Custer Engages the Hostiles

[bradandlaurie]

CUSTER ENGAGES THE HOSTILES

Charles F. Bates; Charles F. Roe; Edward J. McClernand; George D. Wallace; Charles King et al: The Old Army Press, Fort Collins, Colorado, n.d. [no bibliography, few notes]

Not exactly rare, but worth the effort to find a copy [used about $30], this neat little compendium from Mike Koury includes: Custer's Indian Battles by Bates; Custer's Last Battle by Roe; March of the Montana Column by McClernand; Wallace's Report; Comanche Still Lives from the Recruiting News, 1926; The Fight on Custer Hill from the Cavalry Journal, 1927; and a few other articles or excerpts. Several of these items appear on Tal Luther's Custer High Spots.

Bates' narrative dates from 1936, is pro-Custer and aside from errors in clock times gives a basic "standard version" of the Little Bighorn Fight, as well as covering Custer's early years on the plains, including Washita and its aftermath. Roe, who led the Terry/Gibbon advance up the valley on the 26th of June, gives an unbiased account of what he saw and heard, and it is very illuminating. This story first appeared in 1904, and was published in 1910.

McClernand was the official itinerist with Gibbon's command, and his report is essential to an understanding of what Gibbon did and didn't do [and when] on the campaign. His account of the fight on Custer Hill, taken from the Cavalry Journal, is based on what he saw there. Wallace's report of Custer's march is, of course, another essential.

With primary [and important] sources, many excellent maps, both period and later [including Maguire's original], and several seldom-seen photographs [including some 1886 Barry], this volume is a worthy addition to any Little Bighorn/Custer library, and is highly recommended.

Reviewed by G.C. Harper



Regards,

Little Gordie, whose last review was in 1972......................................................

["Hunk" Papa]

I have carefully checked Roe's account against other primary sources and his comments need to be used with caution. For example, he remarks that one June 24th 'we bivouacked for the night on Tullocks Creek near its confluence with the Big Horn River,as the General [Terry] had planned before leaving the Tongue'. He could not have known what Terry had planned on the Tongue because he wasn't there with him.

Hunk

[harpskiddie]

That could be a simple slip of the Tongue, where he meant to say Rosebud, or perhaps Terry or Gibbon mentioned it to Roe, although I do not believe Terry envisaged this particular move before Reno returned from his scout.

Everything needs to be used with caution when dealing with this subject matter, but Roe is a primary [and sometimes only] source for much of the information he imparts, whether or not one tends to agree with his conclusions.

Gordie,
tell Laura I love her. Tell Laura not to cry, my love for her will never die...........................

["Hunk" Papa]

What concerns me most about Roe's Narrative is that it appears to have been compiled from memory some 28 years after the Battle. Apparently the bulk of it is formed by an address Roe gave in 1904 to a convention of the New York National Guard. It was first printed in the exact form of that address in 1910 and later in the form appearing in 'Custer Engages the Hostiles' but the latter only after consultations with and suggestions by, W.A. Graham, E.S. Godfrey, W.S. Edgerly, C.F. Bates, C.H. Asbury and others. As it was also post-battle and very much in line with the official post-battle versions, I would be wary of using anything in it that can be verified against other sources.

Hunk

["Hunk" Papa]

Oops, that should be 'cannot be verified against other sources.' Its past my bedtime

H

[harpskiddie]

That last sentence, as corrected, should be gospel for any evidence anywhere from anyone.

Gordie,
just walk on by - wait on the corner.........................

[Montana Bab]

Thank you, Gordie......I just ordered this book on your word! I was getting worried there for a minute.

Trouble is, I am wary of almost everything I read on this subject. And it is very hard to get to the "guts" of the matter. So I have decided to use..... my woman's intuition ....it's gotten me this far!

This is a great help, Diane, and I'm glad this thread was started!

B&B

[harpskiddie]

Bab:

It's worth the price of admission for the maps.

Gordie,
tellin' stories to a child wont change the hand of fate. We've just gotta stop it now - tomorrow's gonna be too late..............................................................................

["Hunk" Papa]

Gordie, I subscribe to your gospel, but in Roe's case, doubly so. I wouldn't even call his narrative a primary source. There is no evidence that he kept either a diary or a journal so his narrative was compiled from memory 28 years after the event and by a man who appears to want to talk up his own part in the proceedings and is also someone who believes everything he hears from his superiors. His letter of July 4 1876 to his wife, reproduced in "Two Battles of the Little Big Horn" edited by John M. Carroll shows that only 9 days after the Battle, he had already swallowed, without question, the 'blame Custer' scenario, when he writes, "The foolish division of his command was his ruin." His narrative is very much in the same vein.

Hunk

[elisabeth]

My copy came today, at long last. McClernand's take on things is interesting -- particularly his idea that Calhoun's company was originaly stationed on its own, proved "not up to the task", and that Keogh's was then sent to back it up. He makes the point that the dead led horses of the two companies were not found in the same location, which they would have been if the two had been dismounted simultaneously. This is especially interesting because, as far as I know, no-one else who saw the battlefield in the immediate aftermath says anything about Co. I's horses; without McClernand's observation, we could easily assume they were with L's, or even be uncertain as to whether Co. I was mounted or dismounted when disaster struck.

He's writing 50 years later, it's true (published in 1927) but he does say that these are the deductions he made from what he saw at the time -- implying that he made the deductions in 1876. So there's no reason to suppose his memory's at fault on this. Within the 7th Cavalry itself, I suppose, the be-kind-to-Maggie-Calhoun imperative might have silenced anyone reaching a similar conclusion; as an outsider, he wouldn't be so curbed, perhaps.

Bates is a very mixed bag, isn't he? Riddled with inaccuracies and deliberate omissions (e.g. the small matter of the court-martial) in his account of the early years; vicious towards Reno, and almost as much so towards Benteen; yet his detail on the post-tradership scandal is great ... Odd man. Wish I felt more confidence in him.

Agree about the maps. Valuable beyond belief. Intriguing to note the Maguire/Becker interpretation of the route of Custer's command versus that shown in the Godfrey-supervised map (p. 16 in Roe's account). And also, in the latter, the point of Martini's departure. Fascinating stuff.

[harpskiddie]

Vern Smalley made mention of memory on another thread, in relation to Hare perhaps forgetting having met or corresponded with Walter Camp. It is true that people generally tend to forgetfulness in their advanced years, but not necessarily in respect of everything. I, for example, who am of the exact age as was Hare when he wrote the letter referenced, have difficulty recalling the details of some events from last year, but can recall in every detail the day I spent with my son on Father's Day in 1999, most of the details of my brief stay in Winnipeg in 1958, and almost all of my snowbound football playoff game in 1955.

Memory of super-significant events or people in one's life, I would hazard a guess, tends to become imprinted on one's brain [I'm sure that there are studies]. While accounts closer to the event might be more reliable, I don't think one can simply dismiss later ones simply because they are later. Like any other evidence, you want some sort of corroboration if you can get it.

The corroboration for McClernand's view of the Calhoun position comes from the [true] markers, and from other accounts as well. Put them all together, they spell Mother.

Gordie,
no no no don't sing this song, it belongs to P.F. Sloan..............................................................

[mwkeogh]

elisabeth said:

My copy came today, at long last. McClernand's take on things is interesting -- particularly his idea that Calhoun's company was originaly stationed on its own, proved "not up to the task", and that Keogh's was then sent to back it up. He makes the point that the dead led horses of the two companies were not found in the same location, which they would have been if the two had been dismounted simultaneously. This is especially interesting because, as far as I know, no-one else who saw the battlefield in the immediate aftermath says anything about Co. I's horses; without McClernand's observation, we could easily assume they were with L's, or even be uncertain as to whether Co. I was mounted or dismounted when disaster struck.

This is a real revelation Elisabeth. It seems to indicate that I Co. was not sitting mounted (or standing to horse) at the bottom of that ravine. On the contrary, McClernand speaks of the dead led horses of the two companies found in different locations. Note the emphasis on the word led. That means that Keogh had at least one platoon (as I have always suspected) dismounted. I doubt very much that anyone here would think they were dismounted and standing around at the bottom of that gulch. If the horses were in fact, led, then at least one platoon of I Co. was engaged with the hostiles on foot.

[harpskiddie]

I would think it's tough to tell a dead horse from a dead led horse, since most of the led horses would not have been standing around waiting to be shot down in formation. This also flies in the face of other accounts which speak of Calhoun's led horses having been stampeded. at leasat one account speaks of the paucity of horse bones at Calhoun the next year. The two companies might have been dismounted simultaneously in different positions, just as they were found [with some movement between them, one way or the other].

The whole idea of led horses assumes that the troops were dismounted and dismounted by command [not necessarily of an officer]. I think virtually all of I Company became dismounted one way or another, and did all the fighting they ever did on foot. Same comment applies to almost everybody. There was not much fighting mounted, at least not much evidence of same.

Gordie,
they said someday you'll find all who love are blind.................................................................

[mwkeogh]

harpskiddie said:

I would think it's tough to tell a dead horse from a dead led horse, since most of the led horses would not have been standing around waiting to be shot down in formation. This also flies in the face of other accounts which speak of Calhoun's led horses having been stampeded. at leasat one account speaks of the paucity of horse bones at Calhoun the next year. The two companies might have been dismounted simultaneously in different positions, just as they were found [with some movement between them, one way or the other].

The whole idea of led horses assumes that the troops were dismounted and dismounted by command [not necessarily of an officer]. I think virtually all of I Company became dismounted one way or another, and did all the fighting they ever did on foot. Same comment applies to almost everybody. There was not much fighting mounted, at least not much evidence of same.

Gordie,
they said someday you'll find all who love are blind.................................................................

I would agree with you Gordie, that nearly all the hard fighting was done dismounted at both locations, but it seems to me that McClernand saw something to cause him to believe he could locate the two positions where the led horses of both companies were held. We all know that Calhoun's men were dismounted and the horses held in a ravine just to his north. I have surmised that Keogh's had dismounted at least one platoon and deployed it at the top of his ridge. If he did so, then those led horses would have been located at the bottom of the ravine just east of his position. McClernand's statement indicates he saw something, (perhaps a few dead horses with link straps still attached to them) in that location indicating that they were indeed led horses. I would think McClernand would know the difference between horses killed during a melee or firefight, and those that were led, or linked together. (I know this runs a bit counter to your own theory of what transpired at Keogh's position, but it is an alternative that is interesting to ponder, all things considered).