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Post by justvisiting on Jul 2, 2012 6:43:27 GMT -6
Re: Southern France. Pickup Decision at Strasbourg by David P. Colley. You also can read the official history of the Southern France Campaign at CMH here: www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/lorraine/lorraine-content.htmlFrom what Colley states in his book, the logistical situation for the 3d Army was much better than for Bradley & Montgomery's armies due to the capture in relatively good shape of the port of Marseilles. There is supposed to be a book dealing with the logistics of Overlord and Anvil but I didn't see it. Billy
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2012 7:49:59 GMT -6
Billy: I think what you mean to say here is that the logistical situation for 6th Army Group was better due to Marseilles. 3rd Army was in 12th Army Group. That could very well be true. The distances port to front were shorter. Does he say anything about replacements?
Logistical Support of the Armies Volume I and II, should cover it. Also there is another Volume entitled Final Report.
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Post by rangersmith1867 on Jul 2, 2012 8:10:53 GMT -6
I don't understand the hostility to me for just stating facts. I even said in my opening statement that this thread was old but I was new and wanted to comment in on it...since no one had used any of the sources I had used in their discussion.
I should be able to state facts about events and not be chastised for them, by anyone. Sorry if you do not like the facts I presented. I am sorry that you do not understand what I am trying to say. Perhaps this works better in person, and is not conveyed properly via text.
I cannot remember a time where I was attacked for just presenting facts, offering my personal insight, and then concluding with agreeing with everyone...and then being bashed for my methods. I don't leave out facts just because they might be displeasing...that is an injustice.
You agree with me, I agree with you, my methods are what you question and find fault in. Sounds like the same issues that Bradley faced when others thought he made the wrong call, even though clearly he made the right one. Seems it still happens today...people questioning others methods and drawing conclusions on them.
As far as not talking about the man because he is dead...then why is there a group about Little Bighorn? Or do we only talk about the movies where the actors in it are still alive, and discuss events that surround them?
When you do research on a topic, specifically this topic which was the question of if Bradley was a Coward or not...you have to look at both sides and not just talk about the side you agree on. I can clearly see why some people would say what they said about him, but I follow that up with disproving what they said as being wrong.
I am a gun owner, an avid shooters, and have carried them for protection. I can honestly see why some people are afraid of them, and think they cause crime. Maybe they grew up in cities and where guns are a symbol of crime and violence, maybe there were witness to a homicide involving a firearm, maybe they have been shot at...or maybe they just don't know anything about them and are just scared because of the potential damage they can do. So when I am trying to explain to an Anti-Gun person that I disagree with them...they tend to open their mind, ears and heart more when I say "I see why you feel that way..." and then I tell them my side...and almost 70% of the time the conversation ends with them at least saying "I don't mind people like you owning weapons..." What if I just said "YOU ARE WRONG, YOU ARE STUPID, HERE IS WHY I AM RIGHT AND YOU ARE WRONG!"
That is not an open debate, that is someone trying to force their views on others.
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Post by rangersmith1867 on Jul 2, 2012 8:15:22 GMT -6
Also the Pick-a-Nick baskets are quite secure! I actually had a couple black bears in the back yard the other night, the hounds were going crazy.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2012 8:25:17 GMT -6
Hostile, no not hostile. I understand exactly what you are trying to say. I disagree in the need to say it when it involves the reputations of men long dead and unable to defend themselves. It adds nothing to the conversation, and marks you as a man who cannot discern possible agenda driven coffee cooler gossip from facts that have a bearing on the issue at hand.
Now if you do not understand what I am saying here, then I don't know any better way to explain my feelings on the matter. Do you wish to be known on these boards as a dealer in rumor, a transplanted Captain Carter, or as one who examines the evidence. Rumors are not facts. Facts are facts.
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Post by rangersmith1867 on Jul 2, 2012 8:46:04 GMT -6
I never said the Rumors were facts, the facts were them being said, and that gives reason to this article and to those who agree with it.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2012 8:57:50 GMT -6
Let me try this just one more time. When you carry on with the repetition of the unsubstanciated characterizations of someone's conduct long ago, you own them. You are equally responsible. It then becomes a matter of your reputation. If that is what you wish to be, then it is what it is.
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Post by rangersmith1867 on Jul 2, 2012 8:59:28 GMT -6
Okay.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2012 9:47:42 GMT -6
Rangersmith: There is a man abroad elsewhere in what DC refers to as Custerland that gives only two interpretations of Reno. He is either a drunk or a coward - take your pick. Now he makes these conclusions based only upon what others have said. He is unable to discern the fact that those others may have had an anti-Reno agenda, or were repeating gossip, or, or, or. Never once does he consider the fact that the man acted in the best, but imperfectly executed, interests of his command, and made either the right or wrong decision. Now the right or wrong of the decision is the subject for debate, and has been hotly contested here and elsewhere. So while the decision is ripe for debate, the rumors and attacks against the man have no standing in my view. They are the stock and trade of those who only see the smoke and never once examine the fire.
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Post by rangersmith1867 on Jul 2, 2012 10:06:13 GMT -6
From my very limited...but slowly increasing...knowledge of Reno, I think he was a fine officer and at the end of the day his command was not wiped out and he held it together when he was besieged. As far as the mans drinking habits...41 out every 1000 soldiers at that time were hospitalized for Alcoholism...and we all know of the drinking problems soldiers and officers had at that time. So handing out the drunk label is like handing out speeding tickets at a NASCAR event.
I see your point, I was just trying to offer up a reasoning as to why they might have speculated that. That is all.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 2, 2012 10:14:49 GMT -6
Case closed.
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Post by montrose on Jul 3, 2012 21:30:40 GMT -6
Okay, let us take a look at the Bozeman campaign.
Situation. A series of forts was established, penetrating deep into enemy territory. Fort Smith was the deepest fort in this plan. The largest challenge this plan faced was logistics. The Bozeman trail was far from railroad or river lines of communications. Garrison size became an issue. The larger the garrison, the more logistic support it required.
Execution. The forts ended up being next too useless. The garrisons were too small to protect anything outside their gates. Getting just local supplies of wood and forage was a significant challenge. The logistic challenge of just supporting the forts proved too hard for US forces. The Bozeman campaign was a failure, leading to the closing of the forts.
Future US campaigns were reliant on the extension of the railroad system, and exploitation of river lines of communication along the Yellowstone.
Ia Drang analogy. The 1867 campaign resembles the Vietnam Ia Drang battle. The Hayfield fight lines up with LZ Xray, while the Fetterman fight was the campaign's LZ Albany. Both sides won one and lost one, and each drew lessons learned.
The Indians learned that bows will not work against firearms. It wasn't just the paucity of firearms, it was also that their charges were not designed to fight firepower. Note by 1876 the Indians had better weapons and better tactics. (I plan a future post of Indian arms, they were still very poorly armed in 1876).
The Army showed a reluctance to learn anything. The Fetterman outcome was blamed on the individual failure of Fetterman and Brown. The Hayfield fight showed that 20 US could be 800 Indians. So tactically, the Army thought it had nothing to learn. Logistically, much thought went into how to supply forces so far from railroads or rivers. The Army became an enthusiastic ally of extending railroads in the region. The Army also spent much time and effort on doctrine and tactics for mule and wagon trains.
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Post by montrose on Jul 3, 2012 21:50:15 GMT -6
Now, let's look at the tactics specific to the Hayfield fight.
Situation. Indians were harassing local efforts to gather supplies. It was obvious the Indians were looking for an opportunity to attack.
Tactical Plan. The fortification of the hayfield site shows that LTC Bradley recognized the threat and had a plan. The plan was for the detachment to enter the fortification.The interesting part is how long they were expected to hold out, and when and in what size would reinforcements arrive. I believe the distance was 2 1/2 miles, though I need to check this.
Note the plan is similar to COL Carrington at his fort. The difference is he didn't build a redoubt, his wood efforts were over a larger area. So his plan was a hasty defense using the wagons as a barricade. This allowed a defense on wherever the detachment was at the time, not tied to how close they were to a fixed point.
The difference in tactics between Carrington and Bradley was that the hayfield redoubt could hold out longer, Carrington's hasty defence required a rapid reinforcement. I believe the differences in plans reflected the different conditions each man faced. The plans were practical, for each.
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