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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 8, 2008 5:24:39 GMT -6
Regarding booze and its utility and prevalence, it was pretty mandatory in some sittings, military and not. A not implausible theory is that this nation came to be because the British Parliament was in a perpetual state of either inebriation or hangover, which would explain the petty, vindictive and obviously counterproductive actions (various 'acts' involving stamp and tea) that set off the colonies, themselves having a heavier leavening of Puritan types.
For example, it was not unusual for men to consume the equivalent of nine bottles of wine - um, and this wine was stronger than today - at dinner before heading to the debate. Later, Winston Churchill was snockered by any honest standard from morning to night, but he was a prohibitionist compared to many of those he grew up admiring in his youth, themselves shadows of the wooden legs preceding them, a partial function of the dangerous water availalble.
Highly functioning alcoholics were, if not a norm, not unusual back in the day.
Regardless, we have accounts that Reno drank but was not anywhere near in the French category. A 'moderate' drinker, I think he was called. In any case, when he was drunk he was belligerent, for which ample evidence exists.
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 8, 2008 12:08:07 GMT -6
<when he was drunk he was belligerent>
I don't think he showed any belligerance at the LBH, unless it was against one of the packers. But that may have been justified because it's possible the packer may have been trying to steal one of the tins of fruit for the liquid while the troopers were getting thirsty.
Then the packer Frett and his partner Churchill claimed Reno was drinking and/or drunk, had a whiskey flask in his hand and threatened to kill one of the packers. Since no one else witnessed it it's hard to prove.
At the COI Whittaker met with the two packers and coached them before the inquiry. So there could be something fishing about the whole "drunken" incident.
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Post by Montana Bab on Apr 8, 2008 13:53:49 GMT -6
If this is too simplistic, I'm sure I'll be told, but I would be drunk too if I just had another man's brains splattered all over me!
B&B
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Apr 8, 2008 16:24:10 GMT -6
If this is too simplistic, I'm sure I'll be told, but I would be drunk too if I just had another man's brains splattered all over me! B&B
But then, your Babness, you are not a soldier and soldiers are, we are told, trained to take that kind of experience in their stride. I have often wondered however, if it is possible to eliminate anyone's true nature by means of rigourous training?
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Post by Montana Bab on Apr 8, 2008 21:03:18 GMT -6
Ah, yes, Hunk Sire,
Your final sentence gets to the heart of the matter. I had read somewhere (?) that Reno was "unnerved" by that happening.
I had three uncles who fought in the 2nd W.W., all in different branches of U.S. military, and each in their own way years later had upsets of one type or another. One having a severe nervous break down, he, being a "grunt" and fighting man to man on the front in Europe. Needless to say, I think many of our men today are having the same results, as is well know from 'Nam. Guess they don't say "War is Hell" for nothing!
God bless them all.
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Gumby
Full Member
Posts: 202
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Post by Gumby on Apr 9, 2008 13:28:30 GMT -6
I am still reading Jim's book. So far, the writing is excellent and the research as well. I believe the problems noted with the review Diane posted belong to the reviewer. Be fair to Jim and read the book before you judge it. I think those of you who have trashed it based on the rather poorly written review will regret trashing it. I am not saying you will agree with all of the books conclusions (that will never happen with any book on this subject) but I think you will find it was very well researched.
As for the accusations that Reno was intoxicated, there were far more accusers than just the two civilian packers. See Walter Camp's notes, several officers also accused Reno of being intoxicated. Lt. Mathey was one of them. Think about Reno's behavior after the retreat from the valley and it is plain that he was not behaving like a commanding officer should have. The failure to organize his demoralized command while he attempted to recover the personal affects of Lt. Hodgson. His ordering Lt. Varnum to bury Hodgson before and after the pack train arrived when there were clearly more urgent matters to concern himself with. Mathey observed Reno with his flask of whiskey out when he arrived with the pack train. Allowing that Reno may have been in a state of shock, he added to the problem by consuming whiskey as well. I believe that is why Benteen stayed so long before moving on toward Custer. He realized that Reno was not fit to command the remnants of his battalion. He finally gave up within a short time after the pack train arrived and Reno was still acting incompetently. Captain French was fed up as well and led his company to Weir Point with Benteen's men.
Once again, read Jim's book and then decide. I don't think you will be disappointed.
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Post by fred on Apr 9, 2008 14:14:51 GMT -6
Well, I have completed Jim Donovan’s book, so this will be the last installment of my “review” (please excuse the presumptuousness). Grudgingly, I must raise my opinion. I say “grudgingly” because it means there’s a bit of egg on my face, though from what I discovered—after reading the body of the book—there is probably enough egg to go around. It’s kind of like the “Reno Petition”… but I’m being obtuse… maybe even petty… purposely.
In all fairness, A Terrible Glory is really a fun book, a chronologically organized version of Son of the Morning Star, but more fun to read because of it. It is quite well written, but having said that, Donovan’s style seems more plain vanilla than dynamic and that detracts a bit from the book’s overall impact. I do not know the man, so maybe this is his personality, but I tend to doubt it, especially since he voices opinion in a number of matters. It is almost as though he is holding back and that becomes clearer with several of the assumptions he makes. I do not like flat-out assumptions—those followed by no substantiating reasons, however flimsy—but at least they give a book some kick. If he spiced up his narrative somewhat, it would have gone a long way to making this a gangbuster. Cutting the man some slack, however, maybe this is exactly the way he wanted it; besides, he knows better than I. Plus, this is an observation and not a criticism. Some of you know me and you know I am a “throat-grabber”; James Donovan may be more stoic and somewhat savvier.
I made a comment earlier that there is little new material. I want to back up on that a bit. To be sure, there are no eye-rollers to speak of, but what is new—and especially rewarding—are the endnotes. These notes are so superb, I have decided to re-read the entire endnote section, all by itself, because the first time out I neglected to add much to my “notes” and I realize now, that was an error. There is more good stuff in these endnotes than one initially thinks and that includes a number of quotes. I have seldom seen the wealth of information Donovan includes here and what is rather remarkable is it is presented with a contextual understanding rare even in the best of works. These notes alone are worth the purchase price.
Now, having applauded him for that, I need to stick it in his ear a bit (that fits with my Benteen-like personality). He tends to cherry-pick the stuff he likes. What I mean by that is, if Joe Blow said in 1879 they entered the valley at 1 p.m. and then changed it to 3 p.m. twenty years later, Donovan chooses the time that best fits his theory or opinion, regardless of the contextual framing (think… Martini and Curley over the years). Of course, I would probably do the same damned thing, so, pick your poison and leave the hypocrisy aside. (And speaking of Martini, Donovan alludes to the fact Martini supposedly picked up the sobriquet, “Dry Martini.” I may be wrong here, but if memory serves me correct, the martini—dry or otherwise—was not invented until some time in the early 1900’s. You sweet lushes out there may know better than me, however.)
Here are some of the problems I have with the book, and I will get into a few specifics. On page 4, Donovan talks about Varnum and the scouts up in the Crow’s Nest. They see “breakfast fires… some eight miles away.” Bzzzzz! Not a chance. A quick trip to the map will show the distance was only slightly more than half that, some 4 1/2 miles. Bill Boyes once told me that the world’s greatest authority on Davis Creek was Tom Heski and based on Heski’s recent Research Review article, I believe him. Donovan should have double-checked that little gem. Maybe the book was too far along in the publishing process to make a change, but it is an error, regardless.
The next comment, that Red Star “made good time on the twelve-mile trek,” befuddles me. I bare my breast for criticism here: what have I missed?
More egregious to me is Reno Creek. Somewhere in here—I am sorry… I lost the spot; therefore I lost the exact quote (of course, I am not being paid for this, so who cares, right?)—Donovan makes mention of the fatigue of the horses, thereby rationalizing the command’s slow gait. (God! I wish I could find that quote!) Now, to me, the most important element in understanding much of the battle is the timing issue. It confuses virtually everyone and it drove John Gray to his Magnum Opus, setting the gold standard for everything that follows. Donovan emphasizes correctly the military’s obsession with the Indians scattering and he sets a stage on the divide for Custer’s decision to attack. In this, he is absolutely correct. He mentions the Curtiss/hardtack incident (not using Curtiss’ name), the fresh pony tracks spotted by Boyer and Herendeen, the two-Indian incident seen by Varnum from the Crow’s Nest, all culminating in Custer’s realization that his command has been discovered and he has to act now.
Donovan avoids—or maybe evades—the timing issue, maybe on purpose, for it opens a whole different Pandora’s box and it probably would have gone a long way in rattling his narrative. He should, however, have alluded to it in his endnotes—or somewhere—and then continued on in his story. He mentions the noon divide crossing, but skips over DeRudio’s 2-ish p.m. sighting of Custer [Nichols, RCOI, 337 and 317], instead choosing a 3 p.m. Reno river crossing. All this adds up to immersing the neophyte in the battle—and that’s fine, but this book is way too sophisticated for that kind of obfuscation—but… the technique does not hold up to strong scrutiny because of the elisions. Having said that, however, I recognize the difficulty in the whole timing subject and it would be extremely thorny to tackle, going a long way in losing a certain element of reader and literary flow. And the beauty of this book is precisely that readability.
This issue is a perfect example of using an assumption without backing it up with any sort of rationale. A shrewdie would ask, “Well, if the soldiers were worried about the Indians scattering… and they knew they had been spotted… why would Custer simply sashay down Reno Creek and allow the Sioux all that time to escape?” Eleven miles in three hours? Hell, I can do that skipping rope. Well… maybe Custer didn’t! But we will never find that out from this book. To make up for the shortcoming, Donovan matter-of-factly floods us with marvelous tidbits: DeRudio’s Austrian field glasses, for example, and one of my absolute favorites, “Custer watched Reno’s battalion move off the skirmish line into the timber….” I totally agree! God, I love it! The book is loaded with this kind of good stuff!
I mentioned the Benteen versus Custer “jealousy” issue in my original post. I will clarify that by adding, maybe a little bit of Custer’s alleged shady financial dealings should have been included. Benteen’s personality was such that he abjured dishonesty and personal bravado and that could have contributed to his disgust. Just a thought.
A rather serious—and to me, unforgivable—offense occurs in Chapter 16, and Donovan should demand a couple of extra percent from the publisher, Little, Brown. From 31 to the end of the chapter, the endnotes are mis-sequenced, the final one—number 54—not referenced at all. To me, that is beyond both the writer’s and the editor’s control—I think. A book of this nature deserves better.
A few additional gripes—Donovan generally uses the term “troop” in describing the cavalry units despite the fact the term was not official until several years later. Then, in Chapter 17, we have, “… four companies of cavalry, five infantry troops….”
Miles O’Harra’s—and yes, according to a family member, that is the way it was spelled—head was not found in the village; he was not decapitated. As a matter of fact, I question the extent of decapitation Donovan seems to think occurred. By 1876, the only Sioux who practiced that lovely art were the Santees (see Evan Connell), and they were represented at the battle by a miserable few… so sayeth Mr. Donovan (and I agree).
One silly little mistake is in the description of Custer’s dead body. In Chapter 14 (276), we have him shot in the right breast and right temple. In 17 (308), he is now shot in the left temple and left breast. Also, LT Sturgis was identified, grave marked.
Donovan writes that after the battle, Libbie Custer helped nurse the wounded at the FAL post hospital. “Despite an amputation or two, all of the men would recover.” That is not correct. Two men died there: PVT David Cooney of I Company died of his wounds on July 20, and PVT Frank Braun of M Company died of his wounds on October 4, the last man to die, directly as a result of the battle.
I also saw a problem with John Burkman, but lost the quote and page, so I'll just skip it.
On a personal note, I do not care for the analysis of the Indian strength; it is cursory at best and I think it deserves greater attention, especially since this was supposed to have been the greatest concentration of Indians in the history of North America.
I also believe Donovan makes either assumptions or is mistaken with some of his RCOI work/interpretations. For example, he makes the comment, “Wallace’s authority rested on his assertion that he had been riding with Reno when Custer gave him his attack orders, and thus he could support Reno’s claims as to the nature of those orders—even though he had actually been at Custer’s side, exactly where the engineering officer should have been” [362]. At the RCOI, Wallace said he was riding to Hodgson’s left and Hodgson was to Reno’s left; but this was after Reno’s command was called over to Custer [RCOI, 43]. The columns were only 20 to 25 yards apart at that point, so a Wallace move from Custer’s column to Reno’s would not have been difficult or even unusual. (Wallace and Varnum were very close friends and Varnum was a close friend of Hodgson; the corollary would be all three were tight friends. Donovan’s supposition would be stronger if Wallace were between Hodgson and Reno, but it might appear Wallace left the Custer column to make a last-minute “visit” to Hodgson before the separate commands went to battle. That would seem more logical than Wallace merely riding with Reno.) In addition, Varnum said when he re-joined the command, Reno was passing Custer and Wallace was back with the latter (shortly after that was when the “coffee-cooler” comment was made) [RCOI, 139; and, Carroll, I, Varnum, 64-65]. It did not seem to be so all-fired important that Wallace proceed with Custer—a laugh and a hand-wave sent him off—so I fail to see why a quick, “Hi-ya, Benny!” visit would be out of the question.
Also, Mr. Donovan lowers his bar a bit when discussing Frederick Whittaker’s change of heart absolving “Benteen of his previous charges of disobedience,” with the aside, “While Martin may have told [Whittaker] this, a more likely deciding factor was the unanimous support for ‘the Savior of the Seventh’ and the unlikelihood that anyone would testify against him.” That’s an unsupportable cheap shot and it really has no place in a book of this beauty and magnitude.
Oh… and despite still being assigned to the Seventh as a captain of Company L, Mike Sheridan was a lieutenant colonel in 1877, not a captain [381; see the Heitman register].
On the other hand—The George Herendeen/Tullock’s Creek business is beautifully handled.
And, in a stroke of brilliance—alone worth the price of admission—Donovan observes that Custer’s fatal mistake was not so much in his division of command, per se (alluded to, not specifically stated), but in that the division, compounded with a failure to properly assess the Indian strength, location, and dispositions, were the bogies. Many others have blamed Custer for dividing his command and point to that single issue as the root cause of his defeat, but the whole division business is only a tangential issue unless it is connected to something more sinister or of greater incompetence. Donovan has brought that out. A great, great observation!
There is much more in the way of plaudits, but I am getting jealous and besides, the Yankee game is on.
So, fling the eggs boys and girls, but be careful where they splatter. I think Mr. Donovan may have surpassed Lakota Noon with this baby, and to me, that is the entrance fee to great LBH books. Again, it is not an empirical study; this isn’t Fox or Gray or Graham or Hammer or even Hardorff. It is a story, a narrative, but it is the easiest reading and the most riveting of such endeavors. It has its share of flaws—but, hey! I have no hair left, so who cares? Besides, many of those flaws are opinion. And the notes… man, the notes…! A-minus. Right there with Willert, Michno, and maybe even Gray. And it reads better than all but Michno.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 9, 2008 15:26:27 GMT -6
Sturgis was found? Then, there was no need for the fake grave later for his mother?
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Post by markland on Apr 9, 2008 15:32:40 GMT -6
You must of written the review on Monday and I almost envied you. I was sitting at the stadium at the home-opener, freezing my *** off watching the home-town boys wax the Evil Empire, 5-2 (you guys allowed FIVE stolen bases?!).
Now I must be off to get ready as the daughter and I are going again tonight; Greinke, era 1.29 vs. Kennedy, era 23.14. Maybe the bats will work for us tonight, but, having now written this, Kennedy will likely throw a perfect game.
Billy
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Post by mcaryf on Apr 9, 2008 16:29:23 GMT -6
Hi Fred
There is some curious material relating to the distance from the CN to Custer's bivouac. Both Varnum and Wallace say it was 8 miles and various of the accounts could be read to indicate two marches to get near the CN rather than one.
Regards
Mike
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Post by elisabeth on Apr 10, 2008 2:31:13 GMT -6
Fred,
High praise indeed, and generously given.
On a couple of the points you raise: yes, I queried the "Dry Martini" line initially too, thinking it more a turn-of-the-century drink. Was startled to find that while there are differences of opinion about its origins, there's a fair bit of evidence for its having been invented in about 1870 or 1871. So, not impossible after all. And the use of "troop": true, not the official designation until later -- but it's a term that seems to have been used interchangeably with "company" throughout the early years of the 7th Cavalry. It turns up all the time in Keogh's letters, for instance (Nowlan "commands a troop"; "my troop now numbers ninety sabres"; and so on), and in Barnitz too. As it's an accepted usage among officers at the time, I'd think it's legitimate here?
Agree, the endnotes are pure joy.
And -- nice point about Benteen's disdain for Custer's shady dealings playing a large part in forming his opinion of the man. However, to be fair, Benteen himself says he didn't realise the full extent of them until much later, 1881 or 1882 (Benteen-Goldin Letters, p. 253), so it probably wouldn't do to attribute his initial dislike to those; the fleecing-the-rookies card game at Fort Riley might have had an impact -- or then again Benteen may simply have recalled that later, with hindsight, as an indicator of the man's character. It certainly seems to have been the insult to Wilson and the bragging that got up his nose the most at their first meeting, so the book's within its rights to focus on those, I think ...
There's a whole separate book waiting to be written on Custer and money, I suspect. Hope somebody tackles the subject some day!
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 10, 2008 5:34:11 GMT -6
Regarding distances from the CN to Custer. Are the competing distances attributable to accounts that appeared before the end of 1879? Do the distances find reference in letters by the person under discussion within the time frame AND at the RCOI? Is there any indication that those claiming the same distances shared info after the battle?
All it takes is a common assumption that so and so would know; but so and so is wrong. These aren't independently achieved numerals of distance that support each other.
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 10, 2008 8:02:23 GMT -6
Didn't some soldier say he loved to be wallowing in blood & gore?
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 10, 2008 8:04:43 GMT -6
<See Walter Camp's notes, several officers also accused Reno of being intoxicated. Lt. Mathey was one of them>
Didn't Mathey say he didn't want to be quoted? Makes his accusation questionable if he didn't want to back it up.
Maybe it was better to label Reno a drunk rather than a coward. Drunks can get away with it in the military, but a coward?
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 10, 2008 8:06:55 GMT -6
Didn't Benteen dislike start when he first met Custer? I believe Custer was bragging about this and that, then criticized Benteen's commanding officer in the Civil War. From that point on Benteen's "dislike" only intensified, especially after some of the questionable acts of Custer (Washita, Elliott, ordering deserters shot, going AWOL, Belknap-Grant fued) By the time of the LBH and Custer's "plan" of attack, Benteen was probably not going to allow himself and/or his men to be led into a disaster.
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