picture of it.) That creek bed was filling with Indians who were coming out of the village. Reno chose to stop rather than plunge his command into that creek, amidst heaven-only-knew how many Indians. That is when he formed the skirmish line. He merely pivoted his command clockwise, putting M Company on the left, "A" in the middle, and "G" on the right, anchored on the SW edge of that "jutting" timber. M Company skirmishers moved west, toward the benchlands, and wound up breaking contact with A Company to their right. This is what witnesses meant went they referred to "two" skirmish lines, not a single line, moving north, joined, 300 yards long, from Point A to Point B. Those are erroneous assumptions. At least in my opinion, from what I have culled from the various accounts. This is where almost everyone I have ever read gets it wrong. They allow their mental images of what happened-- developed from reading even others-- to dictate their theory, rather than letting the accounts of those who were there-- white and red, soldier and civilian-- dictate theory. Does this answer your question(s)? Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Moltke on Feb 10, 2012 10:12:43 GMT -6
... it seems like Reno had no option but form Skirmish lines, he had a creek full of Indians in front of him plus all the dust and smoke obscuring his view, the other option open to him was turn around retreat and form a defensive line further back, but this would be against Custer’s orders, to attack the village. Hi Ian, As to that initial halt of the charge, do we have testimony of junior officers who agree (or disagree) with Reno's reasoning to halt and dismount? It's a matter of point of view, but it seems that forming the skirmish line by nature conflicts with his orders to attack the village. We ... correction I tend to think of Custer's order to attack as intending a kind of 'Washita' style one. I see that it can be argued that just being seen and positioned on the village at all creates the fight or attack/distraction Custer likely sought but if conditions cause a charge by 3 comp. of the 7th to be halted then a weak skirmish line seems a worse position to take. Orders are orders but if Reno considers stationary skirmish lines still following the order to attack then organizing a better position could have been too. If the skirmish line forms due to battle conditions and Reno feels he cannot continue to follow the orders then he's already chosen to break off the 'attack' and it seems like he should have again placed his men in a better position. On either point, as the condition of Reno's fight changes it seems prudent for him to ensure that Custer is notified of those changes. When Custer is last seen on the hills, did he see the skirmish line formed already? I'm trying to juggle the times and locations in relation to what Custer knew about Reno's position and condition when he lost sight of them and indirectly what he found out by notes. By condition I mean basic things like if his command was still pressing forward an attack, were mounted, in heavy fight ect ect. When Reno notifies Custer twice that he has 'Indians at his front' ... that's essentially telling Custer nothing he didn't know correct? Speaking of those messages and their ill fated messengers, at what point in the Reno fight were each of the two messengers ( privates McIlhargey and Mitchell) sent to Custer? Was Reno still in skirmish line or had the collapse to the timber started? And connecting to above, I can understand that Reno and his survivors are basically in a life or death state but was there any indication that some kind of debate or discussion as to the need to update Custer via another messenger. Of course, I have to remind myself that hindsight always has better vision so at some point you have to put yourself in Reno's position and realize that he wasn't trying to be routed it just happened.
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Post by bc on Feb 10, 2012 11:08:16 GMT -6
I think it was standard cavalry tactics at the time to support a charge with skirmish line fire. I don't see anything wrong with what Reno did when he stopped. His skirmishers fired, forced the NAs back, and the skirmishers advanced again. Things went wrong when NAs came out of the benchlands and began flanking him while at the same time some NAs adjacent to the timber area caused Reno to withdraw part of his skirmish line and move them to the timber. Then M had to shift around to keep from getting flanked.
I personally think Reno's attack orders were in the context of driving the NAs north which did not necessarily mean immediately entering the Hunkpapa vill. That is something that wouldn't work as part of his RCOI defense however.
But no matter what, Reno had NAs up on the benchlands and some NAs in the timber area of the Garryowen loop and there is no way he could leave them in his rear by continuing north. From the testimony however, Reno didn't know about the NAs in the timber or those on the benchlands until after he stopped.
bc
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Post by Moltke on Feb 10, 2012 12:18:02 GMT -6
I think it was standard cavalry tactics at the time to support a charge with skirmish line fire. I don't see anything wrong with what Reno did when he stopped. His skirmishers fired, forced the NAs back, and the skirmishers advanced again. Things went wrong when NAs came out of the benchlands and began flanking him while at the same time some NAs adjacent to the timber area caused Reno to withdraw part of his skirmish line and move them to the timber. Then M had to shift around to keep from getting flanked.bc Hmmmm I see. Would you say that Reno ... well ... hoped then that skirmish line would strong enough to repel any frontal assaults while causing enough panic and confusion to keep Indian flank movements to a minimum? Thus stopping any from escaping past him while Custer attacked from (an)other angle(s). I personally think Reno's attack orders were in the context of driving the NAs north which did not necessarily mean immediately entering the Hunkpapa vill. That is something that wouldn't work as part of his RCOI defense however. Do you mean that at the RCOI a prevailing opinion was that his orders were more directly tied to entering the or a village? Also speaking of the Timber specifically. It seems that when I look at maps of the battlefield that it does create a dangerous region on or near his flank that Indians could move through. Did he ever indicate if he simply thought that his attack would rout or scatter any enemy forces north or away from him and thus go in the opposite directions of the timber or did he hope that his forces would be able to secure it? But no matter what, Reno had NAs up on the benchlands and some NAs in the timber area of the Garryowen loop and there is no way he could leave them in his rear by continuing north. From the testimony however, Reno didn't know about the NAs in the timber or those on the benchlands until after he stopped. Basically your saying though that even had he did continued to move north ... it essentially would have just asked for his forces to be encircled? Hence with or without the knowledge that they were there ... his skirmish line stop effectively saved him from a potentially worse defeat? Btw, Is there a good source for reading statements from the RCOI?
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Post by Moltke on Feb 10, 2012 12:32:13 GMT -6
As long as you ask intelligent questions and are interested in learning and discussing this thing civilly, "fred" will not get sick of your questions and our discussion. Well, I suppose I'll let those much more informed than I decide whether the questions are intelligent or not but my interest will always be there and with that civil debate/discussion. Rest assured. Does this answer your question(s)? Yes, in that it changes the mindset somewhat and thus the questions. I think my mindset still has lingering aspects of some of those 'assertions' concerning the line(s) and " charge". I'm not that familiar with the specifics of the breakdown of the Reno field. As the situation turned against Reno, what were his initial moves? Was there any official attempt to keep Company "G" in place anchored at the Timber while swinging back "H" and the more distant "M"? Or was it just a gradual push back into the Timber amidst an ever lessening amount of cohesion amongst the command. Culminating into the rout across the river.
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Post by fred on Feb 10, 2012 22:59:08 GMT -6
As the situation turned against Reno, what were his initial moves? Was there any official attempt to keep Company "G" in place anchored at the Timber while swinging back "H" and the more distant "M"? Or was it just a gradual push back into the Timber amidst an ever lessening amount of cohesion amongst the command. Culminating into the rout across the river. Early on, Reno split up "G" by taking a number of men and bringing them into the timber. Both A Company and G Company had their horses there; there was a small patrol from M Company that had been directed to clear the timber, but it was very dense and the only way through it was over some buffalo and pony trails. Apparently, some of the horse-holders-- or maybe men from the M Company patrol-- spotted infiltrators and that caused Reno to bring the G Company men into the woods. As A Company (not "H," Lonewulf) plus the few from "G," and M Company advanced, they became more spread out, and Indians on foot and on horseback backed away. As more and more Indians mounted, they began to threaten "M's" left flank and rear and Reno was informed of this. There is some confusion or controversy as to who ordered the pullback, but I believe-- tenuously-- that it was Reno himself. It was reported that the line(s) pivoted clockwise in their retreat, and based on their final positioning at the edge of the timber, this makes sense. While few believe it, M Company, in fact, held their own horses, mounted and rode back to the timber. Those who do not believe this either are too stuck on their own theories or have simply not done the research. You can be assured the M Company troops didn't stroll back and there were some reports that some of the others, as well, broke for the woods, though the officers generally put a stop to that. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by KarlKoz on Feb 11, 2012 16:11:47 GMT -6
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Post by Moltke on Feb 13, 2012 10:30:07 GMT -6
Thank you. As A Company (not "H," Lonewulf) plus the few from "G," and M Company advanced, they became more spread out, and Indians on foot and on horseback backed away. As more and more Indians mounted, they began to threaten "M's" left flank and rear and Reno was informed of this. Bah, sorry can't type. There is some confusion or controversy as to who ordered the pullback, but I believe-- tenuously-- that it was Reno himself. It was reported that the line(s) pivoted clockwise in their retreat, and based on their final positioning at the edge of the timber, this makes sense. While few believe it, M Company, in fact, held their own horses, mounted and rode back to the timber. Those who do not believe this either are too stuck on their own theories or have simply not done the research. I'm reading through a lot of the inquiry currently so this may be answered and maybe I'm just forgetting something but why the discrepancy over the order. Did Reno state one way or the other as to giving that specific order? If so, apparently some of the survivors doubt this being true? What are the commonly held estimates of how much time passed from the last runner to custer being sent and Reno basically then falling back to the Timber? As is the usual, your answers and opinions are very appreciated Fred.
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