Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle

[eamonn]

welcome to the board flanker, it really is informative as u learn as much about the members as u do the subject matter. ;D ;D

[harpskiddie]

flanker:

Your breakout theory is the "standard" "accepted" version of events, and has been for many, many years. As a matter of interest [or not], Deep Ravine and the markers that have been sometimes taken to represent the "South Skirmish Line" are not northwest from LSH, but more southwest. Although the literature is rife with accounts of 28 [sometimes more, sometimes less] bodies having been buried in "a deep ravine," no skeletal remains of any kind have ever been found in Deep Ravine, nor have any meaningful artifacts of any kind.

Gordie

[mcaryf]

I am reading Kuhlmann again at the moment having recently acquired a copy on ebay (previously Elisabeth kindly lent me her copy).

I note that he goes with a theory of Custer seeing men on Weir Point and making a premature move towards them that results in disaster. He also has a very strange idea that Custer was looking for a defensive location to the North from quite an early stage - if that were true surely he would have headed back towards Reno Hill not further North.

Anyway - his theory does result in a movement from LSH to the South to try to link with Reno/Benteen. Is this part with your thinking Gordie or do you have some other reason for your alternate flow?

BTW my interest is LBH rather than Custer himself but for those interested in him there is a book advertised on UK ebay
"WE KNEW CUSTER" edited by Tom O'Neil. Apparently this includes some monographs by people who knew GAC.


Regards

Mike

[elisabeth]

Funnily enough, I was just wondering about something similar, so shall be most interested to see Gordie's answer.

Have just been re-reading Curley's statements (largely Custer in 76). He too says Custer was looking for a defensive location to the north comparatively early on. Wondered for a moment: could the Ford D excursion have been a search for a better defensive position to make a stand, rather than an offensive move? Logic says go for the high ground, i.e. LSH; but the Ford D area would give (a) access to water, (b) some slight degree of cover from light timber along the river bank, (c) grazing, and (d) terrain on which cavalry could counter-charge against Indian offensives ... There'd be the risk of being fired down into from LSH and Cemetery; but if he'd had it in mind to occupy those two features, the flats could -- perhaps -- have been quite a reasonable area for the rest of his troops, his wounded, etc., to lurk until relieved?

The other thing was the Weir Point question, and what effect the appearance of troops there might have had on the actions of others. Kuhlman, as you say, has a dash by L, I, and (for some reason) F from LSH south to try to link up. On a much humbler level, I was wondering whether the breakout to the SW mentioned above could have been so prompted. Running away from Indians, and towards Terry, seems a more instinctive thing to do. Of course, it may have been a Benteen-style charge to try to repel Indians; but if it was a flight towards presumed safety, one possible reason for that presumption could have been the sight of troops to the south ...?

[crzhrs]

In Bray's CRAZY HORSE, the author also feels Custer had realized the sheer size and numbers he was facing may have prompted him into more of a holding, defensive-minded plan.

Sending Yates to the river was not an attempt to cross or feint but to hold it and keep warriors from crossing. Custer still ever mindful of capturing non-coms headed north looking for another access but CH was shielding them and held off countering Custer until more warriors arrived ensuring non-com safety. CH then started his charge to separate Custer from other companies.

The holding action was an attempt to keep warriors from crossing and giving Custer time for an attempt to get non-coms and the anticipated arrival of Benteen.

Warriors at the Ford, using Winchester and Spencer Carbines gave the impression of many, thus forcing Yates back and giving warriors that river crossing.

(All from Bray's Crazy Horse)

[harpskiddie]

Gordie has umpteen reasons for thinking in terms of a "counter flow" movement, but as previously mentioned is not willing to debate the reasons or the theory, which is currently birthing. I tend to get sidetracked by other interests, as I am at the moment. I think it just possible that Custer might have seen the troops on Weir Point, but I don't think so.

Kuhlman, to my mind, gets far too specific in his theories [never mind F Company, how about the first and second platoons of C being manouevered about?], and I think is another researcher who shapes the evidence to fit his theories [or simply makes it up out of whole cloth].

Basically, I think Custer wanted to cross at the northern ford, was repulsed by warriors he thought were fleeing but who were doing no such thing, and tried to get back to the high ground the same way he came down - and was making a fighting retreat. That, to me, is neither offensive or statically defensive, but certainly more defensive than not. I think he kept running into roadblocks, shedding dead as he went along and being burdened by wounded until finally the command was split and chopped up piecemeal. Even if he did not see troops on the Weir heights, he knew that the rest of the regiment was in that general direction, and not too far away.

He had no idea where Terry was, or would be, except that he had been told [supposedly] that Gibbon could not reach the mouth of the Little Horn before 26 June.

That is the broad outline, but the details are yet to be finalized. And it will likely take some time. Lotsa time. Remember, no debate from me. You guys can kick it around all you want.

Gordie

[elisabeth]

OK!!!

For anyone other than Gordie, then:

(1) Would Custer have any reason to think Benteen and Reno had not been rolled up as he was about to be? (Unless he saw troops on Weir Point, of course.)

(2) Given Custer's wounded etc. ... did he abandon the right wing to their fate, digging in where he stood? Not necessarily an indictment; he'd have to do what he could for whom he could. But somehow he had time to kill horses for a defensive ring while (presumably) the right wing was being destroyed. Could a decisive charge have lessened the pressure on the right wing? Or not?

or

(3) Were the right wing abandoning Custer to his fate? A sporting chance that they could have fought their way through to the rest. Might they, or could they, have tried?

Kuhlman, bless him, has them giving up their chance in order to die nobly with Custer. Well, given Victorian ideals, I guess it's not impossible; but any company commander with an ounce of humanity would have cared too much about the safety of his men to make them a "noble sacrifice" unless absolutely imperative. (What men would have followed a commander who thought otherwise?) So ... any thoughts?

[Scout]

Well, I don't want to trash Kuhlman but a lot of his theories were derived from Camp's notes and other writings. And let's not forget Kuhlman bought that Frank Finkel, sole survivor tale hook, line and siinker with absolutly no data or proof to support it. He believed Finkel because "he didn't look like a liar." He even wrote a book to support it. I have a hard time with that. I believe it was Hardorff that said Kuhlman would jump on any theory and with little proof. Elisabeth, you are right...bless him. I don't buy that 'noble sacrifice' stuff.

[elisabeth]

Dear Kuhlman; such a nice man. I love the way he resolutely does NOT look to cast anyone as villain. But yes, a touch fanciful at times.

Amazing how pervasive the "noble sacrifice" notion is. Even the unbombastic Connell slips into it, in SOTMS. He suggests Keogh and Calhoun might have been able to retreat to Reno but that "if they did have such an option they despised it". I don't know about you, but if I were an ordinary trooper I wouldn't thank my CO for "despising" the chance to get me out in one piece. Nor, if I were Terry, would I be particularly impressed at losing entire companies to nothing but a gallant gesture. A noble sacrifice for a purpose is one thing, but for no gain to mission or comrades it's just daft. One might as well expect the entire Reno/Benteen contingent to commit ritual suicide on Reno Hill as a gesture of solidarity with Custer's dead troops. Touching, but hardly helpful ...

[Scout]

Yes, flowery rhetoric is one thing but reality is whole different ballgame. I love the part in 'They Died with Their Boots On' where Flynn's Custer announces he's going to 'sacrifice the command.' That pronouncement is a lot crazier than anything the wacko Custer says in 'Little Big Man.' Perhaps you'd like to check with the men on that one general?

The most important part of human nature is survival...I guess the troopers who made a run for the river forgot about the sacrifice part.

[elisabeth]

It all brings to mind that wonderful sketch in "Beyond the Fringe" where an RAF pilot is being sent on a suicide mission: "You are going to lay down your life, Perkins. We need a futile gesture at this stage. It will raise the whole tone of the war".

[d o harris]

Not that this is relevant, but at the time I found it interesting. When at the battlefield, June, 1970, I met an old soldier who had joined the cavalry before the first World War and retired after the second. He almost never volunteered an opinion, but as we were standing at MT Ford he commented that the the markers extending from LSH along Deep Ravine appeared to him as the point move in an advance, either to attack or breakout.

Fox's book is another that cannot simply be read, but must be studied. This is the sort of book I read, put it aside, and take it up later to study. I first read the book a year or more ago, and have recently taken it of the shelf to study it chapter be chapter to determine whether he in fact proves his theories, or simply asserts them. I'm moving toward asserts.

[markland]

This seems the most appropriate thread to post this link. The link points to the PDF of Douglas Scott's 2005-2006 archaeological investigation into the impact of widening the battlefield road. Interesting reading, especially the recovery of cartridges from Battle Ridge matching those found in 1984 & 1985 at the Reno-Benteen battlefield.

www.nps.gov/history/mwac/publications/pdf/tech94b.pdf

Billy

[mcaryf]

A very interesting read, thank you for the link.

I was impressed with the degree of difficulty the Indians had with getting their cartridges to fire with multiple firing pin impressions. The apologists who suggested Custer got beat because of jamming guns seem to have ascribed weapons' malfunctions to the wrong side!!

Regards

Mike