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Post by conz on Mar 10, 2008 14:56:42 GMT -6
<they had a mission to accomplish, or to die trying> If you mean throwing their lives away if there were options, then that's suicide and stupid. The only options are how to accomplish the mission. The option to abandon the mission because there are too many Indians is not an option to consider, I think. So Custer's job was to accomplish the mission without committing suicide or doing anything stupid. Tall order, but you know the gov't expects a lot for those "big bucks..." <g> We didn't educate all those West Pointers to retreat in the face of too many Indians, did we? Clair
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Post by elisabeth on Mar 11, 2008 8:51:01 GMT -6
Hmmm ... The general consensus (from Terry, Brisbin and the rest) was that Custer was at liberty to attack alone if he thought he could win; otherwise, it was supposed to be a combined operation, with the infantry, the 2nd Cavalry element, and the Gatlings all there to play some active part. It wasn't the 7th Cavalry's duty to wrap the whole thing up on its own; only to do so if by some happy chance it found it could. So "too many Indians" was something it was up to Custer to judge. The mission was to break the power of the hostiles, not to die nobly. If Custer found the mission would be better accomplished by the entire available force rather than the 7th Cavalry alone, there would be no shame or weakness in acting accordingly; it would be the sensible way to fulfil the government's purpose.
As we know, he was bounced into attacking before he knew the true strength of the opposition, and by the time he found that out he'd already committed one part of his force. That complicates things, obviously; but if he's thrown three companies away, is he then obliged to throw away five more to no achievable purpose? He's seen the size of the village, and the numbers and mood of the opposition. He must know he can't win; the best he can hope to do is not lose, or not lose disastrously. Surely this is the moment when an intelligent commander assesses the odds, realises it's not his day, and pulls back in order to have something left with which to accomplish the mission under better circumstances -- whether (a) with Terry's reinforcements, (b) when the village has split up into manageable bite-size chunks, or (c) both.
Interesting, come to think of it, to look at Washita in this context. It could be argued that his true mission there was to go on and attack the other camps. Instead, he concluded "too many Indians", and withdrew. At the time, no-one criticised him for that (apart from the Major Elliott aspect, of course); he was able to claim a major victory, and the newspapers were ecstatic. It's true that Sheridan was less than happy about it later, when he realised how many villages had got away scot-free and that the war would now drag on for months. Possibly this may have been in Custer's mind at LBH, influencing him against a retreat. But it does show that "too many Indians" was a factor in his decision-making on other occasions ...
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 11, 2008 9:21:53 GMT -6
It was worse than that. He didn't know about the other Indian villages till he'd hit his chosen target, and Godfrey sorrowfully drew it to his attention. I'm not sure why you think he was to hit villages at random, since it was the Cheyenne he was after, and they followed a pony trail of raiders to the camp.
Again, conz asks what West Point taught, and doesn't understand the content of his own idiotic questions and postulated scenarios (horse arrow training, cavalry dismount and walk in square....). "We didn't educate all those West Pointers to retreat in the face of too many Indians, did we?" We did, conz, because the term "too many" is information that touches upon mission success. What possibly you meant to say was "mere superior numbers" which indeed might not affect mission success. "Too many" is not the same thing. "Too many" negates your efforts. If you defeat "too many" Indians, they weren't too many, were they? Understand? West Point used to produce good writers with excellent English skills. Wouldn't know it reading conz nor Custer's orders.
You can capitalize Soldiers (now you flourish them out as Warriors; very British...) all you want, but you clearly view them as mere toys for officers to play with. Otherwise you would not suggest West Point wouldn't view retreat in the face of 'too many' wise.
In any case, it doesn't violate the mission to husband force till you have enough. There was no mission immediacy aspect to any of this so long as it got done and the Indians were impoverished and back on the rez.
I suppose if nobody goes back and reads your initial postings, it's possible you could construct a public image here of West Point level knowledge and competence, but it won't last should anyone check the early postings. Or the one referenced here.
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Post by wild on Mar 11, 2008 11:06:27 GMT -6
(1) Was it feasible? No.These are the same Indians who defeated Crook.How far did they march to confront him?They would have pursued Custer and caught him.
(2) Would the world have thought any the less of him, This is the man who begged for command of the regiment.Was he going to bring it back defeated?
(3) Why didn't he? He wagered the remainder of his life on the outcome.
There is a serious school of thought who hold that Scott's two comrades could have survived but Scott thought that in death they could rob defeat of it's gloating.Likewise in death Custer escaped ignominy.
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Post by elisabeth on Mar 11, 2008 11:33:19 GMT -6
DC, Correct me if I'm wrong, as I don't doubt you will, but I thought the general understanding of the purpose of the winter campaign was to "punish the Indians", unspecified. The Cheyenne had done much of the raiding earlier that year, along with the Arapahoes, but the army had also been fighting Kiowa and Comanche pretty frequently throughout the summer. Any band that had failed to comply with the government's directives was going to be fair game; it was just Black Kettle's bad luck (pace CSS) that his was the one that the trail they found led to. We might note that destroying Black Kettle's village didn't end the campaign. They still had to hunt down other Cheyenne, Satanta's Kiowas, and so on. So while Custer's blow against the Cheyenne at Washita was demoralising, it was far from decisive -- there was plenty of unfinished business left to be dealt with. And his reason for leaving it like that was, basically, "too many Indians" ...
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Post by elisabeth on Mar 11, 2008 12:08:59 GMT -6
wild,
Appreciated.
(1) Could be right. They didn't bother him any further once they'd "tree'd" him, though ... Tough to call. They might have been happy just to drive Custer away; but the presence of the Terry/Gibbon forces might have changed that, I suppose, reducing their perceived safety zone?
(2) Yes ... but it kind of depends on what happened next, I think. "Defeated" if that was all, sure. "Heroically rescued to fight another day" if the Terry/Gibbon/Custer column (a) relieved Reno/Benteen, and (b) drove the Indians off leaving many of their possessions behind. It's all in the spin, and I think Custer could have spun it quite nicely ...
(3) Ah. Yes. Interesting. So -- a conscious existential decision, you think? Bit tough on the poor enlisted men, who had no say in the matter, and on people like little Sturgis, with his whole life before him ... but I could see some of the older officers going along with that. (For the last couple of days or so I've been haunted by that line from, I think, Macbeth: "Come wind, come wrack, At least we'll die with harness on our back.") What was before them, after all? This was theoretically going to be the last Indian war; after this, the army would no doubt be cut back yet again; few prospects of promotion except via dead mens' shoes; and for the ex-CW officers, never again any taste of the glory that fed them during that conflict. (Another parallel, The Wild Bunch: "This is our last go-around, Dutch: this time we do it right.") But ... many had wives and children to worry about. And even those who didn't cared deeply for the welfare of their men. So whatever Custer's own motivations may have been, it's hard to imagine everyone would happily comply with his self-immolation, if that's what happened ...
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 11, 2008 20:45:42 GMT -6
(1) Was it feasible? Given the mood of the Indians that day, would it simply have been another buffalo hunt over a longer distance? Or was there a comfort zone -- 5 miles from the village, 10 miles, whatever -- beyond which the Indians would have been satisfied he no longer posed a threat, and could be left alone?
I believe feasible but not by Custer. How far from the village would they purse leaving Reno-Benteen within striking distance.
(2) Would the world have thought any the less of him, then or now, if he'd done so? Much would depend on whether he'd left wounded behind, I suppose. That would lead to ugly mutterings at best, a court-martial at worst. But assuming he hadn't -- or that all his officers concurred in glossing over the fact, as happened with Reno -- it would surely make for a perfectly acceptable story. He's faced with overwhelming odds, thanks to false intelligence from the agencies ... he knows the rest of his command must be holed up somewhere, defending itself a la Beecher Island ... in the nick of time he cleverly extracts his own five companies, and gallops off for reinforcements. He, Terry, Gibbon, Gatlings etc. arrive to the rescue no later than happened in reality .... emotional reunion ... Reno/Benteen command saved ... hurrah for Custer. He could call it support of Reno by drawing the Indians away from the village and allowing 7 companies an open gate through the river bottom.
If this scenario sounds convincing (and a master of spin such as Custer could surely make it so) then we come to the third question:
(3) Why didn't he? To many Indians in terrible terrain for cavalry. At least one account states not more than half were engaged with Custer and they were afraid of shooting each other.
AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Mar 12, 2008 1:42:45 GMT -6
Nice reply Liz
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Post by Rabble on Mar 12, 2008 5:51:33 GMT -6
This all reminds me of many years ago in Korea, a popular verse of the time was: Why are you running - are you afraid to die? The reason we are running is because we cannot fly We're fighting for that bastard Syngman Rhee. Ron
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Post by conz on Mar 12, 2008 6:47:14 GMT -6
Hmmm ... The general consensus (from Terry, Brisbin and the rest) was that Custer was at liberty to attack alone if he thought he could win; otherwise, it was supposed to be a combined operation, with the infantry, the 2nd Cavalry element, and the Gatlings all there to play some active part. It wasn't the 7th Cavalry's duty to wrap the whole thing up on its own; only to do so if by some happy chance it found it could. So "too many Indians" was something it was up to Custer to judge. The mission was to break the power of the hostiles, not to die nobly. If Custer found the mission would be better accomplished by the entire available force rather than the 7th Cavalry alone, there would be no shame or weakness in acting accordingly; it would be the sensible way to fulfil the government's purpose. I don't believe this is correct, because I don't think anyone expected, or even hoped, that both Gibbon's and Custer's force could be brought to the battlefield against the Natives together. That was beyond anyone's expectations, I think. The only references you see to "coordinating" the diverse columns is that if the Natives ran from one, they might run near the other, or Crook's. But I don't think it was ever anyone's plan for any columns to meet on any actual battlefield...that assumption I see posted around here now and then is rather incredulous to me. So Custer, I do not think, has that option...he never should have considered that there might be a way to combine the two columns to attack the large village. He either had to attack alone, or there wasn't going to be any attacking it at all. I think this would only occur to him once he saw Keogh's situation...I doubt Custer thought "he could not win" before that. The "numbers and attitudes" of the Indians didn't phase him much, I don't think. Officers were used to seeing "hundreds" and "thousands" of Warriors riding around out there. Impressive, but not daunting, is the attitude that I read. CPT King and his men are seen joking and calmly picking off Natives in the hundreds against his small battalion after Slim Buttes. I'm always amazed at students who keep coming back to this "numbers" thing...as if that was the most important element in any battle. It isn't, and officers don't consider that it is. It is the quality of your force, and the decisions by its leaders, that win or lose battles...numbers are but a small part of the overall equation. Huge numbers didn't defeat Custer...the Cavalry officers own decisions at that battle, and the Native chiefs decisions, is what caused the outcome. Change those, and you change the outcome, regardless of numbers or attitudes. Never...officers don't think like that. That would be a good study...what actually caused Custer to break contact at Washita after the initial village battle? I haven't studied that aspect closely before, but I'll bet it wasn't really because there were so many Indians around...we should look for other reasons he withdrew. Clair
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Post by conz on Mar 12, 2008 6:53:21 GMT -6
dc,
I'll further your education, since that seems to be solely my job here...
The Soldiers DID train their horses to withstand all kinds of fire, to include arrow fire, just as the Warriors did...all that is documented. Exactly how this was done was up to the vagaries of each NCO, and they could be very creative.
And the Soldiers did dismount and march in a square-type formation around their horses and wagons in many situations, in Europe and America. Doran has a great sketch of such a formation in his book Horsemanship at... in case you are really interested in learning something instead of wasting time trying to cut other people's reputation down to your level?
Clair
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Post by conz on Mar 12, 2008 6:55:40 GMT -6
DC, Correct me if I'm wrong, as I don't doubt you will, but I thought the general understanding of the purpose of the winter campaign was to "punish the Indians", unspecified. The Cheyenne had done much of the raiding earlier that year, along with the Arapahoes, but the army had also been fighting Kiowa and Comanche pretty frequently throughout the summer. Any band that had failed to comply with the government's directives was going to be fair game; it was just Black Kettle's bad luck ( pace CSS) that his was the one that the trail they found led to. We might note that destroying Black Kettle's village didn't end the campaign. They still had to hunt down other Cheyenne, Satanta's Kiowas, and so on. So while Custer's blow against the Cheyenne at Washita was demoralising, it was far from decisive -- there was plenty of unfinished business left to be dealt with. And his reason for leaving it like that was, basically, "too many Indians" ... You are right...it is silly to think that Custer or any cavalry force was trying to "parse out" the bad Indians from the good ones on this campaign. Custer was going to attack any random village he first could get his hands on. This wasn't a "police action." <g> Clair
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 12, 2008 7:22:17 GMT -6
I have missed the accounts where officers of the 7th Cavalry saw thousands riding around. Thousands means more than 2,000 right? The numbers lead to Crook backing off and Custer defeated hard to argue with that but I am confident you will.
Do you think Reno would have retreated if 50 Indians came charging toward him? Do you think 300 Indians could have been defeated Custer on his battlefield?
The numbers had a lot to do with the Indian attitude and determination to fight.
I agree that it should not be the only factor for trained soldiers. I find nothing to indicate that in close quarter and hand to hand combat that the officers of the 7th Cavalry should have any confidence in their ability to handle large numbers of Indians. They certainly weren't going to scare the Indians with their riding ability. The Indians could ride as well as they could on the average.
I also agree that the officer's choices determined their fate. I have only visited the battlefield 4 times and never with the intense study that his board invokes. I still have trouble with any defensive position in Custer Battlefield have sufficient open (200-300 yards) in front of any position for 360 degrees. This is where the numbers come in. The Indians had more than enough to probe for all weaknesses in force. They had sufficient concealment and cover to move close enough to bring it to their advantage in close quarters. That how see it anyway.
AZ Ranger
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Post by elisabeth on Mar 12, 2008 10:23:07 GMT -6
Clair,
I don't believe this is correct, because I don't think anyone expected, or even hoped, that both Gibbon's and Custer's force could be brought to the battlefield against the Natives together. That was beyond anyone's expectations, I think. The only references you see to "coordinating" the diverse columns is that if the Natives ran from one, they might run near the other, or Crook's. But I don't think it was ever anyone's plan for any columns to meet on any actual battlefield...that assumption I see posted around here now and then is rather incredulous to me.
So Custer, I do not think, has that option...he never should have considered that there might be a way to combine the two columns to attack the large village. He either had to attack alone, or there wasn't going to be any attacking it at all.
Agree that this is a somewhat contentious issue, and "co-ordinated" is perhaps the wrong word, but the fact remains that they'd brought along infantry, artillery, and another force of cavalry. A bit of a waste of time and resources if the intention all along was that Custer would/could/must do the job unaided, surely? If he did it'd be a bonus, obviously, but I'm not sure that's the mission he was tasked with ... Most of the pre-battle statements, including Custer's own, refer to this part of the expedition as "a scout". Naturally everyone thought he'd attack if he could -- Bradley and others said so, Terry (if the affidavit is true) said "hold on to your wounded", and Custer had roundly condemned Reno for not attacking on his scout -- but as I read it, possibly wrongly, the mission was primarily "search" rather than "search and destroy". Reno was criticised by Terry only for disobedience, not for failing to attack; if Custer's judgement had led him to the same decision at LBH, Terry would probably have accepted it just as readily, don't you think?
Except, of course, that Custer had painted himself into a corner by publicly slating Reno for that, so may have felt that he couldn't withdraw even when common sense told him to do so. Perhaps Benteen's verdict years later that "the newspapers killed Custer" was even truer than he knew. One could almost argue that had Custer not written that last newspaper report, he could have taken the retreat option with honour intact, and saved most of his command ...
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Post by conz on Mar 12, 2008 14:53:05 GMT -6
AZ,
To be sure, I'm not saying that numbers are irrelevant...I just don't want students to have an inflated perception of how important they are. The U.S. Army has always, throughout its history, been taught to fight outnumbered, and win, and not shirk at mere numbers.
But sure, if the Soldiers have knives and the Indians machine guns, that maybe the relative difference in weapons might have a greater impact on the outcome of the battle. <g>
Clair
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