Gen Crook

[keith]

Respected historians/researchers such as Connell and Caroll describe Gen Crook negligent in not communicating about the engagement at Rosebud Creek on June 17th and his ensuing retreat. Yet he does send a report dated June 23rd to Gen Townsend at Ft. Lincoln. The dispatch includes that he has withdrawn and ordered an additionaql 5 companies of infantry "...and shall probably not make any extended movement until they arrive." Reportedly, this is forwarded to Gen Terry, but arives after the Little Bighorn battle.
This leaves me with two questions:
1) Gen Crook reports through the chain-of -command as per protocol. And he has no current information about the present location or status of Gibbons/Terry. Considering the nature of communications in the field circa 1876, are these criticisms too harsh?
2) Crook's report states 9 men killed and 21 wounded. Later, historians note as many as 28 dead and 56 wounded. Are there expalnations for these discrepancies?

[Walt Cross]

Crook always maintained he won at the “Battle of the Rosebud”. In truth he was surprised by the Sioux, fought a sharp battle with them, and then went back from whence he came leaving the field to the Indians. The Indians were clearly the victors, they returned later and dug up the buried U.S. dead scalping and desecrating their remains. Crook under-reported the casualties to bolster his contention that he had won.

Crook knew about the other two columns and their objective. He knew or should have known that they were just to his north. In fact Major Marcus Reno, contrary to his own orders from General Terry, had penetrated well south along the Rosebud and at the time of Crook’s battle was a mere 35 miles away, a short ride for a scout. Had he dispatched a messenger history might have proved a good deal different.

Crook was a good general and an excellent Indian fighter, but the Rosebud battle shook him up, it was a near run thing that Colonel Royall’s command was not lost like the 7th Cavalry battalion later under Custer. Had it not been for the bravery of Crook’s Shoshoni Indian allies many more soldiers would have died.

Walt

[Steve Wilk]

It must be remembered that this was Crook's first campaign against the Sioux. He was used to fighting small bands of Paiute, Yavapai, Apache, or, initially out of West Point, Rogue River bands of the northwest. None of these tribes could match the military might of the Lakota. I think Crook was stunned by their aggressiveness and lack of fear of his bluecoats. It also should be remembered that three months earlier Col. Reynolds attacked a village on Powder River and Crook was furious with him for botching the job; to the point of having him court martialled. Now Crook himself was at the helm of a near disaster had Royall's battallion been allowed to continue into a potential ambush.

Perhaps he was gunshy thereafter...but why, with a force of over a thousand men (a sizeable force on the frontier) did he not press after the hostiles? Resupply and get after them instead of going fishing for next several weeks while Custer's men were being annihilated. Perhaps he didn't want to risk it; better to let someone else make a potentially career ending blunder. Crook was a flop during the Sioux War; marched his men to the point of starvation with nothing to show for it until Slim Buttes. Some say he was overrated as an Indian fighter.

[shatonska]

all the blame is given to custer , but from reno to benteen to crook all of these where the greatest cause of the lbh disaster , custer made mistakes but these made even greater mistakes united to covardice and self interest !
crook could force the indians to separate even with 2/3 of his strenght after the rosebud , remember that in the three days after the rosebud fight , the big part of the indians was joining the winter roamers , crook could force these bands to go back to the reservation , these bands where forced to fight custer because where attacked by custer on the lbh !

[Walt Cross]

Crook was criticized and I think rightfully so for his poor showing. You are correct, he had the strength and perhaps even the momentum to drive the Sioux. Imagine if he had and Custer joined him. With Gibbons closing from the Northwest and Terry the Northeast, the objective of forcing the Sioux to the reservation would have been realized almost certainly.

Instead, the Sioux gained the momentum, they stood their ground and won a victory, a lesson that would not be forgotten when Custer rode up less than two weeks later. The Sioux and their allies were confident and it resulted in the battle as we know it. After Crook’s defeat his soldiers make up a barracks room ditty that went:

I’d like to be a packer
And pack with George F. Crook
And dressed up in my canvas suit
To be for him mistook.
I’d braid my beard in two long tails,
And idle all the day
In whittling sticks and wondering
What the New York papers say.

Walt

[Walt Cross]

John McDermott, in an article for the American Battlefield Protection Program wrote:

"Crook officially reported nine dead and 21 wounded, but Scout Frank Grouard claimed that 28 soldiers died and 56 were wounded, leading some to claim that a higher figure is more accurate. However, the newspaper correspondents reported nearly the same figures as Crook, and his later compilations of dead and wounded are quite detailed and specific.
The wounded according to Crook's June 17 casualty report were Co. D, 3rd Cavalry: Captain Guy V. Henry; Co. D, 4th Infantry: Privates James. A. Devine, Richard Flynn, and John H. Terry; Co. D, 2nd Cavalry: Sergeant Patrick O'Donnell; Co. I, 2nd Cavalry: 1st Sergeant Thomas Meager; Co. B, 3rd Cavalry: Private Henry Steiner; Co. E, 3rd Cavalry: Privates Horace Harold; Co. F, 3rd Cavalry: Privates Otto Broderson, William Featherly, and Phineas Town; Co. I, 3rd Cavalry: Sergeant Andrew Grosch, Corporal Tobias Carty, Privates John Losciborski, James O'Brien, Francis Smith, and Charles W. Stuart; Co. L, 3rd Cavalry: Sergeant Samuel Cook, Trumpeter William H. Edwards, and Private John Kremer; and Co. M, 3rd Cavalry: Trumpeter Elmer A. Snow. According to newspaper reports, three Crows and four Shoshoni were severely wounded, and the Sioux killed one Shoshoni boy.
Of all the wounded, [Captain] Guy Henry was in the worst shape. When first picked up, he could not speak, but after the dirt had been wiped from his face and he had had a drink of water, he was asked how he felt. "Bully! Never felt better in my life," was his remarkable reply. During the rest of the day, he lay on a blanket, his face covered with a bloody cloth, around which summer flies buzzed fiercely. One of his fellow officers who saw him lying there gave him his condolences. Henry answered in a low but firm voice, "It's nothing. For this we are soldiers," and advised his friend to return to his company.
Killed in the Battle of the Rosebud were Co. F, 3rd Cavalry: Sergeant David Marshall and Private Gilbert Roe; Co. I, 3rd Cavalry: Privates William W. Allen and Eugene Flynn; and of Co. L, 3rd Cavalry: Sergeant Anton Newkirken and Privates Richard Bennett, George Potts, Brooks Conners, and Allen J. Mitchell."

Walt

[keith]

I readily agree the Battle of Rosebud Creek (and the subsequent retreat and inaction) is at best, what one chronicler describes as "Crook's least successful engagement" (an admitted understatement).

Gen Nelson Miles, after walking the Little Big Horn battlefield with Sioux and Cheyenne participants, writes in his Personal Recollections and Observations (1896) of his support for Gen Custer, "General Custer has often been unjustly accused of disobedience of orders." He adds a criticism of Sheridan's and then Terry's stategies "... sent weak exterior columns, five hundred miles apart, into the field without concert of action against a superior body. The commands from the East and West united on the Yellow Stone at the mouth of the Rosebud, under General Terry. He even then divides his force ... he placed at least 50 miles of rough country and an impassable river between the columns..." These comments would seem to be even more applicable to Terry - Crook, as applied here to Terry - Custer.

In terms of "what if" scenerios, what if Gen Crook's actions remain the same, and Gen Custer's engagement (neither Terry nor Custer expected immeadiate assistance from Crook) had been an enormous success? Gen Crook could well be seen to have completed his mission, i.e. move and concentrate the enemy force (and village) North, toward Gibbons/Terry/Custer and their plan of surprise attack. Gen Miles feels the battle was "twice lost," by Reno's retreat from the woods, and Reno/Benteen not moving immediately North to support Custer following the uniting of their units.

I am not dismissing that Gen Crook, up to ther Battle of the Little Big Horn, had engaged the largest force of Native American combatants in history. Nor that he came away the worse for the engagement, nearly suffering a major disaster (6 hours of combat and 25,000 rounds of ammo!). And that it could have impacted his decision making, is obvious. On the other hand, his prudence (and ignorance - though there were no dispaches North, neither were there any to the South from Terry prior to LBH) allows for his reinforcement, and his column is back on the Powder Horn later that summer; one of two columns left to pursue the campaign. These efforts culminate in the Battle of Slim Butte and Col MacKenzie"s attack at Crazy Woman Creek. Strategies now include extensive winter campaigns, lightening strikes against smaller, scattered viilages, dogged pursuit by mounted troops and an expanded role for the cavalry (I can assume the barracks ditty came before the grueling winter campaign), and the inclusion of a significant percentage of Native Americans in the strike force, are all employed by Gen Crook. While Sheridan envisions converging columns in battle line, and Terry is contimplating the gatlin gun, it is the likes of Crook and Custer that seem to breaking new ground in understanding the nature of this "unconventional warfare." Although neither battle is considered a spectacualr action, it has been suggested they were instrumental in developing the mind-set that would eventually lead to the Cheyenne surrender and the Sioux moving across the international boarder.

I apologize that my readings aren't that extensive (I'm hoping santa will be leaving a CD of the Reno Court of Inquiry under the tree), even the above quotes from Gen Miles are from blurbs and not the manuscript - but am I correct in finding a lack of recriminations directed toward Gen Crook at the time (when nearly everyone else involved seems to be scrambling)? And did Crook ever comment on the Little Big Horn Battle?

[keith]

I believe my initial view is an attempt to consider Gen Crook's actions, more from a perspective of real-time decision making, and not hindsight.

1. It was well known that one of the most successful tactics utilized by Native American combatants, was to induce an over-confident, smaller force, to pursue into a well executed ambush. A scenario that seemed ready to present itself, immediately following the Rosebud fight.

2. Neither Terry, Custer nor Crook could have been expected to know with any precision, the time or locale of ensuing engagements. Terry doesn't formulate his plan until the evening of 21st and Custer identifies with certainty, the present locale of the encampment, on the 26th. Suggesting Gen Crook should be rushing pell mell to the north shortly after the 17th doesn't seem to jive with what is happening at the same time in the north.

3. Even if Gen Crook had known of the emergent nature of the events unfolding to his north, he would have to retreat for resupply (with wounded), move north, find Terry or Custer (avoiding another major, unsupported engagement), and then unite with Custer - all within 8 days of the Rosebud Battle. Perhaps an unrealistic expectation.

4. Gen Crook realizes he has been hammered and outgunned, and in desperate need of resupply and reinforcement. The grand strategy of coordinating the actions/reactions of widely separated columns, well into the hinterlands, has been an obvious failure; as demonstrated by their inability to accurately locate one another, let alone communicate.

Terry, Custer and Crook were all operating in a vacuum, as to one another. They are really functioning as independent units. Gen Crook only knows that he has engaged a numerically superior force that demonstrates a commendable elan (fighting spirit, readiness), and barely avoids a catastrophe. Imprudent aggressiveness at this juncture suggests a "Fetterman mentality," rather than the reinforcement and reorganization called for by the circumstance.

The proximity of the Rosebud and Little Big Horn Battlefields seem more an irony, than an element of tactical consideration. Missing each other by 40 miles and 8 days, is akin to noting that another column (or 2 columns), might be somewhere in North Montana.

Have the intial orders given to Gibbons, Terry and Crook survived?

[bhist]

I find it interesting that no one is questioning why Terry did not attempt to send a message to Crook regarding the information they acquired from Reno's scout and, most importantly, the plan devised on the Far West June 21. If one believes these columns were working in tandem, then one has to ask this question.

I think the fact that Terry did not send word to Crook proves that Crook and Terry were acting separately from each other and any attempts to communicate would be a waste of time.

Anyone that thinks Crook is to blame for Custer's defeat should read Neil Mangum's book on the Battle of the Rosebud. He has a chapter devoted to this question and its conclusion finds Crook innocent of any possible blame for Custer's own mistakes on June 25.

[steve wilk]

These columns were not operating in tandem; at least not Crook's. We should remember that he was operating within a different military jurisdiction; ie Dept. of the Platte, which he commanded. Gibbon's battalion and Custer's regiment fell under Terry's Dept. of Dakota. So these two columns were much more apt to cooperate in joint operations. Plus they knew more or less where they could find each other. They had only a vague idea where Crook was. Granted Crook operated within Terry's dept. at Powder River and later Rosebud; but basically I think he felt he was operating independent of the Dakota troops. There was of course professional jealousy and competitiveness within the small frontier army. Crook did not have much regard for Terry as an Indian fighter; with his creature comforts aboard steamers while Crook roughed it with his men. I don't think he wanted Terry to get any credit for any potential victories; and he probably did not want to admit that he was bested by Crazy Horse at Rosebud.

There was also no telegraph service within some three hundred miles so communicating with each other was not as simple as it would seem. True, the two commands were but 40 miles apart on 17 June but that still was at least a day's ride or more. And since they had no idea this was the case, it may as well have been 400 miles. These commands were thought to be able to handle any amount of hostiles independently...the irony is that the three of them combined could not scrape up a single victory nearly all summer.